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Title: Licensing Terms of Standard Essential Patents. A Comprehensive Analysis of Cases 
 
Abstract  
The prospect of licensing patents that are essential to standards on an industry-wide scale is a major incentive 
for companies to invest in standardization activities. Most standard development organizations (SDOs) have 
defined intellectual property rights (IPR) policies whereby SDO members must commit to licensing their standard-
essential patents (SEPs) on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. This study aims to provide 
a consistent framework for both the interpretation of FRAND commitments and the definition of FRAND royalties. 
Our methodology is built on the analysis of landmark and significant decisions taken by courts and competition 
authorities in Europe and worldwide. The purpose of the comparative analysis is to provide a comprehensive 
overview of how FRAND licensing terms have been defined in the evolving case law, while testing the economic 
soundness of the concepts and methodologies applied by courts and antitrust authorities. 
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PREFACE 
_________________________________________________________________ 
This report was prepared in the context of the three-year research project on 
European Innovation Policies for the Digital Shift (EURIPIDIS) jointly launched in 
2013 by JRC and DG CONNECT of the European Commission. This project aims to 
improve understanding of innovation in the ICT sector and ICT-enabled 
innovation in the rest of the economy.  
The purpose of the EURIPIDIS project is to provide evidence-based support to the 
policies, instruments and measurement needs of DG CONNECT for enhancing ICT 
Innovation in Europe, in the context of the Digital Agenda for Europe, of the 
European Digital Single Market, and of the ICT priority of Horizon 2020. It focuses 
on the improvement of the transfer of best research ideas to the market.  
EURIPIDIS aims to:  
 better understand how ICT innovation works, at the level of actors such as 
firms, and also of the ICT “innovation system” in the EU;  
 assess the EU's current ICT innovation performance, by attempting to 
measure ICT innovation in Europe and measuring the impact of existing 
policies and instruments (such as FP7 and Horizon 2020); and  
 explore and suggest how policy makers could make ICT innovation in the 
EU work better.  
Within EURIPIDIS, the present report undertakes a legal and economic analysis of 
FRAND in theory and practice and offers a set of policy recommendations at EU 
level in the context of SEP licensing1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
1  More information on the EURIPIDIS project is available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/euripidis 
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GLOSSARY 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project. A consortium of seven 
SSOs in the field of mobile telecommunication, including 
ETSI. 
ANSI  American National Standards Institute 
CCI  Competition Commission of India 
CJEU  Court of Justice of the European Union 
Disclosure Also SEP declaration. A statement by which the owner of an 
IPR informs an SSO that its IPR may be essential to a 
technology standard developed or under development at this 
SSO. To be distinguished from ex ante disclosure of 
licensing terms.  
DoJ  United States Department of Justice 
DSM  European Digital Single Market 
EMVR Entire Market Value Rule. Rule developed by the Supreme 
Court of the United States that determines under which 
conditions a patent owner is entitled to patent infringement 
damages based on the entire value of a product comprising 
more than the patented feature. 
Essential    See SEP 
ETSI  European Telecommunication Standards Institute 
Ex ante disclosure A statement made by a patent owner prior to standard 
development disclosing the most restrictive terms of the 
licenses the patent owner is prepared to offer all standard 
implementers in case the standard is set such that the 
patent becomes essential to this standard.  
Ex ante negotiation  Also Hypothetical ex ante negotiation. Concept used to 
determine a reasonable royalty by reference to the outcome 
of a hypothetical negotiation between a patent owner and 
an infringer that takes place before the beginning of the 
infringement. In the context of SEPs, the timing of the 
hypothetical ex ante negotiation is often modified, e.g., set 
before a standard was developed. 
FRAND Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory. Also Reasonable 
and Non-Discriminatory (RAND). Concept describes the 
licensing terms to be offered by the owner of an SEP to 
standard implementers. 
FTC  United States Federal Trade Commission 
Georgia-Pacific  List of 15 factors such as licensing royalties, comparable 
licenses, nature and scope of license, profitability of 
products, price and profit benchmarks etc. Routinely cited 
by U.S. courts or applied in a modified form, the Georgia-
Pacific factors have been advanced as an analytical 
framework for assessing FRAND damages. 
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications. An ETSI 
standard describing the protocols for 2G digital cellular 
networks used by mobile phones. First deployed in 1991, it 
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has become the default global standard for mobile 
communications. 
Hold-out Opportunistic conduct of a firm infringing on a patent and 
refusing to enter into a licensing agreement. Term coined in 
symmetry to the notion of [patent] hold-up.  
Hold-up  An opportunistic conduct whereby a party of an agreement 
exploits vagueness in the agreement to expropriate another 
party’s investment, which is specific to this agreement. In 
particular, patent hold-up designates an exorbitant royalty 
request made by a patent holder who led implementers to 
believe that they would be given more advantageous 
licensing conditions. The hold-up value is the additional 
value of the royalty that the patent holder is able to extract 
after the implementer has made irreversible investments to 
implement the patented technology. 
ICT  Information and Communication Technologies 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. The IEEE 
Standards Association (IEEE SA), which is part of IEEE, is an 
important SSO best known for developing the IEEE 802.11 
WiFi standard. 
Implementation  Production and/or sale of a product or service conforming to 
the requirements of a technology standard. 
Incremental value Value added by the patented feature to the product 
implementing the standard, in particular the incremental 
value over the next best alternative. 
IPR  Intellectual Property Right 
ITC United States International Trade Commission. A quasi-
judicial federal agency that provides trade policy advice to 
both the legislative and executive branches. The ITC also 
adjudicates cases involving imports that allegedly infringe 
intellectual property rights. It may order an import ban on 
products infringing patents similar to an injunction with the 
difference is that it only relates to imports of goods from 
other countries without affecting vendors who manufacture 
their products (or have them manufactured) within the US. 
ITU  International Telecommunications Union 
JFTC  Japanese Fair Trade Commission 
KFTC  Korean Fair Trade Commission 
LTE Long-Term Evolution. Standard for high-speed wireless 
communication for mobile phones and data terminals 
developed by 3GPP; commonly marketed as 4G technology, 
although it does not satisfy the technical criteria of a 4G 
wireless service, as specified in the 3GPP 
MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce (China). The Ministry enforces the 
merger control regime in China. 
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission (China). The 
antitrust agency responsible for price-related infringements 
such as price fixing. 
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NPE Non-practicing entity. A company owning patents that does 
not make or sell products or services practicing the patented 
technology. 
PAE Patent assertion entity. Company specializing in the 
assertion of patent rights against infringers. PAE are a 
special form of NPE. 
Patent pool Licensing instrument offering a single license to 
complementary patents owned by several patent holders. 
Patent pools do not own the patents included in the pool 
license, and typically do not assert the patents against 
infringers.  
Privateering  Transfer of the ownership of a patent or the right to enforce 
a patent from an operating company to a PAE. 
Royalty Payment in exchange for the license to use a patented 
technology. 
Royalty base  The price of a product or the price of a component of a 
product that is used to determine the royalty that must be 
paid to a patent owner for the product’s use of a patented 
feature. 
Royalty rate  Percentage applied to the price of a product (or alternative 
royalty base) to determine the amount of the royalty. 
Royalty stacking  Market failure that may result when owners of 
complementary patents do not coordinate the royalties that 
they request for the use of their patents. If royalty stacking 
occurs, the sum of the individual payments requested by the 
different patent owners is higher than the payment that a 
single firm would have requested if it owned all the 
complementary patents. 
SAIC State Administration for Industry and Commerce (China). 
The antitrust agency responsible for non-price-related 
infringements. 
SEP Standard-essential patent. A patent that is necessarily 
practiced by any implementation of a technology standard 
SDO (also SSO) Standard Development Organization (also Standard Setting 
Organization). Organization that develops (sets) technology 
standards. Term includes: formal SDOs and informal 
consortia; organizations like ANSI that do not develop their 
own standards, but accredit other organizations to develop 
standards; organizations like 3GPP that develop technical 
specifications, which are published as standards by other 
organizations. 
SSPPU Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Unit. In the US case law, 
SSPPU refers to a component of a product that can be used 
as a royalty base. 
Standard Also technical standard or technology standard. Technical 
document that describes uniform technical requirements.  
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System. A 3G mobile 
cellular system for networks developed and maintained by 
the 3GPP, also a component of the ITU IMT-2000 standard. 
USDC  United States District Courts 
 9 
WiFi Wireless Fidelity. It is based on the IEEE 802.11 family of 
standards and is primarily a wireless local area networking 
(WLAN) technology designed to provide in-building 
broadband coverage. The 802.11 standard defines an over-
the-air interface between a wireless client and a base station 
or between two wireless clients. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
_________________________________________________________________ 
I.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
The prospect of licensing patents that are essential to standards on an industry-
wide scale is a major incentive for companies to invest in standardization 
activities. However, the exclusive rights conferred by patents on inventors may 
defeat the objective of making standards available to all for public use. In order 
to address this tension, most standard development organizations (SDOs) have 
defined intellectual property rights (IPR) policies whereby SDO members must 
commit to licensing their standard-essential patents (SEPs) on Fair, Reasonable 
and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. These commitments are meant to 
protect technology implementers while ensuring that patent holders receive an 
appropriate reward for their investments in research and development. 
The rapid evolution of information and communication technologies (ICT), coupled 
with the need for wider and deeper interconnectivity in view of the Internet of 
Things (IoT), has led to a variety of SEP owners and implementers with different 
business models and to greater diversity of licensing practices. As a result, it has 
become more difficult to identify a consensual interpretation of FRAND licensing 
principles. In this context, the recent increase in patent litigation in the 
smartphone industry has sparked controversy with regards to the implications of 
FRAND commitments, although SEPs actually account for only a small share of 
litigated patents. The controversy has been further fuelled by a number of 
economic arguments that question the ability of FRAND commitment to ensure 
that royalty rates for SEPs are in fact "reasonable." Specifically, the fact that 
licensing takes place after the setting of a standard raises concerns that FRAND 
commitments are too loose to effectively prevent SEP owners from unduly 
leveraging market power once the standard is implemented (“hold-up” argument) 
or, on the contrary, that they enable implementers to deliberately avoid seeking 
licenses for SEPs (“hold-out” argument). Moreover, the "royalty stacking" 
argument contends that the fragmentation of SEP ownership leads to an 
excessively high royalty stack. However, the strongly polarized public debate 
around the meaning of FRAND is essentially based on theoretical arguments, and 
there is a lack of solid empirical evidence on the prevalence of royalty stacking, 
hold-up and/or hold-out problems.  
The present study aims to provide a consistent framework for both the 
interpretation of FRAND commitments and the definition of FRAND royalties. Our 
methodology is built on the analysis of landmark and significant decisions taken 
by courts and competition authorities in Europe and worldwide. The purpose of 
the comparative analysis is to provide a comprehensive overview of how FRAND 
licensing terms have been defined in the evolving case law, while testing the 
economic soundness of the concepts and methodologies applied by courts and 
antitrust authorities. 
 
II.  COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
Most cases before courts and competition authorities concerning SEPs are related 
to patent infringement damages, injunctions or antitrust. A comprehensive 
comparative analysis of a wide body of case law reveals the following:  
Idiosyncrasies of SEP litigation: Complexities in the technologies and licensing 
practices of SEPs have challenged well-established methodologies and doctrines 
applicable in the general context of patent infringement. Over time, courts have 
questioned the “real-world applicability” of existing frameworks and evidentiary 
rules, leading to modifications and adjustments in the specific context of FRAND. 
 11 
As a result, courts have introduced economic guideposts into the legal analysis. 
Moreover, within the context of SEP litigation, different standards have different 
dispute profiles - with the IEEE 802.11 standards attracting the most litigation 
across various jurisdictions. Portfolio licensing as an established market practice 
is also becoming the norm in FRAND litigation. The mix of SEP and non-SEPs 
(FRAND and non-FRAND-encumbered patents) imposes an additional burden on 
value apportionment and damage calculation.  
Incentive compatibility and fair balance of interests: Across various 
jurisdictions worldwide, policymakers aim for a definition of FRAND that strikes a 
balance between the need to make standards available on the one hand, and 
fairly compensate SEP holders on the other. This approach is motivated by the 
necessity of protecting the rights and legitimate interests of patent owners and 
standard users, taking into account the broader public interest and welfare. 
Policymakers recognize the importance of the FRAND definition for economic 
incentives, including the incentives to innovate, to participate in standard 
development, and to rapidly implement and adopt innovative technology 
standards. Moreover, the risk of hold-up is considered a significant factor for the 
determination of FRAND royalties, even though its empirical relevance is 
disputed. US courts require supporting evidence that a party behaved in bad faith 
before considering hold-up for damages calculation. 
Converging practice on injunctions: The decision of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in Huawei v. ZTE has enhanced convergence across the 
European national jurisdictions by emphasizing the need for good faith in 
negotiations toward an actual result over the initial offer of the licensee: 
injunctions are no longer granted automatically without further consideration of 
the parties’ conduct in the light of their relevant bargaining power. The economic 
analysis of FRAND licensing highlights the pivotal role of injunctions in mitigating 
potential harm stemming from bargaining failure and patent hold-up. At the same 
time, the jurisprudence of the CJEU and national courts in Europe increasingly 
leverage the award of injunctive relief against unwilling licensees as a means of 
strengthening bilateral negotiations as the principal forum for determining FRAND 
licensing terms. The availability of injunctive relief for SEP owners is more 
restricted in other jurisdictions, including the US, Japan and China. Especially in 
the US, where injunctions are generally considered inappropriate when a patent 
owner is committed to licensing his patents, the courts play a more active role in 
determining the licensing terms when negotiations come to an impasse. 
Evaluation of conduct v. emphasis on royalty rates: In the US, reasonable 
royalties are the most frequent kind of damages awarded in patent cases and 
comprise a greater share with each passing year. Reasonable royalties aim to 
award the owner of an infringed patent damages that are proportional to those 
that the patent owner and the infringer would have agreed upon in a hypothetical 
negotiation before infringement began. While the guiding principle of the 
hypothetical negotiation framework is theoretically viable, it is inherently difficult 
to implement in practice. In order to determine a single royalty rate deriving from 
a hypothetical agreement of this kind, US courts are methodologically 
sophisticated when they approach FRAND. In contrast, European courts are more 
reluctant to define a single royalty rate. Instead, they focus on the conduct of the 
parties during the bilateral negotiations and assess whether it complies with the 
specific FRAND commitments made prior to awarding injunctions. 
Core principles of FRAND: FRAND does not describe a single rate, but a range 
of rates. Therefore, courts suggest a specific analysis for the FRAND calculation 
that extends beyond the apportionment of the value of the infringing product to 
the infringed patent typical for the determination of royalties in the general 
context of damages. In addition to preventing hold-up, this specific analysis 
follows the two core principles of the ex ante negotiation benchmark: 
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i) every judicial analysis of FRAND should take place in the framework of the 
hypothetical bilateral negotiation set prior to standard development if there is 
evidence that the patent owner modified its royalty requests in response to the 
standard adoption, and ii) the incremental value of the patent, i.e., the FRAND 
royalty rate should be apportioned to the incremental value of the patent.  
In the interpretation by the courts, however, the notion of the patent’s 
“incremental value” tends to conflate two concepts, which should be analyzed 
separately: the stand-alone (intrinsic) value of the patented technology and the 
value added by the patent to the standard (incremental). Both are relevant for 
the definition of the FRAND range. 
Methodologies for calculating the FRAND royalty: Acceptable methodologies 
use two sources of observable data, namely the prices of comparable licenses and 
a royalty base (prices of either the infringing product or a component of this 
product that practices the patented technology). Although subject to correctives, 
they reveal useful benchmarks to actual values and established practices and help 
the courts inform their decisions on the many aspects of royalty calculation. Not 
measurable directly but approached through proxies, royalty determination has 
become more technical and fact-intensive, revealing existing evidentiary 
challenges and data constraints. Related evidence must be reliable and tangible, 
not conjectural or speculative. There is uncertainty around the appropriateness 
and sufficiency of submitted evidence (comparable licenses, economic modelling 
based on market and survey data, etc.). Most royalty determinations establish a 
FRAND royalty by determining the share of the value of a specific royalty base 
that is attributable to the patented feature. Regarding the royalty base, the 
choice between the price of the end product and the price of a smaller component 
lies at the heart of an ongoing controversy in the US – it should also be 
remembered that the new IEEE policy chooses the smallest saleable patent 
practicing unit (SSPPU). Both approaches, however, are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, and provide useful pointers for the FRAND determination. 
 
III.  OVERARCHING PRINCIPLES OF FRAND 
FRAND is a range. There is no accepted methodology for singling out a unique 
value within the range. The FRAND royalty rate must reflect the following 
benchmarks:  
Ex ante negotiation benchmark: The outcome of a hypothetical ex ante 
bilateral negotiation between the patent owner and the implementer of the 
standard practicing the patented feature (or auction); 
Incremental value added contributed by the patented feature to the product, 
which is implementing the standard (in particular, the incremental value over the 
next best alternative); 
Ex ante value of the patented feature, i.e., the intrinsic value of the patented 
feature excluding any additional value resulting from the inclusion of the feature 
into the standard; 
Incentive compatibility: A FRAND royalty rate preserves the incentives to 
invent, to contribute patented technology to the standard, and to adopt 
technology standards including SEPs; 
FRAND royalties should account for royalty stacking and concerns of patent 
hold-up. 
The above benchmarks describe a (potentially wide) FRAND range. Many different 
rates may be compatible with the ex ante negotiation benchmark and the 
economic incentives to develop and adopt technology standards. The incremental 
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value added by the patent to the standard and the ex ante value of the patent 
describe different boundaries of the FRAND range.  
 
IV.  LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW ON 
FRAND 
 
FRAND is a range 
The theoretical concepts behind FRAND and the empirical data that is available to 
determine FRAND rates for specific patents and products merely allow for the 
determination of a (potentially wide) FRAND range – not a unique FRAND rate. 
The FRAND commitment does not determine future licensing rates that will be 
negotiated between patent holders and standard implementers with scientific 
precision. In practice, explicit royalty caps or ex ante disclosure of the most 
restrictive licensing terms play only a limited role in the current landscape for SEP 
licensing. FRAND continues to be by far the most important regulatory 
instrument, and policies allowing or requiring more explicit commitments 
complement rather than replace the role of FRAND. Future policies for SEP 
licensing will probably continue to confer importance on FRAND commitments. 
Further developing FRAND as a regulatory instrument for the future of SEP 
licensing requires that we understand and acknowledge that FRAND, by design 
and by necessity, defines a range - not a rate. 
 
FRAND is a range that accommodates various approaches regarding its 
legal nature and economic function  
Prevalent legal views are that:  
 the FRAND commitment creates an obligation for the SEP owner to offer every 
potential implementer the right to use the patented technology on reasonable 
conditions that are negotiated in good faith (contract law), or  
 non-compliance with FRAND equals an abuse of a dominant position (antitrust 
law).  
 In both cases, FRAND allows for a potentially wide range of behaviors and 
terms that are non-abusive without any rate specifications.  
Prevalent economic views on FRAND are that:  
 FRAND balances the incentives to contribute to standard development with 
the incentives to adopt and implement standards including SEPs (welfare 
maximization), or 
 the obligation to FRAND licensing restores the prices that would result from a 
competitive process in the absence of specific market failures (patent hold-up 
and royalty stacking).  
Both economic theories on FRAND converge, and neither requires or allows the 
definition of a single FRAND rate. 
 
The determination of the FRAND range is challenging and often error-
prone 
The boundaries of the FRAND range are determined by a comparison of factual 
data with counterfactual equilibria such as the development of an alternative 
standard not including the patented feature, alternative uses of the standard, etc. 
Product market prices, including the prices of end products and components, may 
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reveal the implementer’s willingness to pay for the patented feature, which 
constitutes the upper bound of the bargaining range. Comparable licenses 
indicate some rates that were acceptable to similarly situated parties, thus 
revealing only individual points out of a potentially wide range of acceptable 
agreements. The available empirical data thus neither reveal the entire FRAND 
range nor specify a single FRAND rate. In order to arrive at a single FRAND rate, 
courts have developed evidentiary rules that place restrictions on the 
methodologies that can be used for calculating FRAND rates (e.g., EMVR, SSPPU, 
restrictions on comparable licenses), but these rules are often at odds with the 
principles of FRAND. 
 
There are limits to what courts can do or should be expected to do 
Evidentiary rules and sophisticated methodologies developed by the US courts for 
the calculation of FRAND royalties are not particularly useful in the European 
context. These tools are designed to assist the US courts in determining a single 
FRAND rate. In contrast, in the context of injunctions, European courts have 
focused on defining the conditions under which the conduct of the negotiating 
parties is incompatible with their FRAND obligations. Against this background, 
policies that support market mechanisms and conditions conducive to bilateral 
negotiations and their proper conduct as early on as possible can enhance clarity 
around the definition of FRAND and restore legal certainty in the field of SEPs. 
 
V.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The various approaches and divergent outcomes of FRAND disputes across 
national jurisdictions worldwide – due not so much to fundamental disparities on 
what constitutes FRAND as to differences in litigation profiles, competition 
dynamics and political priorities – have a significant impact on the incentives to 
innovate, implement and participate in standard setting. The interlocking 
incentive structure of FRAND highlights the need for a specific approach to related 
policymaking: 
 
Incentive-based approach to FRAND  
The need for a balanced framework for negotiations between right holders and 
implementers of SEPs to ensure fair licensing conditions has been advocated for 
the European Digital Single Market (DSM). FRAND is a dynamic, commercially 
viable concept that accommodates various business models while facilitating 
worldwide access to standard-compliant products and services for millions of 
consumers and households. However, it needs to reflect the current market 
diversity and dynamics within an enlarged circle of stakeholders so that 
innovators receive market-based financial returns and that, at the same time, 
implementers receive market-based licensing terms. Economically consistent 
policymaking should take the incentives of both sides into account in order to 
promote healthy competition at the micro level with beneficial impact at the 
macro level.  
 
More clarity on FRAND through a common framework  
FRAND has the potential to control opportunistic behaviour, enhance competition 
and evaluate licensing arrangements under a “reasonable” framework. The 
FRAND principles constitute a powerful tool that could affect norms on a systemic 
level. By focusing the FRAND analysis on the requirements of willingness in the 
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context of bilateral negotiations, CJEU jurisprudence has paved the way to a 
common framework that facilitates negotiations between the licensing parties. 
Informed policy action should be designed to deepen and expand this common 
framework by addressing specific types of licensing conduct and clarifying the 
conditions under which FRAND compliance can be excluded or presumed – the 
devil is in the details where FRAND is concerned. European policy action should 
encourage more clarity and flexibility in the definition of FRAND. Articulating a 
common set of criteria and guidelines for practice – anchored in a clear definition 
of FRAND – could facilitate private negotiations, enhance due diligence on behalf 
of the parties, limit the need to seek a third-party determination of a FRAND rate 
and, in the case of litigation, help courts set convergent standards while allowing 
for flexibility on a case-by-case basis. To that end, policy guidance pertaining to 
the various aspects of FRAND should focus on identifying behavior and rates that 
clearly fall outside the FRAND scope (i.e., define what is not FRAND), rather than 
supporting economic guideposts and evidentiary rules that isolate a single rate. 
After the courts, antitrust authorities play a significant role by sanctioning 
conduct that is incompatible with firms’ patent rights or FRAND obligations. 
However, the implementation of the FRAND range in practice should not aim to 
calculate a single royalty rate – an effort that has proven to be at odds with 
economic considerations and the diversity of established legal traditions across 
the various jurisdictions. Against this background, the European approach, which 
ties FRAND compliance to the conduct of the negotiating parties, is more likely to 
result in economically efficient royalty rates. It encourages parties to do their due 
diligence, and to negotiate licenses as early as possible by avoiding delaying 
tactics and opportunism. 
 
Governance in the 5G markets  
SDOs are encouraged to increase their efforts towards a common framework for 
FRAND licensing through enhanced clarity and predictability. The impact of the 
IEEE policy update on the governance of standardization is significant, even 
though its counterpart organizations, including major European standardization 
bodies such as ETSI, have decided not to emulate its example and, instead, leave 
the determination of FRAND rates to the negotiating parties. Nevertheless, the 
development and deployment of 5G means that SDOs will have to work in 
tandem. In view of the next generation of mobile standards, standard setting on 
a global scale and market-led (rather than business-led) SDO policies will 
determine the success of innovation. Considering the increased influence of 
societal groups and vertical industry players (transportation, life sciences, energy, 
etc.) involved in standard setting, a well-coordinated relationship between 5G 
players and these actors will confirm the viability of standard setting governance 
and render 5G infrastructure a booster for vertical markets. 
 
Complementing FRAND with other instruments 
The complex issues at the interface of IPR and standardization and a proper 
balance between the interests of the manifold parties involved cannot be achieved 
through a single instrument. SDOs and other actors have various means at their 
disposal to further support the bilateral process of licensing negotiations. In 
particular, SDOs can make a significant contribution by increasing patent 
transparency in standardization working groups. According to the outcome of the 
Public Consultation on Patents and Standards held by the Commission from 
October 2014 to February 2015, there is broad support for early patent disclosure 
during standard setting. Such transparency-enhancing measures would help 
SDOs and their technical committees make informed choices and notably avoid 
situations where adopted standards cannot be implemented for lack of necessary 
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licenses. In addition to requiring IPR disclosure and licensing commitments, 
several SDOs have adopted policies to encourage patent pool formation. Patent 
pools are often regarded as a promising solution to several of the perceived or 
real market failures in SEP licensing, and in particular the risk of royalty stacking. 
However, their role in the SEP licensing market remains limited.  
 
Advocacy at global level 
The incentives that drive today’s ICT markets and portfolio licensing practices are 
established globally. In this context, FRAND obligations are subject to reasonable 
access to increasingly important standards related to 5G and Internet of Things 
technologies that amplify the benefits for competition and consumers globally. 
While competition and antitrust policies will continue to be shaped at a regional 
level, global advocacy and the ongoing dialogue between European policymakers 
and their counterparts in the US, China and the rest of the world could counteract 
the potentially distortive effects of domestic policies by exploring common ground 
and identifying best practices that safeguard the interests of society as a whole.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.1.  BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
The area of standardization is a rapidly changing and complex environment 
characterized by complementary technologies with high functionality, short 
lifecycles, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) intensity, market deregulation, fierce 
competition and litigation. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
standards are perceived as the foundation of interoperability and the success of 
new products that interact seamlessly with existing devices, platforms and 
ecosystems. Consensus building among the various stakeholders is therefore an 
essential determinant of standard-setting processes, a platform critical to 
ensuring wide market distribution and acceptance of innovative services and 
applications. The presence of network externalities and the strong public interest 
dimension of standardization processes spur a highly dynamic field of intricate 
structures and far-reaching policy implications. The business landscape around 
standardization spans a vast array of industries in telecommunications, 
computers, and audio-video consumer electronics. It is a heterogeneous 
landscape where the various specificities of these industries render it often 
difficult to align the conflicting interests of upstream and downstream players 
with those of research-based players.  
EU policies and scientific evidence indicate clearly that ICT are important for 
growth and productivity. On the one hand, technological progress in ICT-
producing sectors is an important driver of growth, as evidenced by its role in the 
productivity acceleration observed in the late 90s in the US. On the other hand, 
ICT-enabled innovation in ICT–using sectors has provided the base for permanent 
and widespread growth-enhancing effects of ICT adoption throughout the 
economy.  
The Digital Single Market (DSM) is one of the ten priorities of the European 
Commission (EC). The seamless functioning of the DSM is expected to generate 
up to EUR 250 billion of additional growth in Europe before 2020. In the digital 
economy, the EC has recognized the importance of standard-essential patents 
(SEPs), patents on technologies that are necessary for every implementation of a 
standard, as an increasingly important feature in standardization and an 
important element of the business model for many industries in terms of asset 
monetizing and return on R&D investment.2  
The complexity of standards in ICT creates tension where there should be an 
effort to strike a balance between the importance to reward innovation and the 
high stakes in enabling wider access to these technologies.  
Standards are ubiquitous in ICT industries due to the strong need for 
interoperability in this field. Many of them are “formal” standards that are set on 
the basis of consensus among industry stakeholders who are members of 
Standard Development Organizations (SDOs). These standards facilitate the 
deployment of new technologies on the largest possible scale and create a level 
playing field for competition in related product markets. They are usually complex 
technology platforms that include a large number of patented inventions 
contributed by the participants.  
The prospect of licensing patents that are essential to standards on an industry-
wide scale plays an important role in companies’ incentives to invest in 
                                           
2  COM(2015)192 of 6.05.2015: A Digital Single Market in Europe; available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0192. 
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standardization activities, besides other motivations such as directing the 
standard development towards technological solutions where the respective 
company is strong and can offer specific services or infrastructure. However, the 
exclusive rights conferred by patents on inventors may defeat the objective of 
making standards available to all for public use. In order to address this tension, 
most SDOs have defined IPR policies whereby SDO members must commit to 
licensing their SEPs on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms.3 
These commitments are meant to protect technology implementers while 
ensuring that patent holders receive an appropriate reward for their investments 
in research and development. The EC has led numerous public events and 
published related reports in the context of FRAND licensing terms. The most 
recent reports underline the importance of evidence-based policy making and 
point out the need for additional insight in well-specified areas within the evolving 
landscape of IPR markets and standardization – to include the clarification of 
FRAND licensing terms (e.g., Bekkers et al., 2014; Ménière, 2015; 
Pentheroudakis, 2015; EC Public Consultation Report, 2015). 
As a consequence of increasing technology sophistication, implementers now 
need to use a growing number of standards with a larger number of SEPs per 
standard. Moreover, IPR policies used to be defined at a time when standards 
were developed and implemented by a limited number of similar companies who 
used to cross-license their patent portfolios. In contrast, there are now more SEP 
owners and implementers with different business models and a larger variety of 
licensing practices. The increased number of SEPs owner, implementers, and 
practices can be linked to the evolution of even more complex technologies, the 
multifunctional integration of different technologies and the development of 
specific services and applications that go beyond initial purpose functions such as 
communication. As a result, it has become more difficult to identify a consensual 
interpretation of FRAND licensing principles. In this context, the recent increase in 
patent litigation in the smartphone industry has sparked controversy regarding 
the implications of FRAND commitments, although SEPs actually account for only 
a small share of litigated patents.4  
The controversy has been further fuelled by a number of economic arguments 
that question the ability of FRAND commitment to ensure that royalty rates for 
SEPs are in fact "reasonable." The "royalty stacking" argument contends that the 
fragmentation of SEP ownership leads to an excessively high royalty stack. 
Moreover, the fact that licensing takes place after the setting of a standard raises 
concerns either that FRAND commitments are too loose to effectively prevent SEP 
owners from unduly leveraging market power once the standard is implemented 
(“hold-up” argument) or, on the contrary, that they enable implementers to 
deliberately avoid seeking licenses for SEPs (“hold-out” argument). The hold-up 
problem, in particular, is central to the public debates where it provides a 
consistent framework for both the interpretation of FRAND commitments and the 
definition of FRAND royalties. It also qualifies the SEP holder’s behavior as an 
abuse of dominant position, thus opening the door to the intervention of 
competition authorities in matters of FRAND licensing.  
                                           
3  The precise language of the licensing commitment varies by jurisdiction. In the United 
States, participants in a standard-setting organization may commit to licensing patents 
that are essential to a standard on “reasonable and non-discriminatory” (RAND) terms, 
whereas in Europe and other jurisdictions, they may commit to licensing such patents 
on terms that are “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” (FRAND). For purposes of 
this paper, “FRAND” refers to FRAND and RAND commitments. 
4  Gupta & Snyder (2014) find that “less than one-third of the patents involved in smart 
phone litigation can be characterized as SEPs.” 
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1.2.  OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
The present debate on FRAND is strongly polarized. In this context, the absence 
of verifiable, publicly available information on negotiated royalty rates is 
accompanied by a lack of solid empirical evidence on many of the concerns 
underlying the FRAND debate - in particular, royalty stacking, hold-up and/or 
hold-out. Given the limitations of the available information, the debate has 
essentially focused either on theoretical legal and economic arguments or on the 
analysis of specific FRAND disputes.  
Additional clarity on a common framework for FRAND licensing would benefit 
industry stakeholders and consumers alike. Responding to this need, the present 
study is the first to review the existing body of case law on FRAND and achieve a 
comprehensive overview of the ways FRAND licensing terms for SEPs are 
determined by courts and competition authorities in Europe and worldwide. 
Despite significant differences in practice, we detect an emerging consensus 
around specific concepts used for the definition of FRAND and the determination 
of a FRAND rate in specific disputes. We rely on the legal and economic literature 
to interpret these concepts and propose a unified framework. In other words, we 
bridge theory and practice based on a comparative case law analysis, while 
testing the economic soundness of the methodologies applied by courts and 
antitrust authorities. In doing so, we do not invoke theoretical concepts or 
economic analysis to argue for a particular interpretation of FRAND, or to suggest 
how FRAND should be defined in order to achieve specific public policy objectives. 
Instead, we offer an interpretation of the concepts applied in the case law and - 
with reference to extensive legal and economic literature - evaluate whether the 
adopted empirical methodologies achieve the judges’ stated objectives for the 
FRAND determination. 
Our joint (legal and economic) assessment of the different solutions in the various 
jurisdictions to common legal problems seeks to infuse greater clarity in the 
meaning of SEP licensing terms as well as mitigate legal uncertainty through a 
common framework for FRAND. By “common framework” we mean a set of 
interconnected patterns and fundamental principles that claim wide applicability 
without undermining the importance of ex post contractual flexibility as a source 
of economic value.  
The study is divided in four parts: 
 Theories of FRAND. We begin with a systematic overview of how economic 
and legal literature has interpreted FRAND and SEP licensing terms. The 
theoretical considerations of subject-matter experts and scholars serve as a 
springboard for the subsequent analysis of case law.  
 Comparative case study analysis. We perform a comparative analysis of 
recent FRAND disputes, including court decisions, antitrust cases and the new 
IEEE policy (cf text box page 167). The scope of the case studies is global 
with a focus on Europe and the US. Cases are selected according to pre-
established criteria in order to ensure wide coverage of judicial practices and 
the various interpretations of FRAND. 
 Comprehensive analysis of FRAND licensing. We provide a comprehensive 
overview of SEP licensing terms and combine the concepts used in the case 
law for the determination of FRAND rates into a consistent framework. We 
argue that this framework defines a potentially broad range of FRAND rates. 
We discuss how the theoretical concepts defining FRAND have been 
implemented using empirical data, and we critically assess the merits of 
specific evidentiary rules conceived to facilitate the practical implementation 
of FRAND. 
 Public policy analysis. We recast FRAND in the broader policy context and 
provide relevant policy recommendations at the European level. The public 
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policy analysis will look at the implications of SEP licensing in the European 
policy framework by bridging the theoretical underpinnings, case studies and 
the comprehensive analysis of SEP licensing terms.  
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2.  THEORIES OF FRAND 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
In this section, we discuss the prevalent theories of FRAND in the economic and 
legal literature. The purpose of this section is to kick off our research with a 
scholarly view of FRAND before delving into a comparative case law analysis of 
FRAND in Part 3. Furthermore, we will show in Part 4 that our own analytical 
approach to FRAND is not only in line with the case law on FRAND, but also 
accommodates the dominant theories regarding the economic function and the 
legal nature of the FRAND obligation. 
Section 2.1. analyzes the economic function of FRAND. The economic literature on 
the role of FRAND can be divided into two different streams of research: first, one 
body of research analyzes the implications of FRAND licensing terms for economic 
incentives to develop and contribute standardized technologies. Second, another 
body of research analyzes specific market failures in the determination of royalty 
rates; and in particular the risks of royalty stacking and patent hold-up. This 
literature attempts to formulate an interpretation of FRAND, which minimizes the 
impact of these market failures and restores the licensing terms, which would 
result from a competitive technology market. 
Section 2.2. draws on a growing body of legal scholarship regarding FRAND 
commitments in the standard-setting context. It approaches the nature of FRAND 
commitments through the lens of various legal doctrines and demonstrates how 
questions of patent, contract and competition law intersect. Against the 
background of an apparently fractured licensing system, it presents how courts 
and enforcement authorities weigh in to define the meaning of FRAND and how 
the incentives of different legal and regulatory regimes impact that process. 
 
2.1.  THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF FRAND 
2.1.1.  FRAND and incentives to contribute to standard 
development 
On the supply side, FRAND licensing terms define the incentives to contribute to 
development. These incentives comprise two different aspects: first, the 
incentives to develop new standard-essential technology, and second, the 
incentives of the owners of existing technologies to participate in standard 
development and make their technologies available for integration into a 
standard. 
 
2.1.1.1.  FRAND and incentives to develop standard-essential 
 technology 
Industry standards are generally intended for use by an entire industry, and the 
benefit of innovative technology standards accrues to large numbers of actors 
(Kindleberger, 1982). Nevertheless, the effort of developing the technology to be 
included in standards is often borne by only small numbers of firms voluntarily 
contributing to standard development in SDOs. Studying 3GPP, a particularly 
important SDO with more than 450 member companies, Baron & Gupta (2016) 
find that between 58% and 75% of all contributions are submitted by only 10 
firms. The wide discrepancy between the number of standard users and the 
number of active contributors to standard development is a potential problem, 
because firms may have insufficient incentives to contribute to the standard, 
 22 
when the benefits, albeit not the costs, of these efforts are shared with other 
firms.  
SEPs may allow their owners to generate economic profits, and can therefore play 
an important role in incentivizing research and development (R&D) that produces 
standard-essential technology. From a theoretical point of view, the incentives to 
innovate provided by SEPs can be stronger or weaker than the incentives 
provided by the patent system in other contexts. On the one hand, SEPs may be 
particularly effective at inducing R&D, because the inclusion of a patented 
invention in standard is likely to generate additional demand for licenses to this 
patent. Rysman and Simcoe (2008) find that the number of citations to a patent 
increases if the patent is declared essential to a standard, and argue that their 
findings reflect an increase in the use of the patented invention due to its 
inclusion in the standard. On the other hand, SDO policies often require owners of 
SEPs to license these patents on FRAND terms, which prevent them from 
charging excessive royalties or excluding competitors from using their technology. 
Overall, the remuneration of SEPs – even when it is regulated by FRAND terms – 
appears to be attractive. Many SEPs are found to generate substantial economic 
revenues, e.g., through licensing (Stasik, 2010). Pohlmann and Blind (2015) find 
that firms owning SEPs achieve higher returns on assets than firms owning other 
patents. The highest returns on assets are achieved by firms owning a mix of 
declared SEPs and other, non-essential patents. Hussinger and Schwiebacher 
(2015) study the effect of patents on the market value of a firm’s stocks, and find 
that the number of declared SEPs correlates with a firm’s market value, also if 
controlling for the number of patents in general. These studies suggest that SEPs 
can generate higher economic returns for their owners than other patents.5 
This economic return on SEPs determines the incentives to develop technologies 
that could become part of a technology standard. Baron et al. (2014) study 
patent-driven innovation for technology standards and find evidence for both 
over- and underinvestment in patenting standard-essential technology. This 
suggests that, depending on the characteristics of the standard, the economic 
return to SEPs could be either excessive or insufficient to induce the socially 
desirable level of innovation. R&D coordination between innovating firms can 
mitigate either type of inefficiency. 
SEP owners also have incentives to invest resources in the improvement, 
maintenance, or promotion of the standard including their technology to insure 
that industry implementers keep using the standard. Studying a sample of SDOs 
which all practice a FRAND licensing policy, Baron et al. (2016) find that 
standards including SEPs are revised more regularly and survive longer than 
other, comparable standards issued by the same SDOs. This is particularly true if 
the SEP ownership is concentrated within a few firms. 
Several authors voice the concern that FRAND remuneration of SEPs not only 
incentivizes firms to invest in the development or improvement of a standard, but 
also to engage in rent-seeking with no value contribution to the standard. 
Dewatripont and Legros (2013) argue that if the contribution of a patented 
invention to the value of a standard is difficult to observe, FRAND licensing 
policies induce an over-investment in patenting with respect to the social 
optimum. Bekkers and West (2008) document a strong increase in the number of 
patent declarations over time and argue that the obligation to license SEPs on 
FRAND terms has proven insufficient to limit this “proliferation” of patents. Some 
authors claim to provide evidence for opportunistic strategies, through which 
                                           
5  These studies do not establish a causal effect of essentiality. In particular, it is possible 
that the correlation between essentiality and value is due to reverse causality, because 
more valuable patents are more likely to be declared essential. 
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firms obtain a larger number of SEPs without increasing their contribution to 
standard development. Berger et al. (2012) document that many applicants at 
the European Patent Office (EPO) amend their patent applications, while a 
standard is under development, in order to match the claims of their patents with 
the content of the future standard. Bekkers and Kang (2015) find that patent 
applications are often filed “just in time” before standardization meetings. It is 
however unclear how these criticized opportunistic strategies differ from 
legitimate efforts to secure ownership over patentable inventions. 
 
2.1.1.2.  FRAND and incentives to participate in SDOs 
The attractiveness of FRAND licensing terms for patent owners also determines 
the incentives of the owners of existing proprietary technologies to contribute to 
standard development. Owners of existing patents may choose to keep their 
patented technology out of the standard in order to maintain full freedom over 
the licensing terms. The standard may, consequently, not include the most 
efficient technology available at the time of development. FRAND licensing terms 
must therefore provide sufficient incentives for the owners of existing patents to 
contribute their technology to standard development.  
Layne–Farrar et al. (2014), for instance, argue that a rule which limits the 
remuneration of SEPs to the incremental value added by the patent over the 
next-best alternative provides insufficient incentives to the owners of existing 
patents to participate in the standard development effort. Empirically, Stoll 
(2015) has shown that a rule change at an SDO from FRAND terms based 
licensing to royalty-free licensing induced firms owning patented technologies to 
leave the SDO. Contreras (2011) analyzes the effects of a less dramatic policy 
change at two SDOs, namely the adoption of a policy, which encourages patent 
owners to disclose their most restrictive licensing terms before a standard is set 
such as to include the patented technology. This study finds no evidence that this 
policy had a negative effect on contributions to standard development. 
Opponents of strict licensing requirements thus argue that such a policy could 
disincentivize patent owners to participate in the SDO. Based on a similar 
argument, Lerner and Tirole (2006) formulate a model of forum shopping, in 
which SDOs compete with other SDOs to attract owners of patented technologies. 
They predict that owners of more valuable inventions select into SDOs with less 
stringent licensing restrictions. Chiao et al. (2007) empirically test the 
implications of this model. They confirm that SDOs more oriented to technology 
sponsors make greater concessions to patent owners, and show that the 
significance of this relationship depends on the intensity of competition between 
SDOs. Lerner and Tirole (2015) elaborate on the policy relevance of these 
arguments, arguing that competition between SDOs to attract technology 
sponsors forces SDOs to adopt overly permissive licensing polices. They conclude 
from these findings that free competition between SDOs will fail to produce 
socially desirable licensing policies and thus argue for tighter regulatory oversight 
to impose stricter licensing policies. 
The empirical relevance of the arguments regarding forum shopping is disputed. 
Tsai and Wright (2014) review rule changes in a sample of SDOs. The authors 
find that the licensing policies of SDOs appear to be responsive to risks and 
problems associated with the inclusion of patented technologies. In contrast to 
Lerner & Tirole (2006, 2015), this study thus suggests that competition between 
SDOs could result in socially efficient licensing rules and stricter regulatory 
oversight is unwarranted. Baron & Spulber (2016) review how licensing policies of 
40 SDOs have changed over the past 20 years. They find that, overall, licensing 
and patent disclosure policies have become more restrictive over time at most 
SDOs. In particular, they find that four SDOs adopted royalty-free or non-
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assertion policies for some or all of their standards after practicing a less 
restrictive rule, and two SDOs introduced new requirements of mandatory 
licensing assurance from members.  
 
2.1.2.  FRAND and market failures in SEP licensing 
2.1.2.1.  General 
The second perspective on FRAND in the economic literature is to consider the 
role of FRAND commitments in addressing specific market failures in SEP 
licensing: the anti-commons and royalty stacking issues induced by the 
fragmentation of patent ownership, and the hold-up and hold-out problems that 
may result from the ex post timing of FRAND negotiations. We present each of 
these issues by exposing first the underlying theoretical arguments and their 
limitations, before reviewing existing available evidence as a second step. 
It is important to keep in mind that all these concepts are mainly theoretical. It 
should also be recalled that since the theoretical approach to FRAND licensing is 
based on the mathematical modelling of a limited number of stylized facts, it 
often fails to account for the actual variety and complexity of SEP licensing 
arrangements. Moreover, the lack of transparency on actual FRAND licenses 
makes it difficult to properly isolate relevant stylized facts.  
Anand & Khanna (2000) show that licensing contracts in the ICT field (including 
FRAND ones) usually take place on an ex post basis (i.e., the implementer is 
already using the patent invention when negotiations start) and on a non-
exclusive basis. We shortly present below a number of other characteristics of 
FRAND licensing arrangements that can be important in practice, but are 
generally overlooked in the economic literature (Bekkers et al., 2014):  
Caveats for the application of theoretical models of SEP licensing 
 Theoretical models usually consider one-way licenses with running royalties 
between vertically separated SEP owners and implementers. In contrast, 
implementers are often SEP holders in practice, and they frequently strike 
cross-licensing agreements (Shapiro, 2001). Such agreements may involve 
the two-way payment of running royalties, but also partial cancellation of 
these royalties and/or the payment of a lump sum fee. 
 Theoretical models often assume that the SEPs are unambiguously identified, 
and that licensing contracts concern only these SEPs. However, it is often 
difficult to properly identify SEPs, and non-essential patents may be tied to 
SEP licensing contracts. It is also possible that one licensing arrangement 
actually encompasses SEPs relating to several different standards. 
 Many theoretical models assume that the SEPs are ironclad patents, 
conferring their owners with a full-fledged monopoly power to set the royalty 
rate. In practice, the SEP holder's ability to impose a given rate may depend 
on its ability to enforce the related patent in court, and thus on parameters 
such as the size of the portfolio, the legal strength of the patents, the parties' 
capacity to incur the (possibly high) costs of litigation, and the courts' 
interpretation of FRAND commitments. 
 
2.1.2.2.  Patent hold-up  
 
i) Definition 
The notion of "patent hold-up" has been pivotal for several years in both 
economic literature and policy debates related to patents and standardization. At 
the origin, it is meant to describe the shift of bargaining power that occurs in 
 25 
favor of the patent holder when licensing negotiations take place ex post, that is 
after the patent user has already sunk irreversible costs in the infringing activity 
(Scotchmer, 1991).6 By extension, the same terms have been used to qualify the 
abusive use of the market power conferred to patent holders by the essentiality of 
the standard (Shapiro, 2001; Lemley & Shapiro, 2007).  
In this particular case, ex post market power stems from the combination of 
various factors (Farrell et al., 2007). On the one hand, the essentiality of patents 
irrevocably ties them to the standard, and therefore obliges any implementer to 
take a license. On the other hand, implementers are already locked into the 
standard when FRAND negotiations begin: they have sunk investments (e.g., in 
R&D and/or manufacturing equipment) in standard related equipment/knowledge 
before licensing-in the SEPs, and they cannot realistically envisage the 
development of an alternative standard at this stage. The SEP holder is therefore 
able to leverage a position acquired as a result of the standard setting process to 
negotiate royalty rates higher than the technology would have been worth ex 
ante when competing with other alternatives.  
An important consequence is that the risk of hold-up can undermine ex ante 
incentives for implementers to adopt and invest in standards, which is also 
detrimental for patent holders who seek to promote the wide adoption and 
market success of the standard (Lévêque & Ménière, 2016). Hold-up may 
furthermore amplify the royalty stacking problem when the ownership of SEPs is 
fragmented, which again generates opportunity costs for implementers as well as 
licensors (Lévêque & Ménière, 2011; Lerner & Tirole, 2015). 
Once again, it is worth emphasizing that the literature on patent hold-up in the 
context of standards has been mostly theoretical so far, so that the actual 
magnitude of this problem remains questionable in the absence of solid empirical 
evidence. It must be noticed in particular that the type of ex post licensing 
negotiations that could generate a risk of hold-up are common practice in ICT, as 
opposed to other sectors (Anand & Khanna, 2000). It is therefore necessary to 
establish what is a hold-up as opposed to normal licensing practices, and whether 
these criteria differ in the case of standard-essential patents.  
 
ii) Patent hold-up and SEP licensing 
A first interpretation of hold-up as deceptive conduct related to patent disclosure 
has emerged in the wake of a few emblematic litigation cases (see, e.g., Lemley 
& Shapiro, 2007; Farrell et al., 2007). In these so-called "patent ambush" cases – 
such as Dell v. FTC in 1996 and Rambus, Inc. v. FTC in 2005 – the SEP owners 
were accused of deliberately concealing the existence of patents during the 
standard setting process in order to induce other companies to adopt and 
implement standard-infringing specifications, and eventually claim royalties on 
standard compliant products.  
Another interpretation of hold-up refers to the breach of the FRAND licensing 
commitment. It corresponds to situations where a patent holder, once 
implementers are “locked in” by adopting a standard, tries to charge a significant 
                                           
6  More precisely, this notion refers to situations where a firm finds out that it has to 
negotiate a license for a patent that it unwillingly infringed. If the infringer has already 
incurred sunk costs, it may then be forced to accept licensing terms that it would not 
have deemed acceptable prior to the investment (Scotchmer, 1991). The notion of 
patent hold-up has especially been used to qualify the aggressive enforcement 
strategies of patent assertion entities, and more generally the instrumental use of 
legally weak patents to extort substantial settlement fees from alleged infringers under 
the threat of injunction (see, e.g., Shapiro, 2001; Reizig et al., 2007). 
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higher licensee fee (ex post) then it could have asked for its technology before 
such a lock-in occurred (ex ante). In Broadcom v. Qualcomm 7  as well as in 
subsequent cases, the SEPs were clearly identified, and implementers contended 
that the royalties claimed by SEP owners constituted a breach of FRAND 
commitments because they exceeded the level that the SEP holder had led them 
to expect. As a result, arguments about the reality of hold-up ultimately depend 
on the definition of a FRAND royalty benchmark. 
The latter interpretation of hold-up as a breach of the FRAND licensing 
commitments has finally been extended in recent years to encompass the abusive 
use of injunctions. Since an injunction can impose a large on-going loss on the 
implementer, wielding this threat may indeed substantially improve the 
bargaining position of the patent holder (Lemley & Shapiro, 2007; Shapiro, 2010; 
Scott-Morton & Shapiro, 2015). As formulated in an FTC report (2011), "the 
patentee can use the threat of an injunction to obtain royalties covering not only 
the value of its invention compared to alternatives, but also a portion of the costs 
that the infringer would incur if it were enjoined and had to switch".  
This has led a number of competition authorities to take further steps to curb this 
bargaining power in the context of growing numbers of patent disputes in the 
smartphone ecosystem (Ohlhausen, 2015). In the US, the FTC has used its 
Section 5 authority to challenge owners of FRAND-encumbered SEPs that try to 
enjoin willing licensees. The European Commission adopted in 2014 a decision 
that Motorola had abused its dominant position by trying to enjoin certain Apple 
products using alleged SEPs subject to FRAND terms, and in 2015, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in turn held in Huawei v. ZTE that an SEP 
holder’s refusal to license on FRAND terms may, in principle, be an abuse of 
dominance in violation of Article 102 TFEU. In all these cases, the abusive use of 
injunction proceeds from the attempt to enjoin implementers who are willing to 
take a license on FRAND terms. It therefore raises again the question of the 
definition of FRAND terms, but also of the negotiation process from which that 
definition emerges. 
The trend towards a broader interpretation of hold-up and the resulting 
restrictions put on the SEP holders' bargaining power have recently raised the 
reverse concern that the balance of interests may have tilted too far against the 
interests of licensors, in fact depriving them of the benefits and incentives that 
SEPs are meant to generate in the first place. The concept of "patent hold-out" 
reflects this concern. Unlike the hold-up concept, it does not originate in the 
economic literature, but rather from industry stakeholders and from judges and 
lawyers involved in FRAND litigation (Geradin, 2010; Jacob, 2013).  
As compared with ordinary patent owners, SEP holders cannot easily threaten to 
refuse a license because they are bound by their commitment to concede a 
license. Against this backdrop, the worst possible outcome for an infringer is to be 
sued and obligated by a court to pay the same FRAND rate that would have been 
charged for licensing in the first place. The licensor, however, will miss the timely 
availability of royalties. Knowing this, some implementers may engage in “hold 
out” or “reverse hold-up”, not only by using essential technology without a license 
but also by deliberately choosing not to seek a license. Typically, hold-out 
practices are combined with the challenge of validity and essentiality of SEPs in 
front of a court. If this happens, patent “hold out” can induce royalty losses for 
SEP holders. Since SEP holders have also sunk R&D investments in the standard 
when FRAND negotiations take place, the prospect of such hold-out may 
moreover significantly reduce their ex ante incentives to invest in the 
development of standards. 
                                           
7  Broadcom Corp. v Qualcomm, 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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iii) Empirical evidence 
There has been little evidence so far of the magnitude of the hold-up problem in 
the standardization area. The policy debate on patent hold-up has emerged in the 
wake of a few emblematic litigation cases, where the qualification of hold-up was 
one of the key disputed question. Hold-up situations can be easily recognized in a 
few "patent ambush" cases 8 , or when injunctive relief is sought before any 
negotiation. However, in many cases the existence of a hold-up problem is 
ambiguous, as it ultimately depends on the interpretation of what should be a 
reasonable FRAND royalty offer. It is also unclear whether, e.g., an attempt to 
obtain a preliminary injunction without any serious prior negotiation effort should 
be considered as evidence of hold-up if the court actually refused to grant that 
injunction (Jacob, 2013). 
Scott-Morton & Shapiro (2015) argue that patent owners increasingly turned to 
the International Trade Commission (ITC) during the past decade, because the 
"ITC process is significantly faster, and an exclusion order issued by the ITC is far 
more costly to the target firm than the most likely remedy in Federal court, the 
awarding of damages to the patent holder equal to reasonable royalties". Using 
data from Lex Machina, Scott-Morton & Shapiro find that patent holders prevail 
49% of the time when asserting SEPs before the ITC, compared with only 29% of 
the time in the US Federal court.  
At the same time, there is - as far as we know – no empirical study that 
specifically seeks to identify and measure the magnitude of the hold-out. Because 
of this absence of empirical evidence, it is not possible to draw clear-cut 
conclusions on the existence of hold-up and/or hold-up, or on the prevalence of 
one of these two problems in practice. 
As far as we know, the most systematic piece of evidence available is a study 
focusing on the active litigation activity that took place in recent years in the 
smartphone ecosystem (Gupta & Snyder, 2014). The study reviews 2,746 cases, 
filed in the United States District Courts (USDC) during 2001-2013 or in the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) at any time, and involving twenty 
smartphone manufacturers that were active in the U.S. from 2000-2012. It shows 
that a minority of cases involved SEPs. More precisely, 31% of the cases involved 
one or more patents plead as SEP (see Table 1), and 144 (36%) of the unique 
patents asserted in all the cases reviewed were pleaded as or declared to an SDO 
as a potential SEP. The majority of the cases had a request for an injunction 
associated with them. However, injunctions or exclusion orders have been 
granted for a total of only eight cases and sixteen asserted patents in these 
cases, of which none was an SEP. An exclusion order has been granted (by the 
ITC) for only one patent alleged to be an SEP (in Samsung-Apple case no. 337-
TA-794), but it was later overturned by the Obama Administration. 
  
                                           
8  See, e.g., Dell v FTC in 1996 and Rambus, Inc. v FTC in 2005. 
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Table 1: Summary of smartphone litigation 2000 – 2012 
 
 Total USDC ITC 
No. of cases filed 111 83 28 
No. of pending cases 22 16 6 
No. of concluded cases 88 57 31 
Settled 20 9 11 
Trial verdict 10 1 9 
Dismissed 45 34 11 
Other (e.g, administrative 
closing) 
13 13 0 
No. of cases with patent(s) 
found infringed 
7 1 6 
No. of cases granted an 
injunction 
8 2 6 
No. of cases granted 
damages 
1 1 0 
No. of cases with some form 
of adjudication 
14 5 9 
No. of cases with Markman 
hearing 
20 9 11 
No. of cases with one or 
more patents plead as SEP 
35 26 9 
 
Source: Gupta & Snyder (2014). The table is based on the exhaustive list of the twenty 
smartphone manufacturers that were active in the U.S. from 2000-2012. The authors 
examined over 2,746 cases filed in the United States District Courts (USDC) during 2001-
2013 and in the International Trade Commission (ITC) at any time. 
 
 
iv) Hold-up and the definition of FRAND 
As we have seen, FRAND licensing is intimately connected to the objective of 
preventing hold-up. FRAND commitments can indeed be interpreted as 
commitments to non-engaging in hold-up, thereby removing the threat thereof to 
the benefit of both SEP holders and implementers. Conversely, this interpretation 
of SDO IPR policies provides a definition of hold-up as a breach of ex ante 
commitments. 
From an ex ante perspective, hold-up can harm implementers as well as those 
SEP owners who seek to promote the standard (Lévêque & Ménière, 2016). 
Accordingly, the risk of hold-up provides an economic rationale for the 
requirement of FRAND licensing commitments, and provides an analytical 
background against which to interpret the meaning of the FRAND commitment.  
Swanson & Baumol (2005) argue that the role of FRAND commitments is to tie 
the remuneration of SEPs achieved after standard development to the 
remuneration that patent owners could have achieved ex ante, i.e., before the 
standard was set. In order to assess whether a licensing term is compliant with 
FRAND terms, the authors suggest simulating an ex ante auction in which 
different patent owners offer their competing patents for inclusion into the 
standard. The remuneration of the winning patent will thus represent the 
incremental value of the patent over the next-best alternative.  
Several scholars support the view that a “reasonable” royalty rate is one that the 
vendor and the patent holder would have negotiated in a market-driven arm’s-
length negotiation prior to the market adoption of the standard (Farrell et al., 
2007; Lemley & Shapiro, 2007). They argue that private, bilateral negotiations 
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are likely to result in efficient royalty rates and other terms for SEPs, particularly 
if they are conducted prior to the adoption and lock-in of a standard.  
Carlton & Shampine (2013) stress the non-discrimination part of the FRAND 
commitment to address the patent hold-up problem in situations in which 
implementing the ex ante auction model would be prohibitively complicated. Their 
argument is that a patent owner charges different prices to different users of the 
standard partly because some users make more valuable use of the standard. By 
charging a higher price to the user making better use of the standard, the patent 
holder is in fact opportunistically appropriating part of the ex post value created 
by the standard implementer. According to Carlton and Shampine, a FRAND 
licensing policy should require patent holders to charge the same royalty rate to 
all implementers that ex ante expect to create the same value by using the 
standard. A patent holder should not be allowed to increase the rate in response 
to value created ex post by the implementer, i.e., resulting from investments 
made after standard development. 
The interpretations of FRAND reviewed in this section tie the FRAND obligation to 
the notion of hold-up and view the FRAND commitment as a safeguard against 
any increase in royalties as a consequence of the adoption of the patented feature 
into a standard. In contrast, Sidak (2014) argues that it is erroneous to tie the ex 
post remuneration of the patent owner to conditions of the ex ante situation 
before the standard is set. He argues that the FRAND royalty must exceed the 
hypothetical ex ante benchmark in order to compensate the patent holder for the 
additional costs and risks entailed by standard development. In Sidak’s view, a 
FRAND royalty is bound only by the individual rationality constraints of licensees 
and licensors. This means that the royalty rate charged by a patent owner to a 
standard implementer must be such that given the royalty rate, participating in 
the standard is more profitable to both sides than what they could have achieved 
by not participating in the standard. In the case of standards including multiple 
patents, the aggregate royalty burden must be such that using the standard is 
still profitable to the implementer. 
 
2.1.2.3. Anti-commons and royalty stacking 
 
i) Theoretical arguments 
Anti-commons and royalty stacking arise in situations where an enabling 
technology embodies patent-protected components belonging to several patent 
owners. Although patent encumbered standards are a typical example of such 
situations, concerns related to fragmented patent ownership exist in many other 
cases, including ICT in general, but also other technological fields such as 
diagnostic kits or genetically modified organisms (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). The 
problem is further amplified when a final product embodies a number of enabling 
technologies (e.g., standards) that are all characterized by patent fragmentation.  
The concept of anti-commons refers to the transaction costs induced by the 
fragmentation of patent ownership (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). The transaction 
costs (i.e., the search, negotiation, and enforcement costs) of patent licensing 
can indeed dramatically increase with the number of patent owners and/or 
implementers in the market. In a vertically integrated industry where the patent 
ownership of an enabling technology is distributed between, say, four patent-
holding implementers, a total of twelve one-way licenses or, more probably, six 
cross-licensing contracts must be put in place to secure freedom to operate for all 
implementers. If there is now vertical separation between four patent holders and 
four implementers, a total of sixteen licensing contracts must be established. The 
costs of searching for relevant patent owners and negotiating contracts may also 
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further increase if there is a high patent density and/or ambiguity concerning the 
actual validity and essentiality of patents in the field.  
The concept of royalty stacking (or "double-marginalization", or "Cournot effect", 
in the academic jargon) means that fragmented patent ownership induces patent 
owners to charge excessive royalties to implementers, thereby creating an 
inefficient royalty stack for the whole enabling technology or standard (Shapiro, 
2001). Intuitively, each licensor can be expected to seek a high royalty rate, 
ignoring the fact that stacking such high royalties would hamper the demand for 
standard compliant products. Economic theory predicts that royalty stacking then 
leads not only to excessive prices for users but also profit losses for licensors.  
As already mentioned, this theoretical argument relies on a number of simplifying 
assumptions. We discuss below the implications of the main assumptions that are 
commonly made in this strand of literature:  
Patent owners are not active downstream in the implementation of the standard. 
This assumption is strong since separation between licensors and licensees is not 
systematic in practice. Vertically integrated patent owners may be able to 
bilaterally fix the royalty stacking issue by striking broad cross-licensing 
agreements, whereby they reciprocally cancel out (part of) their respective 
royalty costs (Shapiro, 2001). In the latter case, the royalty stack disappears for 
vertically integrated SEP holders, but remains a difficulty for other implementers 
who own no or less SEPs. 
Each patent owner enjoys a full monopoly position, and can therefore freely 
impose any royalty level. Lerner & Tirole (2004, 2014) relax this assumption by 
showing that the licensor's power to charge excessive royalty rates may be 
(partly) disciplined by the implementer's ability to circumvent patents or patent 
bundles. A number of recent papers (Choi & Gerlach, 2015; Bourreau et al., 
2015; Gupta et al., 2015) show, in turn, that the patent holder's ability to charge 
royalties ultimately depend on its ability to enforce the patent(s) in court, so that 
only strong portfolio owners actually enjoy full monopoly power vis-à-vis 
implementers, while the royalty rate charged by small patent owners is bound by 
their portfolio strength. 9  However, these limitations of market power are not 
sufficient to eliminate the royalty-stacking problem. 
Patent owners charge a uniform per unit royalty to all implementers. Ménière and 
Parlane (2010) relax this assumption by considering the case of multiple licensors 
using either fixed fee or two-part-tariff contracts. They find that both contracts 
induce a form of inefficient royalty stacking when they are subject to a non-
discrimination requirement. Spulber (2015) conversely argues that royalty 
stacking would disappear if each patent owner had the possibility to issue a 
limited number of licenses, thereby controlling the number of implementers in the 
market. 
 
ii) Empirical evidence 
There is no direct evidence of the cost of anti-commons and royalty stacking in 
the field of standards, but the rising number of both declared SEPs and SEP-
declaring entities in past years provide indirect evidence of the growing challenge 
of organizing the licensing of standard-essential patents.  
                                           
9  Another interesting implication of both papers is that extra patents become useless 
when portfolios are already strong enough, so that large portfolio owners are better off 
selling part of their patents. Such divestitures can be observed in practice and are 
known as "privateering". Because they create or strengthen smaller licensors, they 
actually tend to worsen the royalty-stacking problem. 
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The large number of SEPs reflects the technological complexity of ICT 
standards10, and also the companies’ attempts to systematically file patents in 
order to license them or obtain freedom to operate through cross-licensing 
agreements (Blind et al., 2009). As shown in Figure 1, the cumulative number of 
SEP declarations at various SDOs steadily increased between 1990 and 2014. The 
increase in the number of SEP declarations has been documented in various 
independent studies (Bekkers et al., 2016; Baron & Pohlmann, 2016). The 
number of SEPs declared to ETSI is much larger than the number of SEPs 
declared to any other SDO. This is partly due to the technological complexity of 
wireless communication standards and also to the fact that ETSI participants 
make blanket statements much less frequently than in other SDOs. Since all 
potentially essential patents must be declared during the standard setting 
process, one must also emphasize that their number significantly exceeds the 
number of patents that turn out to be truly valid and essential once the standard 
specifications have been adopted.11  
 
Figure 1: Cumulative number of declared SEPs by application and first 
declaration date 
 
 
Source: Baron & Pohlmann, 201612 
 
                                           
10  This trend goes also back to the evolution of even more complex technologies, the 
multifunctional integration of different technologies, the need to preserve backward 
compatibility with past standards, and the development of specific services and 
applications that go beyond initial purpose functions such as communication. 
11  Various studies on wireless communication standards suggest, for instance, that truly 
essential patents may actually account for 40% to 80% of all patents declared 
essential at SDOs (Goodman & Myers, 2005; Cyber Creative Institute, 2011). 
12  Counts of declared SEPs may vary between different databases or studies depending 
on the underlying definitions. The presented graph is based on SEP declarations made 
to 17 different SDOs, and patents are counted by patent application number (different 
published patent documents relating to the same application are not counted as 
different patents).  
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SEP-holding entities are also increasingly diverse and specialized. Back in the 
1990s, standard setting involved fewer companies – all from industrialized 
countries – that were usually the main SEP holders and implementers at the same 
time. The pattern has changed over the last decade with the entry of new actors. 
The increasing complexity of standards brought in a number of R&D-oriented 
companies, while new manufacturers – many of which were from developing 
Asian countries – entered at the same time on other end of the industry. The 
ETSI database of SEP declarations for the LTE standard reveals, for instance, that 
104 patent holders had declared SEPs for this standard in 2014 (versus 36 in 
2011). Of the top twenty contributors in terms of number of SEPs, twelve only 
had already been involved in the development of GSM, the main second 
generation standard for wireless communication. An increasing number of 
technology standards has become subject to SEPs declared by a large number of 
firms. Baron and Pohlmann (2016) find that 325 technology standard documents 
are subject to SEP declarations by more than 25 firms each.  
Although these evolutions can be expected to accentuate royalty-stacking issues, 
there is no direct evidence that could confirm that prediction. Using public license 
demands and information from patent disputes, a recent study estimates the 
potential patent royalty stack on a hypothetical $400 smartphone at $120 – which 
approximately equals the cost of the components (Armstrong et al., 2014). 
However, even such a high figure does not prove that the stack is actually 
excessive and inefficient. 
  
iii) Royalty stacking and the definition of FRAND 
The earliest formal interpretation of the FRAND commitment (Swanson & Baumol, 
2005) focuses on the threat of ex post opportunism (hold-up) and abstracts from 
the challenges induced by the complementarity of patented features incorporated 
into a standard. More recent formalizations of the definition of FRAND take the 
complementarity of patents into account, and indeed view the need to address 
the risk of royalty stacking as one of the crucial functions of FRAND. In particular, 
in order to be effective in incentivizing standard adoption, a FRAND licensing 
policy must guarantee the overall reasonableness of the aggregate royalty burden 
in addition to the reasonableness of single royalty requests for individual patents. 
Layne-Farrar et al. (2007) extend the Swanson-Baumol proposal to standards 
including multiple patents. If each patent were remunerated by the value that the 
inclusion of the patent contributes to the standard, the entire value of the 
standard would not be sufficient to remunerate all included patents. The reason is 
that part of the value that a patent contributes to a standard results from its 
combination with other patents. Let a standard include two components A and B, 
which respectively contribute value a and b, while the combination of A and B in 
addition generates value c. The value contributed by A to the standard (the 
difference between a standard including A and a standard excluding A) is thus 
a+c, whereas the value contributed by B is b+c. The sum of these incremental 
value contributions exceeds the total value of the standard a+b+c. Layne-Farrar 
et al. (2007) suggest dealing with this problem by reference to the Shapley value. 
The Shapley value distributes the value generated by the combination of inputs 
among the different contributors according to their average incremental 
contribution to alternative combinations of contributions.  
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2.2.  A LEGAL VIEW OF FRAND 
In the following sections, we examine how the nature and enforceability of FRAND 
commitments have been approached by theory and practice as a matter of legal 
doctrine. 
2.2.1.  Contract law 
Each SDO sets its own terms for a FRAND commitment, which could be phrased 
as an offer to negotiate a license on fair and reasonable terms – it is not a 
commitment to negotiate a contract at a set rate. The FRAND commitment 
typically arises either as a function of the SDO’s by-laws/IPR policies or as a 
separate explicit agreements such as the IEEE “letters of assurance”. For 
instance, Section 6.1. of ETSI’s IPR policy (ETSI Directives Version 36, June 
2016) provides that when essential IPR is disclosed, ETSI will request - but not 
oblige - the owner of the IPR to undertake in writing that it is prepared to grant 
irrevocable licenses on FRAND terms and conditions, and as such to waive its 
right to refuse to offer a license to those seeking one. 
Pinning down the meaning of the FRAND obligation, Sidak (2015) explains that a 
primary purpose of a FRAND commitment is to grant implementers access to the 
patented technology and that the SEP holder will be fairly compensated for its 
contribution to the standard. However, the duty to make a FRAND offer does not 
ensure that a licensing agreement with a specific implementer will eventuate. The 
FRAND commitment does not transform an SEP holder into a guarantor of 
contract formation - the negotiation still might fail. Even though the SEP holder 
has discharged its contractual duty arising from the FRAND commitment by 
making a FRAND offer to the requesting implementer, this may not result into a 
licensing agreement with a specific implementer who might not be willing or able 
to pay a FRAND royalty for the use of the SEPs.  
These inherent ambiguities of a FRAND commitment underpin its nature as an 
“incomplete” contract. From an economic perspective, incomplete contracts do 
not signal inefficiency. They are rather a predictable and efficient result given the 
costs associated with identifying all contingencies that might arise during the life 
of the contractual relationship. From a legal point of view, however, the 
incompleteness of FRAND contracts explains the desirability of different legal 
frameworks and policies to govern ex post opportunism in the field of SEP 
licensing (Tsai & Wright, 2015). 
In the case of FRAND-encumbered SEPs, the position that the enforcement of the 
FRAND obligation is based on the contractual (voluntary) nature of the FRAND 
undertaking between the SEP owner and the respective SDO is endorsed by 
several US scholars and courts. According to this dominant approach, the IPR 
rules of the standard-setting bodies have legal significance only to the extent 
they are enforceable. Because the IPR policies are at base agreements by 
members of the SSO to abide by certain rules regarding IP ownership, their 
enforceability is initially a question of contract law (Lemley, 2002). In other 
words, the FRAND contract between an SEP holder and an SDO delineates the 
implementer's rights, as a third-party beneficiary of the FRAND contract, to 
receive access to the SEP holder's standard-essential technology (Sidak, 2015). 
After the relevant standard is adopted, the implementer/potential licensee can 
seek to enforce the patent holder’s promise as a third-party beneficiary. However, 
it remains unclear whether non-members of the respective SDO who use the 
standards will also be considered third-party beneficiaries of the FRAND 
commitment – some scholars argue against non-members having enforceable 
third-party beneficiary rights under U.S. law (cf. Lemley, 2002).  
Similarly, the binding effect of the FRAND commitment as a contractual 
agreement and a preliminary form of a concluded licensing agreement resonates 
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with European scholars as well as courts. For instance, French law allows 
enforcement by a third party of a contract by which one of the parties agrees to 
confer a benefit on third parties. In Germany, this preliminary commitment 
(“Vorvertrag”) takes place under exceptional circumstances insofar as it develops 
a binding effect prior to the fixation of the specific licensing terms (cf. Burgharzt, 
2011; Straus, 2011; Nägele & Jacobs, 2009). With regards to whom this binding 
effect is addressed, however, the views differ: Some argue that the FRAND 
commitment is only binding towards the respective SSO (Ullrich, 2007), whereas 
others extend the binding effect to any potential licensee (“invitation ad incertas 
personas”; Maume & Tapia 2010). Finally, there is also the view that a FRAND 
obligation is merely a call to potential licensees to make a licensing offer 
(“invitation ad offerendum”).13 Recent case law14 and scholarship (Kühnen, 2017) 
define the FRAND commitment as a declaratory concretization of the willingness 
to license, which exists by operation of competition law (Art. 102 TFEU). In the 
context of patent infringement, a FRAND-encumbered SEP signifies a (self-) 
commitment of the SEP holder to a specific conduct. 
Given that FRAND commitments do not create a license but merely leave open 
the possibility of a license, the threshold question is whether the FRAND 
commitment creates a contract or merely prescribes a duty to negotiate or grant 
a license in good faith. Accepting the contractual basis of a FRAND commitment 
depends on the various Civil Law and Common Law traditions of contract law and 
enforcement - the governing law will not be uniform (typically the law of an SDO’s 
local jurisdiction). Where contract law is a possibility, the (subjective) intent of 
the parties plays a fundamental role on the interpretation of these contracts 
(Brooks & Geradin, 2010): In agreeing to license on FRAND terms, the IP holder 
has not agreed to constrain its licensing terms more tightly than the “range of 
reasonableness”. Thus, if an offer has been made and refused, then the only 
contractual question to be adjudicated is whether the terms offered, taking into 
account all of the specific circumstances between the parties and prevailing 
market conditions, fall outside the range of reasonableness contemplated by the 
FRAND commitment.  
At the same time - and in order to comply with its FRAND commitment - the SEP 
holder must make a FRAND offer in good faith. Should the SEP holder decide to 
enter further negotiations with a potential licensee, the question arises whether 
the construct of a FRAND contract also imposes on the SEP holder to negotiate in 
good faith. Some US district courts have affirmed this obligation during the 
formation of a contract: Any offer, be it an initial offer or an offer during a back-
and-forth negotiation, must comport with the implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing inherent to every contract.15 
Several scholars and courts reject contract law as a general-purpose FRAND 
enforcement avenue. They either regard FRAND commitments as a mere set of 
guidelines pertaining to the interaction of the SEP owners with the SSO, its 
members and third parties16 or as a form of a “patent pledge” enforceable on 
antitrust or competition law theories. According to Contreras (2015), patent 
pledges generally precede formal license agreements and other contracts, but are 
                                           
13  Düsseldorf District Court, Decision of 4 August 2011, Az 4b O 54/0. 
14  See, e,g., Du ̈sseldorf District Court, Decision of 24 April 2012, 4b O 274/10 - IPCom v 
Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone. 
15   Cf. Microsoft v Motorola, 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023 at 1038 (United States District Court for 
the Western District of Washington June 6, 2012); Apple Inc. v Samsung, No. 11-cv-
01846, 2012 WL 1672493, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012). 
16  Cf. U.S. International Trade Commission, Initial determination on Remand issued 27 
April 2015, In the Matter of Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof (Inv. 
n° 337- TA-613). 
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nevertheless intended to induce the market to make expenditures and adopt 
common technology platforms without the fear of patent infringement. Contreras 
proposes a novel “market reliance” theory for the enforcement of patent pledges, 
a theory grounded in the fact that patent pledges are promises, whether or not 
they fulfil the requirements of common law contract, and promises ought to be 
enforced.  
With regards to the legal consequences of a FRAND, some scholars and courts 
debate whether, as matter of contract interpretation, the FRAND contract waives 
an SEP holder’s right to seek an injunction. Lemley & Shapiro (2013), for 
instance, argue that, by making a FRAND commitment, an SEP holder has 
conceded that damages would suffice to compensate the SEP holder for the 
infringement of its SEPs; given the availability of monetary damages, the SEP 
holder will not suffer irreparable harm from the infringement of its SEPs and can 
thus not meet the requirements for obtaining an injunction, as set out by the US 
Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange.17 Equally, in Realtek v. LSI Corp., 
the Northern District Court of California ruled: “In promising to license on RAND 
terms, defendants here admit that monetary damages, namely a RAND royalty, 
would be adequate compensation for any injury it has suffered as a result of 
Realtek’s allegedly infringing conduct”. 18  In contrast, Sidak (2015) finds no 
evidence of such an implicit waiver: Unless the waiver of the statutory right of 
requesting injunctive relief is clearly and unambiguously included in the FRAND 
commitment, an SEP holder may seek and enforce an injunction against an 
implementer without breaching the SEP holder's FRAND contract with the SSO, 
including the SEP holder's commitments to the contract's third-party 
beneficiaries.  
While contract law normally relies on damages as an exclusive remedy, several 
US district courts will grant injunctive relief, compelling a defendant to perform a 
contractual obligation if damages would be an inadequate remedy. These courts 
seem to confirm that a request for injunctions does not violate the contractual 
obligations of the SEP holder arising from a FRAND commitment.19 Other courts, 
however, determined that any form of injunctive relief against infringement is 
arguably a remedy inconsistent with the licensing commitment. In Microsoft v. 
Motorola, the request for preliminary injunctions was deemed improper because, 
in light of its commitment to license on FRAND terms, the SEP holder failed to 
show it had suffered an irreparable injury or that remedies available at law were 
inadequate: “Whatever the appropriate method of determining the RAND 
licensing rate, it could well be that retrospective payment at the rate ultimately 
determined and a determination of the future rate, not an injunction banning 
sales while that rate is determined, is the only remedy consistent with the 
contractual commitment to license […] standard-essential patents.”20 
 
2.2.2.  Competition and antitrust law 
At the interface of contract and competition law, the prevention of hold-up is 
perceived as the primary purpose of a FRAND commitment. This view has found 
several supporters in theory and practice (Farrell et al, 2007; Contreras, 2013; 
Keele, 2015; Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 at 876 (9th Cir. 
                                           
17  eBay Inc. v MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 at 391 (US Supreme Court 2006). 
18  Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998 at 1006-07 (N.D. Cal. 
May 20, 2013). 
19  Cf. Apple v Samsung, No. 11-cv-01846, 2012 WL 1672493 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012); 
Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998 at 1007 (N.D. Cal. 
2013). 
20  Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 at 885 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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2012). On the opposite end, Sidak (2015) argues that the very possibility for an 
implementer to sue the SEP holder for breach of contract and seek adjudication of 
a FRAND royalty in court renders patent hold-up improbable, if not impossible. 
From the perspective of contract interpretation, Sidak has not found any factual 
evidence that the raison d’être of a FRAND contract is to prevent patent hold-up. 
Competition concerns and economic theories on patent hold-up and royalty 
stacking have “infiltrated” the approach of several courts to FRAND. In particular, 
courts have recognized in hold-up and royalty stacking a potentially significant 
factor affecting the adoption of technical standards and the pricing of consumer 
products and therefore used them as “economic guideposts” for royalty 
determination. Furthermore, antitrust authorities use their competition expertise 
and enforcement role to help rein in any potential harm to both consumers and 
innovation. On the US side, Chairwoman Edith Ramirez of the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC, 2014) underpinned the significance of antitrust intervention in 
SEP licensing cases: 
“[W]hen a patentee voluntarily agrees to license its technology on FRAND terms 
as a condition of winning a place in the standard, antitrust enforcers are 
legitimately concerned with a breach that reintroduces the risk of patent hold-up. 
In particular, a breach may raise antitrust concerns if it threatens to deprive 
consumers of the pro-competitive benefits that legitimize the standard-setting 
enterprise under the antitrust laws. […] A dispute with a willing licensee over 
royalty terms that does not take place under the threat of an injunction is not 
likely to create the undue leverage that is the source of the competitive problem 
in the standard-setting context.”  
Equally, the US Department of Justice (DoJ) and the US Patent & Trademark 
Office (USPTO) have addressed antitrust concerns in the context of 
standardization in a Joint Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards–Essential 
Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments (2013). 
On the European front, the issue of injunctions takes centerstage in the context of 
seminal antitrust cases. In Motorola Mobility 21  and Samsung 22 , the European 
Commission prohibited injunctive relief on the premises that it would provide the 
SEP holder with the leverage to extract hold-up, resulting in an imbalance 
between parties. It was deemed an abuse of a dominant position prohibited by EU 
antitrust rule to seek injunctions on the basis of SEPs. While recourse to 
injunctions is a possible remedy for patent infringements, such conduct may be 
abusive where SEPs are concerned and the licensee is willing to take a license on 
FRAND terms. In these circumstances, the seeking of injunctions may distort 
licensing negotiations and impose unjustified licensing terms on patent licensees, 
with a negative impact on consumer welfare.23  
At the intersection of antitrust enforcement and litigation, former UK Court of 
Appeal Justice Robin Jacob (2013) scrutinized the EC’s stance to prevent SEP 
holders from going to court for injunctive relief as a breach of two major 
principles: the right of a party’s access to the courts contained in Art. 6 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the principle of sincere co-
operation as set out in Art 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union. In his view, the 
EC ignores the fact that litigation is a way of bringing things to a head. The 
pressure of a date in court is not a pressure to do a non-FRAND deal, but a 
pressure to do a FRAND deal - litigation is a continuation of negotiation by other 
means. Furthermore, the EC treats an application for an injunction as if it were an 
                                           
21  DG Competition, Decision of 29 April 2014, C(2014) 2892 final. 
22  Commitment Decision of 29 April 2014, C(2014) 2891 final. 
23  EC Press Release in the case of Samsung v Apple, 31 January 2012; EC Press Release 
in the case of Motorola v Apple, 6 May 2013. 
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injunction. When the court comes to make its decision it will have evidence from 
both sides and can decide what to do. Finally, It assumes that a declared SEP is 
in itself market dominant. However, a declared SEP may not be essential at all–
many are not. Even an SEP, once essential, may cease to be so because ways 
around have been devised.  
More recently, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) handed down a 
decision in 2015, which, at its core, endorsed that it is the patent owner’s 
obligation to alert the infringer and to provide a FRAND offer prior to seeking an 
injunction.24 In Huawei v. ZTE, the CJEU addressed a series of questions and 
provided guidance on how both patent owners and standard users should 
consider competition law implications during pending patent infringement 
proceedings as well as during FRAND negotiations.  
 
2.2.3.  Patent law 
The legal frameworks of contract and competition law interact closely with patent 
law, offering working solutions to patent problems. This complementarity is 
particularly evident in the area of patent licensing and supports the transition to a 
more balanced, more efficient system. Under the confluence of the various sets of 
rules, doctrines or defenses such “equitable estoppel” or “implied license” operate 
in many contexts and in patent law, in particular. The Anglo-Saxon patent legal 
system recognizes both doctrines that may apply for the enforcement of a FRAND 
commitment when a patent owner fails to comply with SSO rules. Which doctrine 
is most applicable depends upon which obligation the patent owner is accused of 
violating: disclosure or reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing: 
- Equitable estoppel comprises three basic elements: 1) conduct constituting a 
representation or concealment, 2) that is relied upon by the other party, 3) to 
the other party’s detriment. As a rule, equitable estoppel applies when there is 
inconsistency of behavior or contradictory conduct by the opponent. It may 
also apply if the SEP owner’s conduct was misleading and the potential 
licensee demonstrates both reliance and material prejudice. According to 
Lemley (2002), this renders equitable estoppel particularly well-suited to 
cases where SEP owners fail to comply with the SSO obligations for disclosure, 
but not in the case of a commitment to license on fair and reasonable terms – 
the FRAND commitment per se is not misleading, but rather affirms the intent 
of the patentee to enforce its patent.  
- The doctrine of implied license involves a different type of conduct, namely 
the conduct of the IP holder in the marketplace: If an IP owner declares its 
willingness to license SEPs on FRAND terms, users of the standard may 
assume that they are free to use that standard as long as they pay a 
reasonable royalty – despite lack of express license between them and the 
SEP holder. Unlike equitable estoppel, the doctrine of implied license is only 
applicable outside the SSO context because it relies on the beliefs and 
expectations of the parties to the sales transaction. As a policy matter, Lemley 
(2002) suggests to construe a FRAND commitment as the grant of a license 
itself, rather than merely a contract with the SSO – with the following 
advantages: First, it ensures that all users of the standard benefit from the 
license, even if they would be unable to sue for breach of the SSO contract 
itself. Second, it sharply narrows the scope of the issues that must be litigated 
in these cases (i.e., license scope and royalty rate versus injunctions, 
damages and attorneys’ fees) and, relatedly, makes it possible for the SSO to 
resolve those issues ex ante. Third, and most importantly, the implied-license 
                                           
24  CJEU, Case C-170/13, Decision of 16 July 2015, Huawei v ZTE. 
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approach reduces opportunism by SEP owners because they have already 
licensed their patents. It may also reduce the need for the courts to rely on 
mechanisms like antitrust and fraud to deal with opportunistic behavior such 
as hold-up.  
As we observed above under Section 2.2.1., the contractual approach is 
theoretically questionable and not optimal for solving the issues related to FRAND 
enforcement. At the interface of property and contract, Kesan & Hayes (2013) 
follow a middle path and apply property law to FRAND commitments. They 
namely recognize that the FRAND commitment is an enforceable contract that 
pertains to the treatment of intellectual property. As a prelude to license, the 
FRAND commitment can be characterized as contractually created property 
interests in covered patents. A FRAND commitment is not a license, but when a 
patent owner makes a FRAND commitment, this acts as a conditional covenant 
not to sue, whereby the patent owner promises to not sue standard implementers 
for infringement unless and until good faith attempts at negotiation fail. According 
to Kesan & Hayes, the treatment of patents in the standard-setting context is a 
fifth area where the rights cannot be characterized as solely in rem or solely in 
personam. When a patent is declared essential to a standard, the patent owner 
has in rem rights which the law must protect against a large and indefinite class 
of potential infringers, and all of the adopters of the standards have a duty to 
respect the IP rights of those who own SEPs. When a patent owner enters into a 
license with a standard adopter, this creates an in personam relation with 
affirmative obligations exchanged between defined parties. This perception of the 
FRAND commitment as a hybrid that bears the qualities of both property and 
contract is especially apparent when a patent, which is subject to a FRAND 
commitment, is then transferred - the class of potential licensees still has a 
negotiation right, but the patent owner against whom these rights may be 
asserted is unknown, giving the transfer traits of a quasi-multilateral relation and 
the FRAND commitment a servitude that runs with the patent.  
Beyond the doctrinal standpoint, introducing policy analysis into the litigation 
framework allows for patent infringement remedies and patent case law 
constructs to serve as a framework for the negotiation of FRAND licensing terms - 
parties bargain over licensing terms “in the shadow of the law” (Sidak, 2015, with 
further references). In the US jurisprudence, this intersection of statutory and 
private law is reflected not only in the context of preliminary injunctions where 
the availability of an injunction influences how an SEP holder and an implementer 
negotiate, but also in the context of FRAND royalties where the relevant 
determinations are similar to those that arise when calculating damages in the 
general context of patent infringement. 25  For instance, US jurisprudence has 
extended the application of evidentiary rules that stem from the general context 
of patent infringement damages (e.g., the Georgia-Pacific factors) to FRAND 
                                           
25  Moreover, the intersection of statutory and private law is closely tied to the issue of the 
appropriate appellate jurisdiction when requesting damages in FRAND cases as 
opposed to damages from patent infringement. In a contract case on failure to 
negotiate a FRAND royalty, contract law would provide the measure of damages and no 
determination would be made of patent validity. In the example of the US legal 
system: Whereas the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction for all appeals arising 
under patent law, the Ninth Circuit held that the review the judgment on Microsoft’s 
breach of contract claim for damages fell under its jurisdiction as a matter of contract 
law regardless of whether the contract is a patent license. The mode of calculating 
appropriate royalty amounts in contractual patent license does not “morph” the case 
into one requiring the determination of a “substantial question of federal patent law” 
(cf. Microsoft v Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024 at 1037 (US Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit 2015) (Microsoft II). Contrary to the US, courts in Europe have very few 
cases on damages in the context of FRAND licensing. 
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cases in order to frame the hypothetical negotiation and accomplish the 
apportionment task. 
In contrast, the European concept of FRAND is injunction-centric whereby 
damages play only a secondary role. In this setting, injunctive relief is the 
presumptive remedy for patent infringement – more or less an entitlement. 
FRAND is a defensive procedural tool in the course of patent infringement 
proceedings, which – when successful – allows for exemptions from the general 
principle. The recent CJEU decision in Huawei v. ZTE and its application by the 
European national courts have inversed the trend towards a more conservative 
approach to the grant of injunctive relief. The result is a shift from a defensive 
setup with the Damocles sword hanging over both the implementer (threat of 
injunctions) and the SEP holder (threat of abuse) to a carefully balanced approach 
that takes into account the interests of the parties and those of the general 
public. Steering clear from the automated grant of injunctions, the emerging 
jurisprudence applies a negotiation framework over the litigation nexus of patent 
infringement. This has important implications for the courts, as proceedings 
become fact-intensive and determined by a holistic assessment of subjective 
circumstances in private transactions, i.e., interpretation of “willingness”, “good 
faith”, “diligence” and “avoidance of delaying tactics” during negotiations. 
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3.  COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1.  OVERVIEW OF CASES 
3.1.1.  Case selection criteria 
For the purpose of our comparative analysis, the selection of the cases involving 
SEPs is based on a set of criteria: 
 multiple jurisdictions worldwide (Europe/US/Asia) 
 recent time frame 
 parties and industry involved 
 standard-related technology involved 
 variety of FRAND issues addressed by the court/competition authority 
 significance and wider application of the decision and its reasoning 
 methodology and tools applied by the court/competition authority 
Particular emphasis is put on landmark cases from the wireless and mobile 
technology industry, in which the courts pin down core principles of FRAND or 
apply a distinct methodology for the determination of FRAND royalties. Several 
decisions are rich in content, addressing multiple aspects of SEP licensing, and 
therefore broken down thematically in the respective sections. Most cases involve 
FRAND disputes that were litigated in the past five years – a few older decisions 
from the general context of patent infringement complement our selection, 
highlighting the evolution of case law against a background of increased 
technological complexity and shifting market dynamics. In order to serve the 
comparative purpose of the analysis as widely as possible, we have chosen to 
cover major jurisdictions in Europe, the United States and the emerging SEP 
markets of China, Korea, Japan and India – the convergence or divergence of 
doctrine and applied solutions across the different legal traditions help us distil 
cross-country emerging issues and policy trends.  
From a procedural perspective, many cases circle around the SEP portfolios of 
major corporations that often litigate in both roles, i.e., as claimant in one case 
and as defendant in another. The litigating parties include Motorola, Apple, 
Ericsson, Realtek, Samsung, Qualcomm, Sony, Nokia, Huawei. On the 
implementer side, the defendants are Microsoft, Motorola, Apple, D-Link, LSI, LG, 
ZTE, Huawei, Samsung, InterDigital. Further parties to litigation proceedings 
include non-patent assertion entities (Innovatio, IPCom, Core Wireless), R&D 
institutions (CSIRO), distribution channels (Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone), patent 
pools (Sisvel, One Blue) or privateers (Unwired Planet, Vringo). The technology 
scope spans from wireless technology (IEEE 802.11, 2G (GSM), 3G and 4G (LTE)) 
and cellular technology such as touch screen commands over to video 
compression (AVC H.264), audio and video streaming, DRAMs and Blu-Ray. 
A substantial body of selected cases stems from the US district courts, where 
“litigation is the endgame that influences a patent licensing negotiation” (Cary et 
al, 2014). Here, landmark cases and evolving trends in the FRAND jurisprudence 
have been subject in-depth analysis (or under sharp scrutiny) in the US 
scholarship. Despite strong arguments on both sides, there has been little 
consensus so far on how courts should best address the determination of FRAND 
licensing terms and which methodology best serves the calculation of reasonable 
royalties. 
On the European front, national courts deal predominantly with the issue of 
injunctions and do not directly engage in considerations of the monetary aspects 
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of FRAND as their US counterparts do. This is partly due to the different legal 
traditions and procedural idiosyncrasies of the national jurisdictions. For instance, 
it is common practice in the UK that parties involved in high-stake litigation opt 
for arbitration or out-of-court settlement. In Germany, the distinction between 
patent infringement and a case of damages has a different impact: whereas the 
plaintiff in patent infringement proceedings may enforce through a request for 
injunctive relief, in the case of damages it merely asks the court to issue a 
declaratory judgment on the defendant’s liability - if the court holds that the 
contested embodiment is infringing and this judgment becomes final, the parties 
will mostly seek a solution for the apportionment of damages outside the court 
system. Although the German legal system offers the possibility of separate 
proceedings on the amount of damages, this is rarely the case in practice. 
We conclude our analysis by addressing competition and policy aspects of FRAND 
based on arguments and guiding principles laid out in seminal antitrust cases 
from the European Union, the United States, China, Korea and India. Albeit 
technically not a case, the recent IEEE policy update is part of the broader 
discussion – an SDO perspective on what FRAND should be.  
 
3.1.2. List of cases by country – background and legal context 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) 
In this seminal decision that addresses the general context of damages and not 
FRAND in particular, the district court reasons that a “hypothetical negotiation,” 
between a “willing licensor” (the patent owner) and a “willing licensee” (the 
infringer), at the time the infringement began, may be used to determine 
reasonable royalty damages. For the purpose, it lists fifteen factors of evidentiary 
value, which had already been considered in other leading cases. In most cases, 
the Georgia-Pacific methodology attempts to set a percentage royalty rate, which 
is then multiplied by the dollar amount of infringing sales to calculate the dollar 
amount of “reasonable royalty” damages (case cited on pages 59, 60, 64). 
 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), US Supreme Court 
Online auction site eBay used MercExchange patents in its online auction 
technology, including a US patent that covers eBay's "Buy it Now" function - over 
30% of the company's business. When eBay abandoned negotiations to outright 
purchase MercExchange's online auction patent portfolio, MercExchange sued 
eBay for patent infringement and prevailed in 2003 before the District Court of 
Virginia, which found eBay had willfully infringed the MercExchange's patents and 
ordered a payment of nearly $30 million in damages. However, the district court 
denied MercExchange’s request for injunction against eBay. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court in 2005, stating 
that there was a "general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against 
patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances." Following the reversal, 
eBay took its case to the Supreme Court, where it prevailed. The Supreme Court 
unanimously determined that an injunction should not be automatically issued 
based on a finding of patent infringement, but could be denied simply on the 
basis that the plaintiff does not practice the patented invention. Instead, a federal 
court must still weigh what the Supreme Court described as the four-factor test 
traditionally used to determine if an injunction should issue (case cited on pages 
35, 81, 83). 
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Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F. 3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
Lucent had originally sued Gateway for infringement of its Day Patent, which 
claimed a method of entering information into fields on a computer screen 
without using a keyboard. In the course of litigation, however, Microsoft 
intervened and the evidence at trial focused on whether Microsoft's manufacture 
and sale of its popular products "Microsoft Money," "Microsoft Outlook," and 
"Windows Mobile" infringed the Day Patent. The underlying technology was 
pertinent to the operation of Microsoft Outlook's calendar tool, the so-called 
“date-picker” tool, which allows users to enter dates when preparing a record of 
appointment by scrolling through days, months, and years and entering those 
dates in an appointment form. At the jury trial, Microsoft unsuccessfully defended 
Lucent's infringement claims and Lucent was awarded $358 million in damages. 
On September 11, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit set aside the jury verdict on the grounds that it was not supported by 
substantial evidence at trial and was therefore based on speculation or 
guesswork. The decision of the appeal court is noteworthy, particularly with 
regards to the discussion of two theories of damages commonly employed in 
patent infringement litigation (lost profits and royalty calculation) as well as the 
nature of proof required to obtain and sustain a jury verdict under those theories 
(case cited on pages 55, 88 - 89). 
 
Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard, 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) 
The decision was the first of the recent cases that applied the Entire Market Value 
Rule (EMVR) to royalty bases, thereby setting up more stringent requirements for 
computing the royalty base in patent infringement damages calculations. 
Specifically, the court found that the EMVR must be met in order to use the entire 
unit as the royalty base. Cornell University issued an infringement suit against 
HP. The patent at issue covered an “instruction issuing mechanism” that enabled 
computer microprocessors to work faster by executing multiple instructions 
simultaneously rather than one at a time. The patent read on one component of 
the instruction reorder buffer (IRB), which was part of a computer processor (i.e., 
the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit), a number of which go into a CPU 
module, which goes into a CPU brick, a number of which go into a cell board, 
which is inserted into a server. Concluding that the royalty base should be only 
the processor because it “was the smallest saleable infringing unit with close 
relation to the claimed invention”, the court then calculated damages to be $53 
million, based on $7 billion in processors at a 0.8% rate (case cited on pages 91, 
140). 
 
Uniloc USA, Inc. and Uniloc Singapore Private Limited v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F. 
3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected the so-called “25 
percent rule” for calculating infringement damages as a fundamentally flawed tool 
for determining a royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation. Uniloc sued Microsoft 
for infringement of its US patent directed to a software registration system to 
deter software copying. The system allowed software to run without restrictions in 
a “use mode” only if the system determined that the software installation was 
legitimate. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of non-
infringement and remanded the case for proceedings (case cited on pages 64, 89, 
147). 
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Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993 (W.D. Wash. 2012); 
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (US Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit 2012) 
See detailed summary on page 56 (case also cited on pages 34 – 35, 55, 62, 64, 
82, 84 – 86, 95 – 98, 101, 105, 107 – 111, 130, 136).  
 
LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 694 F. 3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
In this decision, the US Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit raised the bar for 
the application of EMVR. LaserDynamics had filed an infringement suit against 
Quanta regarding its US patent directed to a method of optical disc discrimination 
that essentially enables an optical disc (ODD) drive to automatically identify the 
type of optical disc - e.g., a CD versus a DVD that is inserted into the ODD. A jury 
found for LaserDynamics, which claimed that a reasonable royalty should be 2% 
of the price of the entire notebook computer containing the drive, and awarded 
$52.1 million in damages. After a new trial, a subsequent jury awarded 
LaserDynamics $8.5 million in damages, and LaserDynamics appealed to the 
Federal Circuit. The latter addressed the proper legal framework for evaluating 
reasonable royalty damages in the patent infringement context: In holding that 
the district court properly granted a new trial, the court clarified the standard of 
proof a plaintiff must satisfy in order to obtain damages under an “entire market 
value” theory. Specifically, in applying the EMVR in any case involving multi-
component products, patentees may not calculate damages based on sales of the 
entire product, as opposed to the smallest saleable patent practicing unit, without 
showing that the demand for the entire product is attributable to the patented 
feature (case cited on pages 55, 58, 88, 91, 108, 143 - 145). 
 
Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998 (United States 
District Court, N.D. California (2013)) 
Realtek, a manufacturer of WiFi chips, asserted that LSI, a holder of two FRAND-
encumbered WiFi SEPs, breached its FRAND obligation by seeking an exclusion 
order against the importation of Realtek’s WiFi chips. Realtek sought an order 
barring LSI from seeking to enforce any injunctive relief against it based on those 
SEPs. The district court held that LSI’s seeking injunctive relief at the 
International Trade Commission prior to proposing a FRAND license to Realtek 
was inherently inconsistent with its FRAND obligations. The court granted Realtek 
a preliminary injunction barring LSI from enforcing any exclusion order that it 
might obtain against Realtek with respect to the two SEPs. The case was 
subsequently tried before a jury, which established a royalty of 0.19% of the 
selling price of Realtek’s WiFi chips, or an estimated $0.0019 to $0.0033 per chip, 
as compared to LSI’s initial demand for a royalty exceeding the $1-1.75 price of 
Realtek’s WiFi chips (case cited on pages 35, 82, 87, 96). 
 
In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC , 921 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2013) 
See detailed summary on page 58 (case also cited on pages 85 – 86, 91, 94 – 96, 
99 – 100, 105, 108, 110 – 111, 113, 133). 
 
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 869 F. Supp.2d 901 (U.S. District Court, 
N.D. Illinois 2012); Apple Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) 
See detailed summary on page 57 (case also cited on pages 61, 81 – 82, 84, 96, 
106, 111, 113). 
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Ericsson v. D- Link, 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
See detailed summary on page 63 (case also cited on pages 57, 62, 64, 82, 85, 
89, 91, 92, 97, 105, 112 – 113, 134, 141 – 142, 148, 152). 
 
VirnetX, Inc.v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
VirnetX had successfully asserted four of its patents in a verdict against Apple 
based on infringement by Apple’s Facetime and VPN On Demand products. The 
two accused products involved a videoconferencing platform and a feature used 
to establish secure virtual private networks, respectively. The jury found the four 
patents were valid and infringed, awarding damages of $368,160,000. On appeal, 
the Federal Circuit upheld the jury verdict of no invalidity and infringement as to 
most of the claims of the patents asserted against VPN On Demand, but reversed 
the verdict and remanded the case with regards to the disputed claims of the 
patents asserted against Facetime). In its decision, the Federal Circuit addressed 
various theories of damage determination relevant to the royalty base, the SSPPU 
and the Nash Bargaining solution (case cited on pages 64, 91, 148). 
 
U.S. International Trade Commission, Initial determination on Remand issued 
April, 27 2015, In the Matter of Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components 
Thereof (Inv. n° 337- TA-613) 
In September 2007, the International Trade Commission (ITC) had instituted an 
investigation based on a complaint filed by InterDigital. The respondents in this 
proceeding were Microsoft and Nokia. In August 2009, the ITC affirmed the 
finding of no violation and terminated the investigation in October 2009. 
However, the affirmation was appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in 2012, which reversed the claim construction of several claim terms and 
returned jurisdiction back to the ITC on remand. The remanded issues included 
briefing the issue of the standard-essential nature of the patents-in-suit, and 
whether a patent hold-up or reverse hold-up occurred. Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) Essex held that Nokia’s 3G mobile handsets infringe the asserted claims of 
U.S. Patents Nos. 7,190,966 and 7,286,847 owned by InterDigital. The decision 
stands out in that it considers several FRAND-related issues, including 
essentiality, patent hold-up and hold-out (case cited on pages 34, 78, 106, 113). 
 
CSIRO v. Cisco, 809 F. 3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 3, 2015) 
See detailed summary on page 93 (case also cited on pages 61, 90, 92 – 93, 97, 
114, 145). 
 
Federal Trade Commission, Robert Bosch GmbH, Dkt No. C-4377 (F.T.C. Apr. 24, 
2013) 
See detailed summary on page 117. 
 
Federal Trade Commission, Motorola Mobility LLC, No. C-4410 (F.T.C. July 23, 
2013) 
See detailed summary on page 117. 
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EUROPEAN UNION 
 
European Commission, Decision of 9.12.2009 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 
of the EEA Agreement, Case COMP/38.636 – RAMBUS 
See detailed summary on page 114. 
 
European Commission, DG Competition, Commitment Decision of 29 April 2014, 
C(2014) 2891 final, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., et. al. 
See detailed summary on page 115 (case also cited on pages 36, 78). 
 
European Commission, DG Competition, Decision of 29 April 2014, C(2014) 2892 
final, Motorola Mobility Inc. 
See detailed summary on page 115 (case also cited on pages 35). 
 
CJEU, Case C-170/13, Decision of 16 July 2015, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. 
ZTE Corp., ZTE Deutschland GmbH. 
See detailed summary on page 66 (case also cited on pages 37, 68 – 72, 79, 83, 
99, 156, 164, 165). 
 
 
GERMANY 
 
Mannheim District Court, Decision of 17 December 2013, Case no 2 O 41/13 – 
Vringo v. ZTE; Karlsruhe Court of Appeal, Decision of 19 February 2014, Docket 
No.: 6 U 162/13 – ZTE v. Vringo 
In these proceedings involving a patent essential to a cellular standard, the 
Mannheim District Court found for patent infringement and rejected ZTE’s request 
for a stay of the proceedings in view of the pending referral of the Huawei v. ZTE 
before the CJEU. On appeal, the Karlsruhe court of appeal dismissed ZTE’s 
request for a preliminary stay of provisional enforcement of the district court’s 
decision. The appellate court held that, pending a decision by the CJEU, the 
“Orange-Book-Standard” requirements decision still applied and that it was 
uncontested that ZTE did not meet these requirements in the case at hand (case 
cited on page 69).  
 
Mannheim District Court, 2 O 103/14, Decision of 10 March 2015 - St Lawrence 
Communication v. Deutsche Telekom; Karlsruhe Court of Appeal, 6 U 44/15, 23 
April 2015 - St Lawrence Communication v. Deutsche Telekom; Mannheim District 
Court, 27 November, 2015, 2 O 106/14, 2 O 107/14, 2 O 108/14, St Lawrence 
Communication v. Deutsche Telekom 
The Mannheim District Court held that St Lawrence, a patent licensing company 
and European subsidiary of Acacia Research Group LLC., was entitled to injunctive 
relief against Deutsche Telekom based on the infringement of one of its patents. 
St Lawrence’s patent was judged to be standard-essential with respect to AMR-
WB, a wideband speech-encoding standard whose functions include a greatly 
improved quality of speech. Several mobile phone manufacturers intervened on 
the side of Deutsche Telekom, expressing their willingness to take a license. 
Deutsche Telekom, however, declined to take it. The Mannheim district court held 
that Deutsche Telekom could not rely on a FRAND defense. Irrespective of the 
Orange Book Standard, it is the prerequisite of a FRAND defense that the patent 
infringer is objectively ready, willing and able to conclude a license agreement. 
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On appeal, the court in Karlsruhe disagreed with the court in Mannheim and 
suspended enforcement of injunctive relief pending appeal. Later that year, on 27 
November 2015, the Mannheim district court used the opportunity to apply the 
guidance given by the CJEU in Huawei v. ZTE and granted an injunction against 
Deutsche Telekom. According to the facts of the case, St Lawrence first filed the 
action and then put Deutsche Telekom on notice. HTC, which participated in the 
proceedings as intervener in support of Deutsche Telekom, was put on notice 
indirectly via counsels for Deutsche Telekom shortly thereafter. Therefore, when 
Deutsche Telekom and HTC were first made aware of the infringement, they were 
effectively already under pressure due to the filed court action. Furthermore, the 
FRAND offer was not made by Deutsche Telekom as defendant, but by HTC as 
supplier of the accused devices. As a mere distributor of the accused devices 
Deutsche Telekom had refused to take a license itself. The Mannheim district 
court found that both Deutsche Telekom and HTC had had enough time to 
consider their reaction and could not make the argument that notice of 
infringement was given too late (case cited on page 74, 76, 106). 
 
Düsseldorf District Court, Decisions of 3 November 2015 – 4a O 144/14 und 4a O 
93/14 - Sisvel v. Haier; Düsseldorf Court of Appeal, Decisions of 13 January 2016 
– 15 U 65/15 und 15 U 66/15 – Sisvel v. Haier 
In two related cases, the Düsseldorf district court granted Sisvel’s motion for an 
injunction against German and European distribution companies of the Haier 
group, enjoining them from selling the accused UMTS- and GPRS-compliant 
smartphones and tablets in Germany. Sisvel runs various patent licensing 
programs, including a wireless licensing program that includes more than 350 
patents originally acquired from Nokia that Sisvel claims have been declared 
essential to second, third, and fourth generation wireless standards (including 
GSM, GPRS, UMTS, and LTE). The defendants offer smartphones and tablets in 
Germany that implement the UMTS and GPRS standards adopted by ETSI. Sisvel 
informed Haier (the defendants’ parent company) of its patent licensing program 
several times in 2012 and 2013. Negotiations in 2014 ended without an 
agreement, with defendants rejecting several written license offers by Sisvel 
without making a counter-proposal. Sisvel continued to offer licenses in 2015 
during the pending court proceedings, but the defendants continued to reject all 
of them without making any counteroffers. The defendants disputed that Sisvel’s 
license offer met FRAND requirements. Specifically, defendants argued that 
Sisvel’s license fees, which ranged from EUR 0.15 to EUR 0.50 depending on 
volume, were unreasonable and in excess of a royalty of 0.012% that defendants 
claimed to be FRAND. Defendants also challenged the offer based on the fact that 
it was only for a worldwide license, with no option to license only the asserted 
German patent. Finding that the accused products practiced the FRAND 
encumbered patent, the district court granted injunctive relief (case cited on 
pages 71 – 72, 98). 
 
Düsseldorf District Court, Decisions of 19 January 2016, 4b O 120/14, 4b O 
122/14 and 4b O 123/14 – Unwired Planet v. Samsung 
In a series of trials, the German district court held that Samsung and Huawei’s 
LTE and GSM compliant handsets infringe three European patents of Unwired 
Planet related to cellular technology (respective patent portfolio was acquired 
from Ericsson in 2013). With respect to the infrastructure equipment, the court 
found that Samsung and Huawei’s products infringe one of two asserted patents 
covering LTE technology. Huawei and Samsung have filed an appeal against the 
district court judgment (case cited on pages 104 - 105). 
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Mannheim District Court, 29 January 2016, 7 O 66/15 - NTT DoCoMo v. HTC 
NTT DoCoMO, a major mobile operator in Japan, asserted its patents deemed 
essential for the Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) standard 
against HTC Germany, which allegedly incorporated the patented technology in its 
products. Prior to bringing the action, NTT DoCoMo offered HTC a regional license 
and specified royalty rates for a term of three years. HTC ultimately rejected the 
offer by submitting a counter-offer eighteen months after the initial offer was 
presented (six months after NTT DoCoMo sued HTC). Additionally, HTC did not 
provide security at any time following NTT DoCoMo’s rejection of the counter-
offer. The Mannheim Court found that NTT DoCoMo did not abuse its dominant 
position and granted the injunction (case cited on pages 71 – 72, 98). 
 
Düsseldorf District Court, 31 March 2016, 4a O 73/14 - St. Lawrence 
Communication v. Vodafone; Düsseldorf Court of Appeal, 9 May 2016, I-15 
U35/16, 15 U35/16 – St Lawrence Communication v. Vodafone 
The dispute concerned a patent in the field of wireless telecommunication, which 
is part of the AMR-WB standard under the 3rd Generation Partnership Project 
(3GPP). This standard deals with broadband speech transmission allowing for an 
improved speech quality. St Lawrence, the plaintiff, is a non-practicing entity 
offering the patent in suit as well as its other patents in its family in terms of a 
global portfolio license. Vodafone, the defendant is a network operator 
distributing various mobile phones, incl. those originating from the intervener 
HTC as well as cell phones sold under the Vodafone brand. The district court 
stated the infringement of the patent by the defendant and granted an injunction 
against Vodafone, which had neither made a counter offer, nor furnished security. 
On appeal, the Düsseldorf court of appeal affirmed the order of preliminary 
injunctions (case cited on pages 71 – 72, 98 – 99, 101). 
 
Karlsruhe Court of Appeal, 31 May 2016, 6 U 55/16 
The plaintiff had filed a complaint for alleged infringement of a DVD-pool patent 
against the defendant before the decision in the Huawei v. ZTE case was 
pronounced. In out-of-court discussions, the asserted patent and its alleged 
infringement was not pointed out to the defendant; this information was only 
included in the filed complaint. In the course of the proceedings, the defendant 
indicated willingness to discuss a FRAND license. The plaintiff provided an offer it 
considered FRAND, which the defendant disputed before bringing an own offer. 
The Mannheim district court awarded the complaint and held that the FRAND 
defense could not be successfully raised. In its decision, it reviewed the disputed 
FRAND offer of the plaintiff only on a summary basis, checking for evident non-
FRAND compliance without going into details of the actual calculation. On appeal, 
the Karlsruhe court of appeal abated the preliminary enforcement of the first 
instance judgment, albeit limited to the claims for recall and destruction of the 
infringing goods – the order on the injunctions was upheld (case cited on page 
72). 
 
 
THE NETHERLANDS 
The Hague District Court, Decision of 7 March 2010, Doc. no. 316533/HA ZA 08-
2522 and 316535/HA ZA 08-2524 (joint cases) - Philips v. SK Kasetten 
The Hague district court held that SK Kasetten infringed several essential patents 
owned by Philips, relating to CD and DVD technology. SK Kasetten argued – 
under reference to the Orange Book decision of the German BGH – that it was 
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entitled to a license under FRAND terms, and that this would preclude Philips from 
enforcing its patents. The Court of The Hague rejected the application of the 
Orange Book criteria under Dutch law (case cited on page 73). 
 
The Hague District Court, 10 March 2011, Case n° 389067 / KG ZA 11-269 - Sony 
Supply Chain Solutions (Europe) B.V. and LG Electronics, Inc.  
LG’s complaint relates to its European patents on the Blu-ray Disc standard and 
specifically asserts the following three patents. LG explains that those patents are 
essential to the Blu-ray Disc standard, and therefore, necessarily infringed by 
Sony’s PlayStation 3 since it comes with a Blu-ray player. LG claims that it was 
willing to grant Sony a license on FRAND, but Sony allegedly wants to take a 
license only if LG and Sony also reach an agreement on royalties in entirely 
different and unrelated technology areas (such as TVs, monitors and mobile 
phones). In February 2011, LGE was granted a leave to attach Sony’s PlayStation 
3 devices for the purpose of surrender. That order was granted ex parte by the 
Breda District Court and was directed against Sony's Dutch affiliate. Based on 
that Court Order, a substantial number of Sony’s PlayStation 3 was seized. In 
addition, shipments of Sony’s Playstation 3 were seized by Dutch customs officers 
based on the European Regulation 1383/2003. Following Sony’s appeal, The 
Hague District Court ordered that the interim injunction be lifted and the goods 
seized (case cited on page 73). 
 
The Hague District Court, Decisions 14 March 2012 and 20 June 2012, Cases No. 
400367/HA ZA 11-2212 - Samsung Electronics v. Apple Inc. et al. 
Samsung sued Apple for infringement of its patents related to 3G-technology. 
Before discussing infringement and validity, the court denied in its interlocutory 
judgment Samsung’s request for injunctive relief. It held that in view of the 
negotiations on the terms of a FRAND license between the parties, the request for 
an injunction by Samsung in light of the circumstances should be seen as an 
abuse of authority and/or contrary to the pre contractual obligation to negotiate 
in good faith. The court held that it could not be maintained that Apple was not 
negotiating in good faith (case cited on pages 73, 99, 109). 
 
The Hague District Court, Decision of 24 October 2014, C/09/470109 / KG ZA 14-
870 - ZTE v. Vringo 
As of September 2012, Vringo and ZTE have been unsuccessfully engaged in 
licensing negotiations regarding Vringo's portfolio of SEPs. In April and May 2014, 
at Vringo's request, Dutch customs seized several shipments of ZTE's goods using 
UMTS technology. The goods allegedly infringed Vringo's European patent that 
has been declared essential for UMTS. Subsequently, Vringo made ZTE a last 
licensing offer on 18 June 2014. ZTE did not respond to this offer and instead 
initiated preliminary proceedings before the District Court of The Hague to lift the 
customs seizure and prohibit Vringo from effectuating further seizures on the 
basis of any of its SEPs. The Court rejected ZTE’s request, stating that the 
customs seizure could not be perceived as Vringo forcing its licensing terms on 
ZTE (case cited on pages 74, 109). 
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FRANCE 
 
Paris District Court, Decision of 8 December 2011, no. RG 11/58301, Samsung 
Electronics Co Ltd, et al. v. Apple France Sar. 
Samsung filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against Apple attacking the 
iPhone4S. Apple argued before the Paris district court that Samsung‘s claim would 
constitute an abuse of a dominant position. The court dismissed Samsung’s claim 
and did not address the issue, because it found that after a summary assessment 
of the facts that there were serious doubts against infringement and that this did 
not justify the grant of a preliminary injunction (case cited on page 109). 
 
Paris District Court, Decision of 29 November 2013, no 12/14922, 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. TCT Mobile Europe SAS and TCT Mobile 
International Ltd. 
The patents in suit were related to three of Ericsson’s SEPs for the 
implementation of the 3G standards (UMTS). Ericsson sought a preliminary 
injunction against TCT Mobile, accusing TCT Mobile of infringing the French 
designations of these European patents by marketing product ranges of mobile 
phones suitable and intended for use on the 3G-network. The district court found 
that the requested preliminary injunction could be granted for SEPs when the 
negotiations for a license are ongoing and where the parties agree on the 
geographical extent and technological scope of the agreement, but disagree only 
on the royalty rate (case cited on page 74). 
 
Paris District Court, Decision of 17 April 2015, n° 14/14124, Core Wireless v. LG 
Electronics 
Core Wireless and LG failed to reach an agreement regarding the licensing of Core 
Wireless’ portfolio of 1,261 SEPs covering 2G, 3G and 4G ETSI standards. These 
patents had been acquired from Nokia in 2012. Core Wireless decided not to 
request an injunction or damages. Instead, it asked the court to set a FRAND rate 
for the licensing of its SEPs to LG. In its opinion, looking at a “sample” of five 
SEPs was a proper way to assess that its whole portfolio was essential and that a 
FRAND license royalty should be set on the said portfolio. However, Core Wireless 
did not disclose a single document explaining what a proper royalty rate could be, 
requesting the Court to appoint an expert. LG replied that the patents were 
invalid or, at least, non-essential to the standards and that such a claim from 
Core Wireless was an abuse of a dominant position. Leaving aside LG’s invalidity 
defense by LGE, the Paris district court examined the essentiality of the patents 
at issue. Stating that Core Wireless had not demonstrated that any of the 
asserted patents was essential to any of the standards, the court rejected its 
claims (case cited on page 107). 
 
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Nokia v. Interdigital Technology, UK High Court, Patents Court, Decision of 21 
December 2007, [2007] EWHC 3077 (Pat) 
This decision was ground breaking in that it was the first to grant a negative 
declaration regarding the essentiality of patents to an international standard. 
Specifically, the UK High Court addressed the question whether it had a role to 
play in deciding whether patents declared to be essential to an international 
standard were actually essential. Nokia sought to establish that the inventions 
claimed in a number of InterDigital's patents were not essential to the 3G mobile 
 50 
telecommunications standard in Europe. The claim originally specified twenty-nine 
patents, which had been declared to ETSI as essential to the standard, but prior 
to the exchange of evidence only seven were still in dispute. InterDigital did not 
ultimately advance any case in relation to three of these, so that merely four 
patents remained contended by the time the matter came to trial. The underlying 
technologies related to power control, the use of multiple pilot signals by a single 
CDMA air interface base station and antennae diversity. Judge Pumfrey held only 
one out of the four patents essential, but only with regard to the method claims. 
After evaluating presented evidence and taking into account the substantial size 
of the UK market, he concluded that the declarations would be useful and that he 
was right to grant them (case cited on page 107). 
 
IPCom v. Nokia, 18 May 2012, [2012] EWHC 1446 (Ch) 
The decision – one of many in a series of cases in which IPCom sues both HTC 
and Nokia on the same patent - addresses the question to what extent SEP 
holders may seek injunctive relief. The UK High Court refused to grant IPCom (a 
non-practicing entity) a request for injunction against Nokia for practicing an 
IPCom FRAND-encumbered SEP. IPCom confirmed that it was bound by an 
undertaking given to the European Commission in 2009 to grant a license to 
Nokia on FRAND terms. Nokia equally confirmed its willingness to take a license 
on FRAND terms. Under the circumstances, the court concluded that an injunction 
would be inappropriate (case cited on page 74). 
 
Vringo Infrastructure Inc. v. ZTE (UK) Ltd., UK High Court, Patents Court, 
Decisions of 6 June 2013, [2013] EWHC 1591 (pat) 
Vringo issued two sets of proceedings against ZTE in the High Court for 
infringement of six patents all of which related to mobile phones and 
telecommunication systems. These patents were part of a large portfolio of over 
500 patents that had been acquired from Nokia – hundreds thereof were declared 
as standard-essential. Vringo claimed that it had offered ZTE a worldwide 
portfolio license that complied with any and all contractual and/or competition 
obligations. Whereas Vringo argued that the court should first address the FRAND 
issues and then deal with validity and infringement, if necessary, ZTE favored the 
opposite approach. Birss J stated that there were two different circumstances in 
which the court could make a determination relating to the rate and terms of a 
license with different outcomes – that of the willing licensor and licensee in which 
the decision ends the dispute and that of the parties who will continue to look at 
the issues of validity and infringement before being bound by the initial finding. 
Despite being prepared to set a FRAND rate, the court refused the application, 
noting that it would only be a worthwhile exercise of both parties were willing to 
be bound by its determination. However, as ZTE did not agree to be bound, the 
court could not and should not compel or coerce a defendant to be bound by a 
FRAND decision, thereby losing its entitlement to challenge the validity and 
infringement of the patents in suit. Accordingly, the judge refused to schedule a 
FRAND trial before invalidity and infringement had been determined (case cited 
on pages 75, 108). 
 
IPCom GmbH & Co Kg v. HTC Europe Co Ltd & Ors, UK High Court, Patents Court, 
Decision of 24 April 2015, [2015] EWHC 1034 (Pat) 
In the on-going dispute between IPCom, Nokia and HTC, Nokia sued IPCom in the 
UK High Court to revoke its European chipset level patent relating to 
communication channel access control. Nokia also sought declarations of non-
infringement in relation to certain handset models. In the first instance, Floyd J 
had found the patent valid as amended and infringed by certain Nokia products 
 51 
that are compliant to the UMTS standard. Nokia appealed the decision. With a 
ruling of 10 May 2012, the Court of Appeal upheld the first instance decision. In 
parallel opposition proceedings, however, the European Patent Office (EPO) 
revoked the said patent and the UK Court suspended the patent revocation 
pending appeal before an EPO Technical Board of Appeal. In September 2012, the 
parties returned to the court to determine whether IPCom was entitled to an 
injunction in the UK. The court took the view that it would be inappropriate to 
grant an injunction, because IPCom was willing to grant a FRAND license in 
accordance with undertakings given to ETSI and the European Commission, and 
that Nokia accepted that it would take a license on FRAND terms (at least for the 
UK designation of the patent). The court therefore found that the only remaining 
issue in dispute was the determination of FRAND terms. On 6 December 2012, 
the parties were before the court again, with Justice Floyd hearing applications 
from both Nokia and HTC for permission to adduce evidence from a technical 
expert at the trial of the non-technical defenses. Birss J agreed to adduce 
evidence from a technical expert and comparable licenses, but shortly before the 
hearing due January 2013, Nokia and IPCom announced that they were close to a 
settlement and they invited the court to delay determining a FRAND royalty (case 
cited on page 59). 
 
Unwired Planet International Ltd. v. Huawei Technologies Co, Samsung 
Electronics Co, Google and others, UK High Court, Patents Court, Decision of 21 
July 2015, [2015] EWHC 2097 (Pat) 
In November 2015, the UK High Court ruled that Unwired Planet’s European 
patent for an LTE standard (known as 3GPP TS 36.322 release 8 version 8.8.0.), 
which it had acquired from Ericsson, was valid and infringed by Samsung and 
Huawei. In context of this litigation, the UK High Court handed down an interim 
judgment (dated 21 July 2015), which addressed issues relating to the transfer of 
an ETSI FRAND obligation. In this interim judgment, Birss J struck out arguments 
brought by Samsung that Ericsson had breached Article 101 TFEU by not ensuring 
the transfer of an effective FRAND obligation to Unwired Planet in relation to 
these patents. However, he allowed arguments relating to other alleged breaches 
of Article 101 TFEU to proceed to trial, on the basis that they might have a real 
prospect of success. The Unwired Planet litigation is ongoing with one non-
technical and three technical trials planned for 2016. The first one is expected to 
address a wide range of issues relating to the terms of FRAND licensing (case 
cited on page 103). 
 
 
CHINA 
 
Huawei v. InterDigital, Judgments of 28 October 2013, Guangdong Higher 
People’s Court of China (Yue Gaofa Minsan Zhougzi Nos. 305 and 306) 
See detailed summary on page 76 (case also cited on pages 95, 102, 112, 119). 
 
Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) v. Qualcomm, 
Decision of 10 February 2015 
See detailed summary on page 120 (case also cited on pages 90, 119). 
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KOREA  
 
Seoul Central District Court, 24 August 2012, Case no. 2011 GaHap 39552, 
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Korea Ltd. 
In April 2011, Samsung filed a lawsuit in the Seoul Central District Court seeking 
an injunction against Apple for infringement of patents it claimed were essential 
to the UMTS cellular standard, and for which Samsung had made FRAND 
commitments to ETSI. Apple contested infringement and validity of the asserted 
patents. In August 2012, the court issued a decision in which it found that Apple 
infringed two of the asserted patents. The court awarded Samsung damages of 
KRW 40,000,000 (approx. USD 35,500) for Apple’s infringement of the two 
patents and granted Samsung an injunction. Furthermore, the court denied 
Apple’s claim that Samsung had violated the Korean anti-monopoly laws by 
seeking an injunction for its SEPs. Although SEPs provide the patent holder with a 
dominant position in the relevant markets, both parties are responsible for their 
failure to reach an agreement (case cited on pages 77, 157). 
 
Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), Decision of 26 February 2014, Samsung 
Electronics Co., Ltd. 
On April 15, 2011, Apple filed a lawsuit against Samsung with a US district court, 
seeking an injunction to prohibit infringements on designs and non-SEPs as well 
as damages. In response to the lawsuit, Samsung filed a lawsuit against Apple 
with the Seoul Central District Court on April 21, 2011, seeking an injunction to 
prohibit infringements on four SEPs and non-SEPs related to technology for 3G 
mobile communications systems, along with damages therefor. Samsung sought 
an injunction to prohibit Apple from selling four products (iPhone 3GS, iPhone 4, 
iPad1(Wifi+3G) and iPad2 (Wifi+3G)) based on the alleged infringement of the 
related SEPs. In response to the Samsung's lawsuit, Apple alleged (i) that 
Samsung Electronics seeking an injunction constituted an unfair use of patent 
infringement by a market dominant firm and (ii) that its breach of the obligation 
of timely disclosure of patent information in the course of standard setting 
constituted the interference of the competitor's business activities. The KFTC 
concluded that, because Apple failed to engage in good faith negotiations, 
Samsung’s injunction claims against Apple do not constitute an abuse of 
dominance or unfair trade practice. In its decision, the KFTC made reference to 
the commitments Samsung had made to the European Commission, to the 
findings of the U.S. International Trade Commission that Apple infringed 
Samsung's patents (which led to an appeal to the Federal Circuit), as well as to 
the U.S. Department of Justice decision to close its investigation into Samsung for 
potential abuse of SEPs (case cited on pages 78, 113). 
 
 
JAPAN 
 
Apple v. Samsung, Japanese IP High Court, Decision of 16 May, 2014, Case No. 
2013[Ne] 10043 (This is an appeal case from the Judgment of Tokyo District 
Court, February 28, 2013 [Case No. 2011 [Wa] 38969]) 
In this case, the Japanese IP High court considered a FRAND defense for the first 
time. Samsung had filed a request for a preliminary injunction against Apple with 
the Tokyo district court. On 28 February 2013, the Tokyo district court rejected 
Samsung’s request for a preliminary injunction against Apple on a patent 
essential to 3G. With respect to Apple’s motion for a declaratory judgment that 
Samsung did not have the right to claim damages based on infringement 
allegations, the court found that although Apple’s products infringed certain 
 53 
asserted patents and those patents were valid, Samsung did not have a right to 
damages. The court held that, under the Japanese civil code, parties in contract 
negotiations have the duty to share important information and negotiate in good 
faith. The court ruled that Samsung breached this duty, because it failed to 
provide information that would support the calculation of its royalty demands. 
Samsung appealed against the decision to the Japanese Intellectual Property High 
Court. The latter stated that, once a patent is FRAND-encumbered, the 
proprietors cannot seek injunctive relief. To the extent that the infringer provides 
sufficient proof that it has been willing licensees, seeking injunctions against this 
willing licensee amounts to an abuse of right under Civil Code Article 1 (3) - a 
fundamental principle of Japanese civil law applied to all areas of private assertion 
of rights. The court granted damages of 9,955,854 Japanese Yen (approx. USD 
83,400.10 at the time). The amount was calculated based on FRAND royalty 
analogies with existing pool rates (case cited on pages 79, 95, 157). 
 
Imation Corporation Japan v. One-Blue LLC, Tokyo Dist. Ct., Feb. 18, 2015, Case 
No. 2013 (Wa) 21383 
Imation sells Blu-ray Disk products in Japanese retail stores. The defendant, One-
Blue, is a patent pool management company, jointly established by Blu-ray 
related patent proprietors in 2009. The plaintiff had been selling Blu-ray disks in 
the US without a license from the defendant or individual licensors. On 25 June 
2012, the defendant informed the plaintiff about the worldwide licensing program 
the defendant was offering and requested the immediate suspension of sales of 
unlicensed Blu-ray disks. The royalties proposed by the defendant was USD 
0.1075 per BD-R, USD 0.135 per BD-RE, USD 0.13 per BDXL-R, and USD 0.16 
per BDXL-RE. The plaintiff did not consider the proposed royalty to be fair and 
reasonable, but declared its willingness to pay a fair and reasonable royalty at 
3.5% of the sales cost of the bare discs. The plaintiff also requested that the 
defendant disclose licensing agreements with other parties, including the applied 
actual royalty rates (including grant back agreements). A week later, the 
defendant responded that it would not negotiate with individual licensees in order 
to avoid allegations of discriminatory practices. On 4 June 2013, the defendant 
sent out a notice to three retailers in Japan, warning them that the sales of Blu-
ray discs were produced without a license, constituted an infringement of the 
patents managed by the defendant, and that the patent proprietor had the right 
to seek damages and injunctions with immediate suspension of sales. The Tokyo 
district court ruled that the above notice contained a “false allegation” and was 
thus prohibited under Art. 2 (xiv) Unfair Competition Prevention Act (case cited 
on page 80). 
 
 
INDIA 
 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Micromax Informatics Ltd. and Mercury 
Electronics Ltd., High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, Court order of 12 March 2013, 
Docket no. C.S. (OS) 442/2013; Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Xiaomi 
Technology and others, Interim Application No. 24580 of 2014 in Civil Suit 
(Original Side) No. 3775 of 2014, High Court of Delhi (8 December 2014); 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Intex Techs. (India) Ltd, Interim Application 
No. 6735 of 2014 in Civil Suit (Original Side) No. 1045 of 2014, High Court of 
Delhi (13 March 2015) 
The High Court of Delhi dealt with issues pertaining to SEPs and their availability 
on FRAND terms in cases filed by Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson against multiple 
companies alleging infringement of its patents that were essential to the 2G and 
3G standards. In the first suit against Micromax, the Single Bench of the High 
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Court of Delhi ordered an ex parte interim injunction against Micromax for alleged 
infringement of eight patents purportedly essential to wireless standards. The 
court also issued an order authorizing the seizure of documents. The court order, 
however, did not provide any reason for the prima facie finding of patent 
infringement. Micromax’ appeal to a division bench of the Delhi High Court was 
dismissed. The order dismissing the appeal did not mention FRAND. Eventually, 
the interim injunction was lifted following an interim arrangement between the 
parties, according to which Micromax had to deposit the royalties at the 
demanded rates. Similarly, injunctions were granted in the other two cases 
against Xiaomi and Intex. In all cases, the defendants were ordered to pay 
Ericsson a royalty determined by the court. For the purpose, the court examined 
relevant cases across various jurisdictions worldwide and relied on information on 
comparable licenses in order to determine FRAND. Specifically, it used the net 
sales price of the downstream device as royalty base. In addition to the patent 
infringement suits, Ericsson filed appeals against various orders passed by the 
Competition Commission of India (CCI), as reported below. The High Court of 
Delhi granted interim stay on all these orders (cases cited on pages 80 – 81, 90, 
95). 
 
Micromax Informatics, Ltd v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Case No. 50 of 
2013, Competition Commission of India (12 November 2013); Intex Techs. 
(India) v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Case No. 76 of 2013, Competition 
Commission of India (16 January 2014); Best It Worlds (India) Private Ltd. v. 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Case No. 4 of 2015, Competition Commission of 
India (12 May 2015) 
Micromax filed a complaint with the Competition Commission of India (CCI), 
alleging that Ericsson abused its dominant position by imposing exorbitant 
royalties for the use of its SEPs. Micromax further argued that using the sales 
price of the downstream product as the royalty base constituted an abuse of SEPs 
that would ultimately harm consumers. Micromax claimed that Ericsson was using 
its market position to impose excessive royalties, i.e., Ericsson was the sole 
licensor for the SEPs necessarily implemented in 2G and 3G Wireless 
Telecommunication Standards and there were no technical alternatives to the use 
of these technologies. In its preliminary order, CCI stated that, in the relevant 
product market, Ericsson was the largest holder of SEPs for mobile 
communications (2G, 3G and 4G patents used for smart phones, tablets etc.) and 
thus held a dominant position in the market for devices that implement such 
standards. Ericsson’s royalty rates were deemed excessive and discriminatory, 
given that they were set as a percentage of the price of downstream products 
instead of as a percentage of the price of the GSM or CDMA chip. A similar 
outcome marked the suits of Intex and Best It Worlds (India) (cases cited on 
pages 90, 122). 
 
3.2.  FRAND AS A BILATERAL NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
The assertion of patent rights related to FRAND-encumbered SEPs, for example, 
in the context of injunctive relief and - to a certain extent - during patent 
infringement, is typically regarded as the result of unsuccessful bilateral 
negotiations between the involved parties. Courts and competition authorities 
approach certain aspects of this bilateral context through a different lens, 
depending on the legal and procedural particularities of the respective 
jurisdictions. In the following parts of the study, we will focus on how 
“reasonableness” in the context of FRAND hinges on the willingness of the 
negotiating parties in the context of patent infringement and the definition of the 
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bargaining range through the hypothetical negotiation construct; and in the 
context of injunctions and the requirements attached to a good faith negotiation.  
 
3.2.1.  Defining timing and other factors of the negotiation 
process 
3.2.1.1.  Ex ante negotiation benchmark 
The notions of “hypothetical negotiations” and “ex ante bargaining” are deeply 
embedded in the US patent law. Central to the calculation of patent damages, the 
hypothetical negotiation attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the parties 
would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an agreement just before 
infringement began, and necessarily involves an element of approximation and 
uncertainty.26 The hypothetical negotiation s necessarily deemed to take place “ex 
ante”, i.e., prior to infringement or at a time when the patented technology was, 
at least hypothetically, competing with alternative technologies for inclusion in 
the standard, and not “ex post”, i.e., at the time of the infringement or after the 
patent was locked into the standard. In other words, the basic question posed in 
a hypothetical negotiation is: if, on the eve of infringement, a willing licensor and 
licensee had entered into an agreement instead of allowing infringement of the 
patent to take place, what would that agreement be? This question cannot be 
meaningfully answered unless we also presume knowledge of the patent and of 
the infringement at the time the accused inducement conduct began. Were we to 
permit a later notice date to serve as the hypothetical negotiation date, the 
damages analysis would be skewed because, as a legal construct, we seek to pin 
down how the prospective infringement might have been avoided via an out-of-
court business solution.27 
By defining a certain approach to the negotiation process, the hypothetical 
negotiation construct is tied to a series of undefined or debated assumptions such 
as the presumed strength of the infringed patent, the timing of the negotiations, 
and the significance of ex post facts. An area of dispute in implementing the 
hypothetical negotiation construct surrounds the timing of the negotiation. On the 
one hand, an early start date of the hypothetical negotiation at the time of the 
standard lock-in tends to favor the infringer and his ability to avoid investments 
and to next-best alternatives. On the other hand, a later start of the hypothetical 
negotiation at the “eve of the infringement” tends to favor the patent holder as it 
may result in higher royalty rates due to lock-in effects. In the latter case, 
uncertainty with respect to the precise time of the first infringement can thus 
result in the hypothetical negotiation being set well after lock-in. Lock-in costs 
refer to costs that the alleged infringer has usually made between the ex ante 
hypothetical negotiation date and the infringement, incl. designing technology 
into products and peripherals, configured production equipment and processes, 
trained employees etc. In other words, lock-in costs refer to how much more it 
would cost the infringer to switch to an alternative technology ex post that it 
would have cost to switch ex ante. 
In cases involving infringement of non-SEPs, the start date of the hypothetical 
negotiation is traditionally set just before the infringement. This is not the case in 
the context of SEP litigation: the case law on FRAND has added a number of 
assumptions regarding the circumstances of the hypothetical negotiation, which 
apply specifically to the FRAND context. In the Microsoft v. Motorola analysis, for 
example, it is explicitly assumed that the bilateral negotiation takes place under 
                                           
26  Lucent Techs., Inc. v Gateway, Inc., 580 F. 3d 1301 at 1324-1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
27  LaserDynamics, Inc. v Quanta Computer Inc., 694 F. 3d 51 at 76 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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the FRAND obligation.28 This assumption can have several implications both for 
the timeframe of the negotiation and the aspect of essentiality.  
 
 
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993 (W.D. Wash. 2012); 
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012) 
This is a pioneer case, the first explicit judicial discussion on the meaning of 
FRAND. The court makes clear that RAND is to be understood as creating 
additional obligations on top of “reasonable royalties”, in particular to account for 
the risks of hold-up and royalty stacking. Following core economic principles, 
Judge Robart set forth the first framework for the determination of RAND royalty 
rates. Although not a new legal doctrine on the meaning of FRAND, the solution 
concept is framed as a hypothetical bilateral negotiation ex ante to standard 
setting. The court proposes a modified list of Georgia Pacific factors to account for 
the RAND commitment and the asserted essentiality of the patents. 
Microsoft sued Motorola in the Western District of Washington for infringement of 
patents relating to smartphone technology. Later that month, Motorola sent 
Microsoft two letters offering to license each of two sets of standard-essential 
patents—one relating to the 802.11 WiFi standard and the other to the H.264 
video compression standard—for 2.25% of the selling price of each consumer 
product incorporating those standards. Both standards were incorporated in 
Microsoft’s Xbox video game console; the H.264 standard was also incorporated 
into Microsoft’s Windows operating system. That the patents were standard-
essential was not in dispute. The following month, Microsoft brought a diversity 
action against Motorola in the Western District of Washington alleging that by 
sending the two offer letters, Motorola had violated its commitment to license its 
patents on RAND terms. Although Motorola’s commitment was to IEEE and ITU, 
Microsoft brought the breach of contract claim as a third-party beneficiary of that 
commitment. Motorola also filed a patent infringement action with the 
International Trade Commission (ITC), seeking to enjoin Microsoft from importing 
the Xbox into the United States, and filed suit in Germany seeking to enjoin 
Microsoft’s sales of H.264-compliant products. German action was particularly 
threatening to Microsoft, as its European distribution center for all Windows and 
Xbox products was in Germany. In response, Microsoft relocated its distribution 
center to the Netherlands to protect itself against the possible economic loss it 
would suffer if the German court were to issue an injunction. It also sought (and 
obtained) an order from the district court enjoining Motorola from enforcing any 
injunction issued by the German court. 
After holding a bench trial, Judge Robart issued on 25 April 2013 a 207-page 
opinion on FRAND issues (cited as Order of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, April 25, 2013, No. 10-cv-1823 (W.D. Wash.)). He determined that the 
RAND rate for Motorola’s H.264 patent portfolio was 0.555 cents per end-product 
unit (with un upper bound of about 16 cents a unit), and that the RAND rate for 
its 802.11 patents was 3.71 cents per end-product unit (with a range of 0.8 cents 
to 19.5 cents per unit). Both rates were much lower than the approximately $4 
per unit Motorola had sought in its offer letters. The case then proceeded to a 
jury trial on the breach of contract claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Microsoft finding that Motorola had breached its duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, and awarded Microsoft damages in the amount of $14.52 million, all but 
$3 million of which was for the cost of relocating its distribution center from 
Germany to the Netherlands. 
                                           
28  Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993 (W.D. Wash. 2012). 
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Robart’s 
determination of the RAND rates for each of the two sets of SEPs at issue in the 
case, and upheld both the jury’s and Judge Robart’s decisions. With this decision, 
the Ninth Circuit was the First Appeals Court to Rule on FRAND/SEP Licensing. 
 
 
The analysis of the timing of the hypothetical negotiation concerning a FRAND 
license is related to the role of FRAND in preventing patent hold-up. The risk of 
patent hold-up arises from the possibility that a patent owner increases royalty 
requests after the standard is set. This risk can be avoided by setting the date of 
the hypothetical negotiation prior to the adoption of the standard. There is 
however no general rule that the date of a hypothetical negotiation must be set 
prior to the date of standard adoption. As the Federal Circuit points out in 
Ericsson v. D-Link, the implementer needs to provide evidence on hold-up in 
order for the court to adapt the consideration of the timing. 29  In Apple v. 
Motorola, Judge Posner deems the date of the hypothetical negotiation to be the 
date on which the patent became essential to the standard, rather than the date 
of first infringement.30 This sets the hypothetical exercise at the time when the 
patent was embodied in the standard (ex ante) and not afterwards (ex post).  
 
 
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 869 F. Supp.2d 901, U.S. District Court, 
N.D. Illinois (2012); Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
The case involved Apple’s patents covering heuristics for touch screen commands 
and a real-time data processing system (live audio and video streaming) as well 
as Motorola’s patent related to a method of cellular communication. For the 
calculation of damages, Apple’s expert attempted to value certain asserted patent 
claims relating to heuristics for touch screen commands such as vertical scrolling 
and tap-for-next-page commands.  
In lack of data to support the value of those precise features, the expert relied on 
data valuing a laptop touchpad, asserting that a laptop touchpad was sufficiently 
technically comparable to a smart phone touch screen to provide relevant 
evidence of value. Also, the expert discounted the touchpad price for certain 
features that were not related to the patent, such as its wireless capability. He 
compared this estimate with royalties paid by Motorola for related touch screen 
technology and rationalized the differences. With regards to the patent related to 
live audio and video streaming, Apple’s expert estimated the value of its features 
by estimating the cost of non-infringing alternatives Motorola could have used to 
design around Apple’s patent. The first involved redesigning a microchip already 
in its phones and requiring application providers to re-design their applications. 
The second involved replacing the existing chip or adding a new chip. Deeming 
the first alternative to lack certain practical advantages, the expert relied on one 
of Apple’s technical expert witnesses to identify the replacement chip and 
estimate its cost to Motorola.  
In its summary decision, the district court did not define a FRAND rate and 
dismissed the case on the grounds that there was no evidence of damages. Judge 
                                           
29  Ericsson v D- Link, 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
30  Apple, Inc. v Motorola Mobility, Inc., 869 F. Supp.2d 901, U.S. District Court, N.D. 
Illinois (2012). 
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Posner rejected Motorola’s request to enjoin Apple from practicing FRAND-
encumbered SEPs owned by Motorola.  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed in part the district court’s ruling. The 
appellate decision addressed the injunction issue, but not the level of a FRAND-
compliant royalty. The appellate court held that requests for injunctive relief 
should be evaluated under the framework applicable to injunctive relief in general 
patent cases based on the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange (2006). Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of 
injunctive relief to Motorola: Through its FRAND commitments, Motorola had 
agreed to add many market participants that would be willing to pay a FRAND 
royalty. Dissenting Judge Rader was unconvinced that Apple sufficiently proved 
its efforts towards negotiating a FRAND license. 
 
 
This approach is in line with economic considerations suggesting that, to avoid 
hold-up, the correct date should be the date on which the standard was adopted. 
For cases involving multiple patents, the Federal Circuit held in LaserDynamics v. 
Quanta Computer that, in each case, there should be only a single hypothetical 
negotiation date - not separate dates for separate acts of infringement.31 This 
goes to the issue whether non-infringing alternatives may include alternatives 
available at the time that the standard was adopted. According to In re Innovatio, 
the existence of patented alternatives should be considered, but not to drive 
down the price as much as alternatives in the public domain (reject economic 
models where competing patent owners price at incremental value over the next-
best alternative). Consideration of available alternatives should be limited to the 
options discussed in the SSO: the court will assume that technology that did not 
even merit a mention by the IEEE in its deliberations about the standard was not 
likely to have been a serious contender for adoption into the standard.32 
 
 
In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC , 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, (N.D. Ill. 2013) 
In re Innovatio stands out as a landmark US case in field of standard-essential 
patents. It addresses a wide range of issues, from hold-up and incentive 
compatibility over to the royalty and the overarching principles of FRAND (ex ante 
negotiation and incremental value). 
Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, a patent assertion entity, sued numerous coffee 
shops, hotels, restaurants, supermarkets, large retailers, transportation 
companies and other commercial users of wireless internet technology located 
throughout the United States, for infringing its portfolio of 19 patents essential to 
the IEEE 802.11 (WiFi) standard. Reportedly, Innovatio sought royalties in the 
range of $2500-3000 from each outlet for a license to the patents. Innovatio also 
began filing patent infringement suits in a variety of federal courts against 
entities that did not take a license. At the same time, at least five major suppliers 
of WiFi equipment filed declaratory judgment actions against Innovatio seeking 
declarations of invalidity and non-infringement of Innovatio’s patents. The Joint 
Panel on Multi-District Litigation (JPML) consolidated these actions for pre-trial 
proceedings before Judge Holderman in the Northern District of Illinois.  
                                           
31  LaserDynamics, Inc. v Quanta Computer Inc., 694 F. 3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
32  So Judge Holderman in In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., MDL No. 2303, 
2013 WL 5593609, at *20 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) Oct. 3, 2013) (sealed version filed 
Sept. 27, 2013). 
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Judge Holderman ruled that all of Innovatio’s asserted claims in nineteen (19) of 
its patents were essential to the 802.11 standard and Innovatio was required to 
license them on RAND terms based on the prior assurances to IEEE. 
Thereafter, the parties agreed to a bench trial on the issue of damages in order to 
assess prospects for early settlement before incurring the expense of a liability 
trial. Judge Holderman held a six-day bench trial to determine the RAND rate to 
be applied to manufacturers of WiFi equipment (.56 cents per WiFi chip). Judge 
Holderman did not consider the RAND rate that should be applied to users of WiFi 
equipment. 
 
 
In Europe, Justice Floyd formalized the “ex ante” approach during a hearing dated 
6 December 2012 in the case Nokia v. IPCom (Lundie Smith, 2013): 
“…in the case of a patent which is essential to a standard, it is appropriate to 
enquire into what license terms would have been agreed between a willing 
licensor and a willing licensee on the basis of the invention which the patent 
protects but without knowledge that the patent will be incorporated into the 
standard. The reason that that is said to be relevant is because the patent forces 
companies who wish to participate in the standard to make use of it. That fact 
alone may skew the appropriate royalty rate, which has to be paid. The approach 
is called the “ex ante” approach to the settling of the terms because it is based on 
the assumption that the terms are being agreed before the standardization has 
taken place.” 
IPCom, Nokia and HTC are on a litigation streak since Floyd J held IPCom’s patent 
in suit infringed by two Nokia devices. 33 IPCom sued both Nokia and HTC on the 
same patent in separate proceedings, but the parties decided to have their cases 
heard in a joint trial on the issues of damages as well as on the determination of 
licensing terms. The “ex ante” approach was reflected in the following issues 
raised by Nokia and HTC’s: i) whether the invention of the patent has been 
actually used in the UK and if so to what extent, ii) whether other methods of 
controlling access existed and if so the technical consequences of their use, and 
iii) the technical behavior of ways of designing around the patent, which at least 
as between Nokia and IPCom have been held not to infringe. These issues were 
said to require the input of a technical expert. The judge agreed to adduce 
evidence from a technical expert and comparable licenses, but shortly before the 
hearing due January 2013, Nokia and IPCom announced that they were close to a 
settlement and they invited the court to delay determining a FRAND royalty.34 
Meanwhile, IPCom and HTC have returned to the courts and the Patents Court 
has already handed down a first judgment concerning issues of validity, 
infringement and essentiality.35 
 
3.2.1.2. Georgia-Pacific factors 
The construct of “hypothetical negotiation between a willing licensor and willing 
licensee on the eve of the infringement", where a “next best non-infringing 
alternative” is available to the willing licensee, constitutes the theoretical 
underpinning of the so-called Georgia-Pacific framework. This framework arose 
from the seminal Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. 
                                           
33  IPCom v Nokia, [2011] EWHC 1470 (Pat).  
34  Cf. case report prior to settlement by Smith, 2013. 
35  UK High Court, Patents Court, Decision of 24 April 2015, IPCom GmbH & Co Kg v HTC 
Europe Co Ltd & Ors [2015] EWHC 1034 (Pat). 
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Supp. 1116, 1119-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and aff'd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir.) 
and was conceived as an evidentiary list of 15 factors for the assessment of 
patent damages: 
1. Royalties patentee receives for licensing the patent in suit  
2. Rates licensee pays for use of other comparable to the patent in suit  
3. Nature and scope of license in terms of exclusivity and territory/customer 
restrictions  
4. Licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain patent 
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention  
5. Commercial relationship between licensor and licensee, such as whether they 
are competitors or inventor and promoter  
6. Effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of 
the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator 
of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or 
convoyed sales  
7. Duration of patent and term of license  
8. Established profitability of the products made under the patent, its commercial 
success and its current popularity  
9. Utility and advantages of patent property over old modes and devices  
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial 
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefit of 
those who have used the invention  
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention and the value 
of such use  
12. The portion of profit or selling price customarily allowed for the use of the 
invention  
13. The portion of realizable profit attributable to the invention as distinguished 
from non- patented elements, significant features/improvements added by the 
infringer, the manufacturing process or business risks  
14. Opinion testimony of qualified experts  
15. Outcome from hypothetical arm’s length negotiation at the time of 
infringement began  
Covering a wide range of aspects related to the nature of licensing negotiations 
and the surrounding market conditions, the factors include considerations relating 
to past technology agreements (factors 1, 2), the nature, scope, and duration of 
the license (factors 3, 7), licensing policy (factor 4), commercial relationship 
between the licensor and licensee (factor 5), sales of non-patented items (factor 
6), sales and profits (factors 8, 11), contribution of the patented technology 
(factors 9, 10, 12, 13), opinions of qualified experts (factor 14), and the amount 
that a licensor and licensee would have agreed to in a hypothetical negotiation for 
a license to the patent-in-suit (factor 15). In the context of expert testimony, 
each factor is commonly assigned an “up,” “down,” or “neutral” score - “up” 
raises the royalty whereas “down” lowers it. 
Having provided this non-exhaustive - albeit comprehensive - list of evidentiary 
considerations, Judge Tenney explained that the manner and extent to which the 
different factors would be considered was left to the discretion of the fact finder.36 
Hence, the Georgia-Pacific factors were not intended as a test or formula for 
                                           
36  Georgia-Pacific Corp. v United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 at 1120-1121 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
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resolving patent damages, but as a replicable methodology, which allows for 
flexibility and modifications relevant to the case. 
For the last three decades and since the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, 
the Georgia Pacific framework has become the preferred way to compute a 
reasonable royalty. These factors have been routinely cited by U.S. courts when 
assessing “reasonable royalty” patent damages and have been advanced as a 
viable analytical framework for assessing FRAND damages. Grounded in a 
reasonableness inquiry, these factors are instructive in identifying the 
quantitative value and normative goals of fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory royalty rates. Some factors affect the determination of the 
bargaining range (Factors 1,2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13); other factors (Factors, 
3 and 10) affect the determination of the point royalty within the bargaining 
range. In other words, the result enables an evidentiary process that will 
determine a licensor’s minimum willingness to accept and a licensee’s maximum 
willingness to pay for the patented technology – the lower and upper bounds of 
the bargaining range. The ultimate outcome of the Georgia-Pacific framework 
should divide the surplus between the licensor and licensee according to their 
relative bargaining power. 
In recent case law, the hypothetical negotiation construct has faced some 
criticism. Some of the concerns regard the vague character of the fifteen Georgia-
Pacific factors and the risk of letting them develop into a mandatory checklist for 
every case. In other words, the said framework poses many potentially relevant 
questions but does not say how the finder of fact should weight the answers. 
In CSIRO v. Cisco37, the Federal Circuit affirmed that the calculations of FRAND 
rates must discount the royalty for the value accrued through inclusion of the 
patent into the standard – a requirement non-applicable to other reasonable 
royalty cases. According to the court, FRAND determination thus entails 
apportionment going beyond the apportionment that is generally required for 
reasonable royalty calculations. Applying the Georgia Pacific factors for the 
calculation of SEP royalty rates may thus not be enough. In this respect, the 
Federal Circuit did not restrict the relevance of additional apportionment 
requirement to FRAND-encumbered patents, but extended it to all SEPs. 
The utility and economic accuracy of the Georgia-Pacific factors in the RAND 
context have been questioned further in Apple v. Motorola.38 Reluctant to apply 
the Georgia-Pacific construct in the specific case, Judge Posner recognized that 
some factors cover a number of legitimate elements that any fact-based, data-
driven assessment of royalties (in or out of FRAND contexts) should take into 
consideration. For example, the nature and scope of the license (Factor 3) is 
typically important to valuation: broader rights (more relevant jurisdictions 
covered or more standards included, for instance) provide more value to the 
licensee and hence can command higher rates. And other licenses covering the 
SEPs at issue (Factor 1) can provide market-based data points for how parties 
actually operating in the industry value the patents-in-suit.39  
Despite scrutiny, the Georgia-Pacific-Factors construct is not discredited, but 
continues to provide guidance – albeit to a limited extent. Noteworthy in this 
direction is the case Microsoft v. Motorola. In the first detailed judicial 
determination of FRAND royalty rates for the 802.11 and H.264 WiFi technology 
standards, Judge Robart considered the Georgia-Pacific factors as a useful 
                                           
37  CSIRO v Cisco, 809 F. 3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 3, 2015). 
38  Apple, Inc. v Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 at 911 (N.D. Ill. 2012), affirmed and 
revised in part by Apple Inc. v Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
39  Apple, Inc. v Motorola Mobility, Inc., 869 F. Supp.2d 901, U.S. District Court, N.D. 
Illinois (2012). 
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starting point, and in particular determined the royalty calculations based upon an 
analysis of the outcome of a hypothetical negotiation. He nevertheless found that 
many of the Georgia-Pacific factors are contrary to RAND principles. For example, 
factor four - “[…] the licensor’s established policy and marketing program to 
maintain his patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by 
granting licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly” - 
is contrary to the RAND purpose of preventing monopolies. The judge went on to 
apply the Georgia-Pacific methodology with some significant modifications to 
account for the circumstances of the RAND commitment and the incremental 
value of allegedly infringed patents to the overall product offering. In the case at 
issue, Judge Robart set a judicial example by applying legal-contractual principles 
to the economic arrangements framing the parties’ licensing negotiations. By 
treating the RAND obligation as a contract, the court adopted an extensive set of 
legal and analytic principles to deploy in pursuit of a reasonable term40: 
1. the rates received by the licensor in a patent pool;  
2. the rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the 
patent in suit;  
3. the nature and scope of the license;  
4. the contribution of the patent to the standard (“Microsoft factor 6”) and the 
contribution of the standard to the product; 
5. alternatives to the current patented technology;  
6. evidence of the benefit and value of the patent to the owner and 
implementer;  
7. the customary practices of business licensing RAND-encumbered patents, 
which exclude non-RAND patents; and  
8. the impact of the SEP holder’s obligation to license its SEPs on RAND terms to 
avoid hold-up and royalty stacking on what a licensor and licensee would 
typically have agreed upon in reaching an agreement voluntarily. 
The above “modified” version of the Georgia-Pacific factors (also called “contract-
law model”) stands out as the first effective judicial approach to RAND 
commitments. It offers a reliable, workable framework to the extent that it takes 
into account a number of quantitative and qualitative indicators in order to assess 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the licensing negotiations. Albeit 
systematic enough to be extrapolated to other cases, Judge Robart’s approach 
raises interpretative challenges insofar as his ultimate royalty calculation does not 
favor SEP holders or does not provide adequate compensation in the context of 
good-faith offers by SEP holders. It has thus been subject to the same criticism as 
the broader Georgia-Pacific framework it is embedded in (see, e.g., Sidak, 2013; 
Beach, 2016; Teece & Sherry, 2016).  
Motorola filed an appeal against the district court decision, in particular because 
of the judge’s failure to implement the typically cited Georgia-Pacific factors. The 
Court of Appeal upheld Robart’s methodology, thereby clearly limiting the role of 
the Georgia-Pacific factors for FRAND determinations – a position it reaffirmed 
later in Ericsson v. D-Link.  
 
 
 
                                           
40  Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *54–65 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). The reference is to the Order of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law by Judge James L. Robart, April 25, 2013, No. 10-cv-1823 (W.D. 
Wash.). 
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Ericsson v. D- Link, 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
Ericsson sued D-Link and others in E.D. Texas for infringing patents alleged to be 
essential to the IEEE 802.11(n) WiFi standard. Intel, who supplied the WiFi chip 
for the products, intervened. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Texas found D-Link liable for infringement of Ericsson’s SEPs related to IEEE 
802.11 standard-related technologies and had assessed damages at US$0.15 per 
infringing device.  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the judgment of infringement but vacated 
the damages assessment and remanded the case back to the District Court for 
further proceedings. In doing so, the Federal Circuit noted a number of factors 
relating how damages should be assessed. Whereas the issues of validity, 
infringement, and damages were addressed in the jury trial, SEP-specific issues, 
incl. royalty stacking and Ericsson’s entitlement to injunctive relief were left to 
presiding Judge Davis to decide.  
This is a significant decision given its impact on patent damages in general, i.e., 
clarification on the entire market value rule and the applicability of the Georgia-
Pacific factors, as well as the specific impact in litigating royalties for RAND-
encumbered patents.  
 
 
While previous case law insisted on the necessary modifications to the Georgia-
Pacific factors in order to account for FRAND commitments, the Federal Circuit 
decision of 2014 in Ericsson v. D-Link went a step further to question the 
relevance of Georgia Pacific as a starting point for FRAND determination41:  
“Although we have never described the Georgia-Pacific factors as a talisman for 
royalty rate calculations, district courts regularly turn to this 15-factor list when 
fashioning their jury instructions. Indeed, courts often parrot all 15 factors to the 
jury, even if some of those factors clearly are not relevant to the case at hand. 
And, often, damages experts resort to the factors to justify urging an increase or 
a decrease in a royalty calculation, with little explanation as to why they do so, 
and little reference to the facts of record.[…] We believe it is unwise to create a 
new set of Georgia-Pacific-like factors for all cases involving RAND-encumbered 
patents. Although we recognize the desire for bright line rules and the need for 
district courts to start somewhere, courts must consider the facts of record when 
instructing the jury and should avoid rote reference to any particular damages 
formula.” 
According to the Federal Circuit, the district court’s application of the Georgia-
Pacific framework in the particular case had led to an erroneous increased royalty 
award, because the said framework did not account for essentiality. In addition to 
the implications of essentiality for the royalty analysis, the Federal Circuit held 
that the trial courts should also consider the patentee’s actual FRAND 
commitment, i.e., the precise language on licensing terms to which the patentee 
commits. The court did not propose a modified version of the Georgia-Pacific 
framework, but did highlight the necessity of tailoring the said framework – and 
any method for determining a reasonable royalty - to the relevant technology and 
facts of the case. Among others, it questioned inter alia the relevance of Factor 5 
(”[…] the commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee”–is irrelevant 
because Ericsson must offer licenses at a non-discriminatory rate), Factor 8 (“it 
                                           
41  Ericsson v D- Link, 773 F.3d 1201 at 1235 ff. (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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accounts for an invention’s ‘current popularity’, which is likely inflated because a 
standard requires the use of the technology”) and Factor 10 (“ […] considers the 
commercial embodiment of the licensor, which is also irrelevant as the standard 
requires the use of the technology”).42 
 
3.2.1.3. Ex ante benchmarks v. ex post considerations? 
In order to evaluate and consolidate the information relevant to the Georgia-
Pacific factors, US courts require that the expert testimony on patent damages be 
employed in a coherent, rigorous and replicable economic methodology. They do 
not consider the parties’ quantitative evidence uncritically, but rather engage in a 
probative inquiry into the value of expert witness testimony and other numerical 
conclusions.43  
In the context of hypothetical negotiations, for instance, bargaining theories 
constitute inadmissible expert testimony if not adequately related to the facts of 
the case. Specifically, in VirnetX v. Cisco Systems, the Federal Circuit criticized an 
expert's use of the “Nash-bargaining solution” to calculate a reasonable royalty.44 
According to Nash’s theory, the bargaining parties would jointly maximize the 
product of the surpluses generated by a successful bargain. The proposed the 50-
50 split was rejected as too detached from the facts of the case. Similarly, in 
Uniloc v. Microsoft, the court ruled that the proposed 25/75 split or so-called "25 
percent rule of thumb" is a fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline 
royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation because it failed to tie a reasonable 
royalty base to the facts of the case at issue.45 
Although the ex ante benchmark of the hypothetical negotiation has become the 
touchstone for patent damages law in the United States, the ex ante paradigm is 
scrutinized for being out of step with modern technology and licensing practices 
that typically involve multi-component and cross-licensing of large portfolios (Lee 
et al. 2016; Belgum 2014). In Microsoft v. Motorola, Judge Robart noted that 
there are practical difficulties in actually doing an ex ante analysis, not the least 
of which is the fact that SSOs do not actually conduct those kinds of negotiations 
as part of the standard setting process.46 Courts have therefore allowed ex post 
considerations to factor into their analysis.  
Against this background, Lee et al. (2016) argue that the hypothetical negotiation 
has been “contaminated” with ex post considerations such as ex post valuations 
and lock-in costs. Even certain Georgia-Pacific factors related to comparable 
licenses and ex post valuation of the patent have been regarded as responsible 
for the trend: The use of ex post information encompassed by these factors tends 
to overcompensate the patent holder due to the confluence of two elements. 
First, patent holders are more likely to assert patents when they claim 
technologies used in commercially valuable products than when the products in 
which they are used have little value. Second, just as royalties agreed to ex post 
are likely to be larger than those agreed to ex ante, so the Georgia-Pacific factors 
imply greater value at a later time, when the commercial prospects of the 
                                           
42  Ericsson v D- Link, 773 F.3d 1201 at 1230-1231 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
43  In detail, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 at 
1127-1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
44  VirnetX, Inc.v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
45  Uniloc USA, Inc. and Uniloc Singapore Private Limited v Microsoft Corp., 632 F. 3d 
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
46  Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., Order of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, April 
25, 2013, No. 10-cv-1823 at para 77 (W.D. Wash.). 
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products using the patented technology seem assured, than ex ante, when the 
commercial prospects are uncertain.  
Whether the continued reliance on the hypothetical negotiation construct of the 
Georgia-Pacific factors is likely to achieve the ultimate goal of reasonable royalty 
damages - namely, to provide the patent holder with fair and adequate 
compensation for the unauthorized use of a patented invention – is equally 
questioned by scholars: 
According to Layne-Farrar and Wong-Ervin (2014), merely invoking the name 
“Georgia Pacific” is not enough for a pass: the factors should be used with 
available data, the comparability of licenses should be defended, and all 
calculations should be explained.  
Geradin (2014) cautions against potential pitfalls of applying the Georgia-Pacific 
framework, given that that licensing agreements are often “highly relationship-
specific and thus agreements will be hard to compare.” Geradin discusses the 
practice of comparing the rate offered ex post standardization by SEP holders 
with the rate offered for the same patents ex ante standardization. Though many 
are inclined to treat the ex ante rate as a “safe harbor” against any claim of 
opportunism, Geradin finds that there is little reason why licensors should be 
prohibited from charging higher rates ex post than ex ante. Not only may ex post 
contracts be more efficient in the way they incorporate a clearer understanding of 
the technology and the market, but also forcing SEP holders to charge similar ex 
ante and ex post rates deprives SEP holders of giving preferential terms to early 
adopters of their technology. 
Jarosz and Chapman (2013) argue that the use of the hypothetical negotiation 
construct introduces unnecessary and unproductive questions and conflict into the 
determination of reasonable royalty damages. Their first concern is that the said 
construct tends to frame the problem of patent infringement as a contracting 
problem by suggesting that infringement is the result of failed negotiations and 
that the solution is the retroactive negotiation of such a contract, under 
appropriate assumptions. The second caveat is that the circumstances of a real-
world negotiation and a hypothetical negotiation differ in that many of the 
uncertainties and motivations that drive real-world negotiations simply do not 
exist in a hypothetical negotiation. Effectively, the evolution of the reasonable 
royalty damages along the lines of the Georgia-Pacific factors has reversed the 
proper relationship between damages and tools to estimate those damages. As an 
alternative, Jarosz and Chapman propose an asset valuation approach based on a 
direct and objective assessment of a patent’s 1) incremental benefits, 2) licensing 
comparables, and 3) design-around costs, considering all relevant evidence. Their 
approach promises to eliminate the distractions and distortions that consideration 
of a hypothetical bargaining process can introduce while remaining consistent 
with the original purpose of reasonable royalty damages, the fundamental 
teachings of Georgia-Pacific, and the recent line of cases on reasonable royalties.  
 
3.2.2.  Evaluating the parties’ conduct in the context of 
injunctions 
The question of availability of injunctive relief has a powerful incentive-related 
impact on the bargaining positions of the parties. The various jurisdictions have 
approached the issue of injunctions in the SEP context in different ways. In 
particular, courts and antitrust authorities have focused on the scenario where, 
typically after efforts to conclude a license fail, the SEP owner seeks to enforce its 
patent rights by filing an infringement claim that includes a request for an 
injunction as a remedy. In this context, questions arise whether injunctive relief is 
a legitimate remedy for patent infringement in major jurisdictions; whether 
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availability of injunctive relief is subject to certain limitations; what defines a 
“willing licensee” under specific circumstances; whether seeking an injunctive 
relief could amount to a violation of competition law.  
 
3.2.2.1.  Legitimacy of injunctive relief and the concept of the 
“willing licensee” 
In its seminal decision Huawei v. ZTE, rendered on 16 July 2015, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provided a framework for the negotiation 
dynamics between the prospective licensor and licensee in cases where they are 
competitors and the licensor holds a dominant market position47: 
First, it is up to the SEP holder to alert the alleged infringer by specifying the 
patent and the way it has been or is being infringed.  
Second, if the alleged infringer has expressed a willingness to conclude a license 
agreement on FRAND terms, the SEP holder must present a specific, written offer 
for a license on FRAND terms to the alleged infringer. This offer should specify, in 
particular, the royalty and the way in which it is calculated.  
Third, the alleged infringer must diligently respond in good faith to the offer made 
by the SEP holder, and observe recognized commercial practices in the sector. 
Good faith must be established on the basis of objective factors and implies that 
there should be no delaying tactics. If the alleged infringer does not accept the 
initial offer, it must promptly submit a written counteroffer on FRAND terms to 
the SEP holder. If the SEP holder rejects the counteroffer, the alleged infringer 
should provide appropriate security for the payment of royalties and render 
accounts of its past and current use of the SEP in question. 
 
 
Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-170/13, Decision of 16 July 2015, 
Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp., ZTE Deutschland GmbH 
The background for the decision is a request for a preliminary ruling by the 
Düsseldorf District Court concerning the availability of remedies (primarily, but 
not only injunctive relief) to holders of FRAND-committed SEPs prevailing in 
patent infringement actions. The court referred five questions to the CJEU owing 
to the divergent approaches being taken by German courts and the European 
Commission (in its press release of 21 December 2012 announcing the Statement 
of Objections against Samsung) on the conditions under which a claim for 
injunctive relief for FRAND-encumbered SEPs can be sought and enforced without 
infringing EU competition law: 
The first question referred by the German court to the CJEU focuses on whether 
the principles in the Orange-Book case are to be applied, or whether it is 
sufficient for the potential licensee to be willing to negotiate a license on FRAND 
terms in order to avoid injunctive relief.  
The second question focuses on what is needed for a potential licensee to be 
regarded as a “willing licensee”, in particular, whether there are specific 
requirements for said willingness to negotiate in substantive and/or chronological 
terms.  
                                           
47  CJEU, Case C-170/13, Decision of 16 July 2015, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE 
Corp., ZTE Deutschland GmbH. 
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The third question focuses on whether there are requirements to the offer to be 
made (e.g., does the offer have to set forth all of the commercial terms? Can the 
offer be conditioned upon actual use and/or validity of the SEP?  
In the fourth question, the Düsseldorf court has requested clarification on 
whether there are particular requirements with respect to a pre-contractual 
fulfilment of obligations arising from the requested license (e.g., does the 
potential licensee have to pay pre-contractual royalties? Can an obligation to pay 
pre-contractual royalties also be fulfilled by giving security payment or putting 
money into escrow?).  
The fifth question, is asking whether the presumption of abuse of a dominant 
market position by an owner of an SEP also applies to other remedies for patent 
infringement (rendering of accounts, recall of infringing products from distribution 
channels, damages).  
In essence, the Düsseldorf District court is asking the CJEU whether the 
requirements established by the German Federal Supreme Court in the so-called 
“Orange Book Standard case” are in compliance with Article 102 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It is important to note that, at the 
time of the referral, the European Commission was also investigating a possible 
abuse by way of asserting SEPs in two parallel proceedings, which ultimately 
resulted in the Commission’s decisions in the cases of Samsung and Motorola, 
respectively. 
 
 
Specifically, the CJEU decided that the following conditions must be satisfied 
before a dominant SEP licensor can validly bring an injunction against a party 
infringing an SEP, without acting contrary to Article 102 TFEU: 
1) Response to a FRAND offer: The SEP holder must present to the alleged 
infringer a specific, written offer for a license on FRAND terms, in accordance 
with the undertaking given to the relevant standardization body. In particular, 
this written offer must specify the amount of the royalty and the way in which 
that royalty is to be calculated. If the alleged infringer is deemed to be using 
delaying tactics once a FRAND offer has been presented by the SEP holder, 
e.g., if the alleged infringer causes any undue delays in the negotiations, this 
may point towards its “unwillingness” to license and prevent it from using 
Article 102 TFEU in a counterclaim against the SEP holder. The CJEU judgment 
also states that the alleged infringer “cannot be criticized” for challenging the 
validity of the SEP and/or its essential nature. If the alleged infringer wishes 
to submit a counter-offer, it must do so promptly and in writing, and in 
compliance with FRAND terms. If the alleged infringer continues to use the 
patent in question and has not diligently responded -either by accepting the 
FRAND offer or by submitting a FRAND counter-offer -, the SEP holder may 
seek an injunction stopping the infringement or seek the recall of products 
made using the SEP without risking Article 102 TFEU scrutiny. 
2) Security: According to the CJEU, if the alleged infringer has already been 
using the SEP without a license, it must provide appropriate security, e.g., 
though a bank guarantee or the placing of funds in a deposit account, from 
the point at which the counter-offer is rejected. If the parties are unable to 
agree bilaterally on the details of the FRAND terms following the counter-offer 
by the alleged infringer, the parties “may” request that the amount of the 
royalty be determined by an independent third party. 
In essence, the CJEU embraced the guidance of the Advocate General: The SEP-
holder should: i) alert the implementer in writing, with reasons, specifying the 
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alleged infringement of the relevant SEP before commencing proceedings; and ii) 
present the implementer with a written license offer on FRAND terms, specifying 
all relevant terms including the royalty. In return, the implementer “must respond 
in a diligent and serious manner” to the offer and, if it disagrees with the offer, 
must “promptly” submit a reasonable counter-offer. A “purely tactical and/or 
dilatory and/or not serious” conduct would be deemed insufficient.  
The above framework within which the SEP-holder and infringer must negotiate 
for the infringer to avoid the risk of injunctive relief is intended to strike a balance 
between the SEP-holder’s rights to intellectual property and access to the courts 
on the one hand, and the implementer’s freedom to conduct business and 
undistorted competition on the other. In this sense, the CJEU promotes diligent 
bilateral negotiation as the means of reaching a FRAND agreement. Hence, 
emphasis is added to diligence and timeliness on the part of the alleged infringer. 
In order to avoid injunctions, an infringer must demonstrate that it is objectively 
ready, willing and able to conclude such a licensing agreement by acting 
promptly, diligently, in good faith and in accordance with recognized commercial 
practices in the field to obtain necessary FRAND licenses. Furthermore, a potential 
licensee who challenges validity, essentiality, or infringement is not per se 
unwilling. 
The Huawei v. ZTE ruling reflects the European Commission’s earlier efforts in the 
Samsung and Motorola Mobility cases to create a pro-licensee “safe harbor” from 
SEP injunctions, under which a licensee can show that it is “willing” by agreeing 
that a court or an arbitrator shall determine the FRAND terms in case the parties 
fail to do so bilaterally. The rationale here is that a licensee acting in good faith 
should be protected against a dominant SEP holder may be abusing its position of 
dominance by preventing other companies from entering the market. Although - 
the legitimacy of the injunction reaffirmed - the SEP holder maintains its right to 
seek injunctive relief, recourse to injunctive relief against a willing licensee may 
amount to an abuse of a dominant position according to Article 102 TFEU. 
Although the CJEU does not specify the criteria for determining “willingness” 
within the context of injunctions, it does make clear through the above “ping-
pong” that both sides have to take concrete steps before injunctions can be 
enforced.  
It is thus left to the national courts to decide on the exact criteria of “willingness” 
and on a case-by-case basis. An abuse of dominance could be established after 
examining the conduct of both the SEP-holder and the implementer. 
 
3.2.2.2.  Assessing abusive conduct in German case law post-Huawei 
v. ZTE 
German patent law does not provide a basis for an infringer to avoid an injunction 
based on a FRAND defense. This is why the FRAND defense is also referred to as 
a “compulsory license defense”. Some jurisdictions, but not all, allow a 
defendant/implementer in patent infringement proceedings to raise an “antitrust 
defense”, claiming that an injunction based on patent infringement is 
unwarranted as the SEP holder would be required, under competition law, to 
grant a (compulsory) license to the implementer on FRAND terms. Such an 
antitrust defense is available under the so-called “Orange Book” case law, but 
only if a number of conditions are fulfilled.  
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According to the case law of the German Federal Supreme Court 48 , the 
enforcement of the claim to an injunction constitutes an abuse of a dominant 
market position and breach of good faith, if the prospective licensee made a 
binding, unconditional offer to conclude a license on customary terms. Such offer 
cannot be rejected by the patentee without violating competition law, and 
provided that the potential licensee behaves as if licensed. The defendant’s “dolo-
petit plea” based on antitrust law will only be successful if he is a “willing 
licensee” acting in good faith. This requires the following conditions to be 
cumulatively met:  
- An offer that the patentee must not reject. The party seeking a license must 
have made, and remain bound by, an unconditional offer to conclude a license 
contract, which cannot be rejected by the patentee without infringing antitrust 
law. The offer has to be serious, i.e., include concrete terms and conditions, 
and be ready for acceptance. An offer to conclude a license agreement, 
subject to the condition that the court holds for infringement, is not 
unconditional and therefore not sufficient.49 
- A license seeking party that acts like a licensee. The defendant has to behave 
as if the license had already been granted. If the party seeking a license has 
already started to use the subject matter of the patent before the patent 
holder has accepted the offer, the prospective licensee must then comply with 
those obligations that the license contract to be concluded imposes on the use 
of the licensed subject matter and anticipate its duties under the agreement.  
Following the strict Orange Book standard, German courts have traditionally 
taken a more favorable position towards the patentee, ruling that an alleged 
infringer can be subject to an injunction even if willing to take a license, unless it 
has conducted itself in every way as a dutiful licensee should do, including paying 
royalties (into escrow if necessary) and abiding by other terms of a regular 
commercial license.50 Prior, to the CJEU decision in Huawei v. ZTE, the FRAND 
defense had only been successfully tested in two known cases before the 
Mannheim District Court.51 
                                           
48  German Federal Court of Justice, Decision of May 6, 2009, Case no. KZR 39/06 – 
Orange Book. 
49  The Orange Book decision of the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) 
is silent on the question whether the potential licensee would still be able to challenge 
the validity or essentiality of the SEP in question. While the Orange Book Standard 
does not exclude such a possibility, some first instance courts have decided that a 
successful FRAND defense would require the potential licensee to waive its validity 
and/or essentiality challenge; see, e.g., Mannheim District Court, Decision of 9 
December 2011 - Motorola v Apple. Later, the Court of Appeal of Karlsruhe granted 
Apple’s request to preliminarily stop the enforcement of the first instance judgment 
after Apple amended its license offer, Karlsruhe Court of Appeal in Karlsruhe, Decision 
of 27 February 2012, 6 U 136/11 - Motorola v Apple.  
50  Within the context of FRAND litigation, the German courts granted injunctions in the 
following cases: Karlsruhe Court of Appeals, Decision of 27 February 2012, 6 U 136/11 
- Motorola Mobility Inc. v Apple Sales International; Mannheim District Court, Decisions 
of 2 May 2012, 7 O 373/11 and 7 O 376/1 - General Instruments Corp v Microsoft 
Corp. and Microsoft Deutschland GmbH; Du ̈sseldorf District Court, Decision of 24 April 
2012, 4b O 274/10 - IPCom v Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone; Karlsruhe Court of 
Appeal, Decision of 19 February 2014, 6 U 162/13 – ZTE v Vringo; Karlsruhe Court of 
Appeal, Decision of 23 April 2015, 6 U 44/15 - St Lawrence Communication v Deutsche 
Telekom. 
51  Mannheim District Court, Decision of 9 December 2011, 7 O 122/11 - Motorola v 
Apple; Mannheim District Court, Decision of 27 May 2011, 7 O 65/10 - Philips v 
Sony/Ericsson. In the latter case, the Mannheim District Court dismissed an injunction 
claim on the grounds that the defendant’s offer to license at a fixed royalty rate and 
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In the aftermath of the CJEU decision, more SEP-related proceedings that had 
been stayed before the district courts of Düsseldorf and Mannheim have been re-
opened and, to some extent, concluded. The core question addressed in these 
decisions is under what circumstances a claim for injunctive relief can be seen as 
an abuse of dominant position and, in support of an abuse, whether the parties 
have fulfilled their obligations according to the guidance of the CJEU (i.e., alerting 
the SEP user, expressing willingness, presenting a written offer, diligently 
responding to the initial offer). By intentionally not specifying the notions of 
“willingness”, “good faith” or “diligent response”, the CJEU leaves a wide margin 
of interpretation for national courts to fill. 
In the case St. Lawrence Communication v. Vodafone, the Düsseldorf District 
Court sharpened the meaning of FRAND by establishing a conduct framework for 
the negotiation of FRAND licenses52: 
1. Notification by the Claimant 
2. Declaration of willingness to license by the Defendant 
3. FRAND offer by the Claimant 
4. FRAND counter-offer by the Defendant 
5. Rejection of counter offer by the Claimant 
6. Security and rendering of account by the Defendant, and if both agree:  
7. Third-party determination of the licensing terms. 
The Courts of Düsseldorf and Mannheim have further specified the above 
requirements as follows: 
Regarding the first requirement to alert the SEP user of the alleged infringement, 
the Mannheim District Court recently held in NTT v. HTC that to fulfil this 
obligation the SEP-holder has to specify the patent on which the claim is based 
and declare that this patent is declared essential to the relevant standard. 53 
Furthermore, the alleged infringer must be put in a position to understand why 
the SEP-holder assumes that the alleged infringer makes use of the teaching of 
the patent in dispute. In the court’s view the SEP-holder can fulfil this obligation 
by providing claim charts. In the court’s view it is sufficient, if the SEP-holder 
provides claim charts for only some exemplary patents, not for all standard-
essential patents that are included in the offered license. In the above-mentioned 
case St Lawrence Communication v. Vodafone, the Düsseldorf District Court 
decided that the notification requirement established in Huawei v. ZTE must occur 
before the filing of the complaint but in any case before the deposit of the 
advance payment of the court fees is made – the latter is a requirement under 
German law.54 
On the second requirement, i.e., the licensee’s declaration of willingness and the 
promptness at which it is expressed after gaining knowledge of the alleged 
infringement, both courts in Düsseldorf and Mannheim held that a delay of five or 
                                                                                                                         
the deposit of the calculated royalties in an escrow account validly established the 
FRAND defense. 
52  Düsseldorf District Court, Decision of 31 March 2016, 4a O 73/14 - St. Lawrence 
Communication v Vodafone. 
53  Mannheim District Court, Decision of 29 January 2016, 7 O 66/15 - NTT DoCoMo v 
HTC. 
54  Düsseldorf District Court, Decision of 31 March 2016, 4a O 73/14 - St. Lawrence 
Communication v Vodafone. 
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three months, respectively, does not sufficiently demonstrate the willingness of 
the alleged infringer to take a license.55 
Regarding the third and fourth requirements of the infringer’s counteroffer in 
response to the SEP holder’s initial offer, the district courts of Mannheim and 
Düsseldorf require a sufficient counteroffer by the defendant even when the initial 
offer is not FRAND. Specifically, the Düsseldorf District Court suggested in Sisvel 
v. Haier56 that a defendant may not have to make a counteroffer if the SEP 
owner’s offer was not FRAND-compliant and could, instead, require a modified, 
FRAND-compliant offer. However, in the case that the defendant decides to make 
a counteroffer, the counteroffer must comply with the Huawei v. ZTE 
requirements even if the SEP owner’s initial offer did not. The court found that the 
defendants failed to meet those requirements. A similar approach was adopted by 
the Mannheim District Court in the case St Lawrence Communication v. Deutsche 
Telekom, in which Deutsche Telekom raised a FRAND defense in the context of 
injunctions based on a license offer made by HTC to St Lawrence 
Communication.57 In this case, the district court held the HTC’s counter-offer to 
be neither timely nor “specific” according to the case law in Huawei v. ZTE. In its 
ruling, the Mannheim court did not review St Lawrence Communication’s initial 
offer for FRAND compliance, but was satisfied that it was sufficiently specific so as 
to enable HTC to make a counter-offer.  
By examining whether the counter-offer passes the FRAND test first prior to 
questioning whether the initial offer is FRAND, the districts courts effectively shift 
the burden of FRAND compliance back to the defendant or lower the bar for the 
burden of proof carried by the SEP holder. In the aforementioned decision in NTT 
v. HTC, the Mannheim District Court held it sufficient that – on the basis of a 
summary examination – the license offer was not evidently in breach of the 
FRAND requirements. The SEP holder has merely the obligation to specify the 
adequate royalty rate and the basis for the calculation of the royalty rate through 
objective criteria so that the alleged infringer is in a position to understand why 
the SEP-holder is convinced that his offer is FRAND.58 
Albeit this approach hardly surprises given the German courts’ established case 
law on the Orange Book standard, their interpretation of FRAND does not comply 
with the CJEU’s requirements as set out in Huawei v. ZTE. Most decisions reveal 
that the burden for a successful FRAND defense still lies entirely with the 
implementer.  
Correcting this course, the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal stayed on 13 January 2016 
the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment in Sisvel v. Haier, arguing that 
the Düsseldorf District Court had misunderstood the CJEU guidance.59 According 
to the appeal court, the CJEU established a process of balancing the interests of 
the SEP owner with those of the alleged infringer in which every step of the 
process must sequentially follow the preceding step. Hence, the alleged infringer 
must satisfy its requirements only if the SEP owner has first met its own 
                                           
55  Dusseldorf District Court, Decision of 31 March 2016, 4a O 73/14 – St Lawrence 
Communication v Vodafone; Mannheim District Court, Decision of 27 November, 2015, 
2 O 106/14, 2 O 107/14, 2 O 108/14 - St Lawrence Communication v Deutsche 
Telekom. 
56  Düsseldorf District Court, Decisions of 3 November 2015 – 4a O 144/14 und 4a O 
93/14 - Sisvel v Haier. 
57  Mannheim District Court, 27 November, 2015, case nos. 2 O 106/14, 2 O 107/14, 2 O 
108/14, St Lawrence Communication v Deutsche Telekom. 
58  Mannheim District Court, Decision of 29 January 2016, 7 O 66/15 - NTT DoCoMo v 
HTC. 
59  Düsseldorf Court of Appeal, Decisions of 13 January 2016 – 15 U 65/15 und 15 U 
66/15 – Sisvel v Haier. 
 72 
respective burden. The appeal court emphasizes that an injunction cannot be 
granted if the SEP owner fails to make a FRAND-compliant license offer after the 
alleged infringer has expressed its willingness to take a license on FRAND terms. 
The alleged infringer has no obligation to react to an offer that is not on FRAND 
terms. Absent such an offer by the SEP owner, the alleged infringer is under no 
obligation to take any of the further steps set out in Huawei v. ZTE (such as a 
counteroffer on FRAND terms or the provision of adequate security and 
accounting). The Court of Appeal has scheduled two oral hearings at the end of 
2016 and beginning of 2017, respectively, in order to render a final judgment on 
the issue.  
Despite the guidance of the Düsseldorf appellate court in Sisvel v. Haier, the 
Düsseldorf District Court left open in its recent decision in St Lawrence 
Communication v. Vodafone, the question as to whether the defendant has to 
respond with a counter-offer, if it cannot be determined that the SEP-proprietor’s 
initial offer was actually FRAND. 60  In the case at hand, however, the court 
examined the claimant’s offer and considered it FRAND, i.e., in line with 
established licensing practice. Subsequently, injunctions were granted and later 
affirmed by the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal.61  
Finally, the German district courts have addressed the question of how quickly 
the counteroffer must be provided. In two cases, the respective submissions of a 
counteroffer six months62 and 18 months63 after the initial offer were deemed 
untimely and injunctions were granted. The courts clarified that an alleged 
infringer can only raise the FRAND defense if the counteroffer is made without 
delay taking into account the circumstances of the particular case. 
The divergent views between district and appellate instances regarding the post-
Huawei role of German courts in the interpretation of FRAND become more 
apparent in the latest case law. Specifically, the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal 
confirms in its decision dated 31 May 2016, that the SEP holder’s initial offer 
should be on FRAND-terms and that it is up to the national courts to clarify those 
circumstances.64 According to the court, the fact that the CJEU did not clarify the 
specific requirements of a FRAND-compliant license – the CJEU was not addressed 
with these issues in the referral in the first place - does not imply that the 
national courts are discharged from further clarifying FRAND. Moreover, it cannot 
be inferred from the CJEU decision, that the national courts should restrict 
themselves to a summary judgment and examine only for evident non-FRAND 
compliance. On the contrary, this superficial examination could not be in line with 
the CJEU’s reference to the possibility of the parties to agree to the adjudication 
of a FRAND royalty rate by a third party when bilateral negotiations fail. Instead, 
a full and comprehensive review would be required to determine if the offer was 
in fact FRAND. In light of these considerations, the appellate court favors an 
enhanced role for courts in the definition of FRAND terms that extends beyond 
the restrictive interpretation of the Mannheim District Court at the first instance 
trial, according to which infringement proceedings should not shift into mere 
FRAND calculation proceedings, as this endeavor is complex and time consuming.  
                                           
60  Düsseldorf District Court, Decision of 31 March 2016, 4a O 73/14 – St Lawrence 
Communication v Vodafone; five further parallel decisions were rendered the same day 
(4a O 126/14, 4a O 127/14, 4a O 128/14, 4a O 129/14 and 4a O 130/14). 
61  Düsseldorf Court of Appeal, Decision of 9 May 2016, I-15 U35/16, 15 U35/16 – St 
Lawrence Communication v Vodafone. 
62  Düsseldorf District Court, Decision of 31 March 2016, 4a O 73/14 – St Lawrence 
Communication v Vodafone. 
63  Mannheim District Court, Decision of 29 January 2016, 7 O 66/15 - NTT DoCoMo v 
HTC. 
64  Karlsruhe Court of Appeal, Decision of 31 May 2016, 6 U 55/16.  
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3.2.2.3.  Converging practice in European jurisdictions in the context 
of injunctions 
 
i) The Netherlands 
Unlike German practice, Dutch courts do not recognize the existence of an 
antitrust law defense in the context of patent infringement proceedings. Instead, 
they merely refer of “special circumstances” that exempt the SEP holder from 
obtaining an injunction. Specifically, The District Court of The Hague held in the 
case Philips Electronics v. SK Kasetten that the mere existence of an obligation to 
grant a FRAND license does not necessarily prevent the holder of an essential 
patent from enforcing its patent, including through a suit seeking injunctive 
relief.65 The court found that it was the responsibility of the party seeking a 
license to obtain a license prior to entering the market and to initiate proceedings 
against the patentee if the latter were to unreasonably refuse such a license. If 
the potential licensee has failed to do this prior to its market entry, the patentee 
may then in principle enforce its essential patents, unless “special circumstances” 
exist. Save for exceptional circumstances, an enforcement action does not 
amount to an abuse of power or unlawful/unreasonable conduct of the patent 
holder. In the case at hand, the court ordered injunctions as SK Kasetten failed to 
make any offer to Philips and therefore establish the occurrence of special 
circumstances. The mere existence of a FRAND commitment does not provide any 
safeguards to implementers that infringe SEPs.  
In more recent case law, Dutch courts have been more reluctant to grant 
injunctions automatically. In a Blu-ray standard dispute between Sony and LG 
Electronics, The Hague District Court distanced itself from the aforementioned 
case law in Philips v. SK Kasetten and considered a contractual mechanism for 
getting to an agreed license as sufficient to lift the interim injunction against Sony 
and have the seized products implementing the contested standard (Sony’s 
Playstation 3) released.66 The Court ordered that LG Electronics, should it wish to 
obtain a new leave to attach for the purpose of surrender that is based on the 
allegedly essential Blu-Ray patents, must serve this request on Sony before filing 
it with the court and state in the request that it wishes that parties be heard and 
that Sony be called to that hearing.  
In the Dutch proceedings Samsung v. Apple involving the availability of injunctive 
relief in relation to standard-essential FRAND-encumbered patents related to 
3G/UTMS technology, the District Court of The Hague did find such “special 
circumstances”: the specific way in which Samsung acted in the negotiations - 
inter alia by initiating proceedings before making a first license offer and failing to 
respond substantively to certain counter-offers - contravened its obligations to 
negotiate on FRAND licenses in good faith. 67  The Court subsequently denied 
injunctive relief on the basis of an abuse of rights by an act contrary to pre-
contractual good faith. It held that an injunction grant would put Apple under 
considerable pressure in the negotiation of the terms and conditions of the FRAND 
license. The ruling explicitly left open the question of whether Samsung’s filing for 
the injunction could also be considered an abuse of a dominant position within the 
meaning of competition law. Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that a 
                                           
65  The Hague District Court, Decision of 7 March 2010, Doc. no. 316533/HA ZA 08-2522 
and 316535/HA ZA 08-2524 (joint cases) - Philips v SK Kasetten. 
66  The Hague District Court, Decision of 10 March 2011, Doc. no. 389067 / KG ZA 11-269 
- Sony Supply Chain Solutions (Europe) B.V. and LG Electronics, Inc. Case reported in 
AIPPI Report 2011. 
67  The Hague District Court, Decisions 14 March 2012 and 20 June 2012, Doc. no. 
400367/HA ZA 11-2212 - Samsung Electronics v Apple Inc. et al. 
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FRAND undertaking constitutes a license offer that an implementer could simply 
accept by practicing the standard; a patentee does not have to assume that every 
implementer wants a FRAND license, and not every implementer has to expect 
that it is contractually bound to the patentee by merely practicing the standard 
(cf. AIPPI Report 2014). 
With parallel proceedings before the German and UK courts, the dispute ZTE v. 
Vringo before The Hague District Court raised the question whether ZTE’s “wiling 
licensee defense” established special circumstances in favor of lifting a customs 
seizure of several shipments of ZTE goods using UMTS technology and allegedly 
infringing Vringo’s SEP.68 Although, as of September 2012, Vringo and ZTE had 
been unsuccessfully engaged in licensing negotiations regarding Vringo's SEP 
portfolio, Vringo made ZTE an ultimate licensing offer in June 2014, following the 
successful request for customs seizure. ZTE did not respond to this offer and 
instead initiated preliminary proceedings before the District Court of The Hague to 
lift the customs seizure and prohibit Vringo from effectuating further seizures on 
the basis of any of its SEPs. Only a month into the proceedings, did ZTE make a 
counteroffer to Vringo. The Court denied ZTE’s claims, stating that ZTE could not 
be considered a willing licensee under FRAND. Moreover, according to the court, 
the customs seizure could not be perceived as abusive on Vringo’s part. In the 
matter at hand, the seizure was not so much a reaction to an unsatisfactory 
counteroffer by ZTE as a reaction to the absence of any counteroffer on behalf of 
ZTE.  
 
ii) France 
In a case involving Ericsson’s three standard-essential patents for the 
implementation of the 3G standards (UMTS) declared as such to ETSI, the Paris 
district court found that the requested preliminary injunction cannot be granted 
for SEP when the negotiations for a license are ongoing and where the parties 
agree on the geographical extent and technological scope of the agreement, but 
disagree only on the royalty rate. While the plaintiff contended that the 
defendants should be described as infringers acting in bad faith, considering the 
facts of the case, the court found that the parties should be able to negotiate 
without the balance of power being impaired. The court was of the view that 
granting an injunction in the specific context would unduly favor the patentee and 
distort the principle of FRAND licenses by putting unjustified pressure on the 
future licensee.69 
 
iii) United Kingdom 
In the English courts, the law governing the grant of an injunction is that of 
equity, strongly focused on achieving a fair outcome between the parties. An 
injunction is therefore always a matter of the judge's discretion, although - for 
many years - an injunction was invariably granted in cases where patent 
infringement was affirmed.  
However, in 2012, the English Patent Court decided to deny a permanent 
injunction in an infringement action brought by IPCom against Nokia. 70 
Considering whether Nokia, who had agreed to take a (conditional) license, 
                                           
68  The Hague District Court, Decision of 24 October 2014, C/09/470109 / KG ZA 14-870 - 
ZTE v Vringo. 
69  Paris District Court, Decision of 29 November 2013, no 12/14922, Telefonaktiebolaget 
LM Ericsson v TCT Mobile Europe SAS and TCT Mobile International Ltd. 
70  IPCom v Nokia, 18 May 2012, [2012] EWHC 1446 (Ch). 
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should be prohibited from further sales pending a determination of what terms 
should apply, the judge accepted that, as a “general working rule”, damages may 
be awarded in substitution for an injunction when the injury to the claimant’s 
legal right can be estimated in money and adequately compensated by a small 
money payment, and the case is one in which it would be oppressive to the 
defendant to grant an injunction. The judge found no basis for an injunction 
award, even though Nokia's commitment to take a license was conditional upon a 
finding that the patents at issue were both valid and infringed, matters which can 
take several years to reach a final determination. 
In one of the parallel proceedings initiated by Vringo v. ZTE, the Patents Court did 
not directly have to consider whether or not to grant injunctive relief, but Birss J 
used the opportunity to note that injunctions should likely not be available 
against a willing licensee and that the defendant’s challenge of the infringement 
or validity of the patent would not make him unwilling71: 
“There is what I will call a general idea (without expressing a view on whether it 
is right or wrong) that when a patent is an SEP, if a defendant is a willing 
licensee, then it may be that the patentee is not entitled to obtain an injunction 
against the defendant, whereas if the defendant was not a willing licensee, then 
the defendant may be subject to the risk of an injunction. [...] In my judgment, a 
defendant accused of patent infringement by a patentee who claims to have a 
standards essential patent is and must be entitled to say, ‘I wish to know if this 
patent is valid or infringed or not before I take a license’. Such a stance cannot 
fairly be described as unwillingness.” 
 
3.2.2.4.  Evolving landscape of injunctions in emerging SEP markets 
 
i) China 
The first document to address the issue of injunctions in the context of FRAND 
was the so-called “Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Patent Infringement Dispute 
Cases” (entered into force on 1 April 2016; henceforth: “Interpretation”). 
According to Art. 24 of the Interpretation, the court would generally not support 
the grant of injunctive relief in favor of the holder of an explicitly disclosed and 
FRAND-encumbered SEP under the following conditions: i) when the SEP holder 
intentionally violates its FRAND commitment, causing the negotiations between 
the SEP holder and the alleged infringer to fail, and ii) the alleged infringer is not 
obviously at fault in the process of negotiation. 
In its Interpretation, the Supreme People’s Court separates SEP disputes from 
traditional IP infringements: contrary to the ordinary patent infringement, the 
decision of the grant of an injunctive relief in SEP infringement cases should 
consider the subjective fault of the parties when the defendant raises a FRAND 
defense. A summary of judicial practices, the Interpretation deals with the issue 
of injunctions from a patent and tort law perspective without any reference to 
antitrust considerations. 
Additional guidance on the issue of injunctions is embedded in Anti-Monopoly 
Guidelines for the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights (Draft for Comments, 
dated 31 December 2015) issued by the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State 
                                           
71  Vringo Infrastructure Inc. v ZTE (UK) Ltd., UK High Court, Patents Court, Decisions of 6 
June 2013, [2013] EWHC 1591 (pat). 
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Council. The Draft introduces four factors to be considered for the grant of 
injunctive relief in the context of patent infringement: 
1. The performance and actual will of both parties in the negotiation; 
2. whether the SEP commitment contemplated injunctive relief; 
3. the licensing conditions provided by both parties in the negotiation; and 
4. the impact of an injunction on licensing negotiations, the relevant market, 
downstream competition and consumer welfare. 
Albeit not judicial in nature, the above guidelines have significant impact on the 
decision of Chinese courts. 
Lastly, Art. 17 of the draft of the Anti-monopoly Law (AML) and relevant practices 
in other jurisdictions addresses two ways of regulating the abuse of the 
instrument of injunctive relief by SEP holders. Subject to comments, the draft 
version proposed by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
and State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) leaves open which of 
the two approaches will be adopted at the final stage: The first option emulates 
the European approach, i.e., the abuse of injunction is treated as an abusive 
conduct prohibited by the “catch-all” provision of Art. 17(7) AML; the second 
option establishes abusive conduct only when the injunction is used as a tool by 
the SEP holders to force licensees into accepting unfair licensing terms prohibited 
under Art. 17 AML (excessive pricing, refusal to deal, exclusive dealing, tying, 
discrimination etc.).  
So far, the practice of the Chinese courts and administrative authorities remains 
consistent, pointing to the second approach and after considering the broader 
impact of injunctions on public interests:  
In Huawei v. InterDigital, the Guangdong Higher People’s Court upheld the district 
court’s decision finding that the US-based SEP holder InterDigital had abused its 
patent rights and violated Chinese antitrust law by seeking an injunction in a US 
court against an alleged infringer. 72  Specifically, the court characterized 
InterDigital’s attempt to seek an injunction as a patentee negotiation tactic based 
inter alia on the following grounds: i) InterDigital breached its FRAND duties; ii) 
InterDigital filed actions against Huawei in a Delaware court and ITC to seek 
injunction remedy for its SEPs while the two parties were still at the negotiation 
stage; iii) Huawei acted in good faith throughout the negotiation process, while 
InterDigital’s goal was to force Huawei to accept the unreasonably high royalty 
rates; iv) SEP holders may not force a good faith negotiating party to accept 
terms for using SEPs. InterDigital’s conduct was therefore deemed an abuse of a 
dominant market position.  
Similarly, as part of the anti-monopoly investigations into the mergers 
Microsoft/Nokia and Nokia/Alcatel-Lucent, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) examined the behavior of the parties and the combination of facts in 
order to determine bad faith in the context of injunctions: Where the SEP holder 
honors its FRAND commitments but the SEP licensee does not act in good faith, 
an injunction may be appropriate. 73  In both investigations, MOFCOM raised 
                                           
72  Huawei v InterDigital, Judgments of 28 October 2013, Guangdong Higher People’s 
Court of China (Yue Gaofa Minsan Zhougzi Nos. 305 and 306). 
73  In October 2015, MOFCOM conditionally cleared the $17.6B acquisition of Alcatel-
Lucent by Nokia approximately seven months after the parties initially notified the 
transaction. Prior to MOFCOM’s imposition of a remedy, the US, the EU, and various 
other authorities cleared the merger Nokia/Alcatel without conditions. In contrast, 
MOFCOM approved the transaction subject to three remedies covering each of the 
parties’ 2G, 3G, and 4G SEPs: i) a commitment to license SEPs on a fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) basis and not to enforce SEPs with injunctions 
unless licensees were unwilling to accept FRAND license terms; ii) a commitment to 
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concerns regarding the concentration of SEP ownership in the hands of the 
merging entities, i.e., the Nokia/Alcatel-Lucent transaction was found to increase 
Nokia’s market share of wireless technologies from 25-35% to 35-45% for 2G 
and 3G, placing it ahead of Qualcomm as the 4G market leader. Regarding SEP 
licensing as the primary barrier to entry in smartphone manufacturing, MOFCOM 
leverages the concept of FRAND in the context of merger control as an effective 
regulatory instrument - a direct route to level the playing field and ensure 
licenses for local manufacturers.  
In general, an SEP holder may obtain an injunction if it offers a FRAND-compliant 
offer and acts in good faith during the negotiation. At the same time, the licensee 
engages in negligent or wilful misconduct during the negotiation (delaying tactics, 
reverse patent hold-up) or proposes unreasonable licensing terms. Finally, the 
injunction may not harm the public interest. SEPs are usually part of a larger 
patent portfolio, which means preventing the implementation of an SEP can 
significantly impair a product or an entire industry (cf. Cheng et al., 2016). 
 
ii) Korea 
The Korean Patent Act recognizes injunctive relief as a remedy against patent 
infringement (Article 26), but it does not make any express distinction between 
SEPs and non-SEPs. In addition, the Korean Supreme Court has never expressly 
denied the availability of injunctive relief for patent infringement simply due to 
the existence of a FRAND commitment (AIPPI Report 2014).  
As in China, the issue of injunctions has been decided both on a judicial and 
administrative level: 
In Samsung v. Apple, the Seoul Central District Court decided that Samsung’s 
request for injunctive relief did not constitute an abuse of patent rights on the 
grounds that a FRAND declaration cannot be construed to include a commitment 
not to seek injunctive relief.74 In its decision, the court clarified the principle of 
availability of injunctive relief for FRAND-encumbered SEPs and noted that 
denying an injunction against unauthorized and unilateral implementation of an 
SEP would overprotect implementers that do not act in good faith. The court 
found that the potential licensee needs to demonstrate willingness to enter 
negotiations in good faith and the offer should be concrete enough to satisfy that 
requirement. Whether the parties negotiated in good faith or not would eventually 
have to be determined on a case-by-case basis under consideration of the 
particular circumstances. In the case at hand, the court reached the conclusion 
that Apple did not meet the requirement of good faith in the light of the following 
circumstances: i) it did not request or negotiate a license despite being aware of 
the existence and implementation of the SEPs; ii) it did not negotiate despite 
being informed by Samsung of the possibility of infringement; iii) it did not 
deposit or offer a financial contingency as described in Art. 4.5 ETSI IPR 
Guidelines against the possibility that there was infringement; iv) it did not 
                                                                                                                         
inform Chinese licensees and Chinese companies engaged in licensing negotiations 
about transfers of SEPs to third parties; and (iii) a commitment not to transfer SEPs to 
third parties except on the condition that the third party accepts Nokia’s FRAND 
commitments. Previously, in April 2014, MOFCOM conditioned its approval of the 
acquisition on Microsoft’s and Nokia’s compliance with similar terms (adherence to the 
FRAND terms of the SSOs, refrain from seeking injunctions against Chinese 
manufacturers, refrain from certain cross-licensing practices, non-transfer clause etc.); 
see case reports, Koblitz (2014) and Gu (2016). 
74  Seoul Central District Court, 24 August 2012, Case no. 2011 GaHap 39552, Samsung 
Electronics Co., Ltd. v Apple Korea Ltd. 
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negotiate a royalty rate calculated on the basis of a rational evaluation and review 
of the SEPs.  
In contrast, Samsung had not illegally maintained or reinforced a dominant 
position in violation of the KFTA and its claim for an injunction did not constitute 
an unfair trade practice. Moreover, there was no evidence that Samsung had 
intentionally failed to conceal its declared SEPs during the standard-setting 
process or otherwise deceived the SSO. Although the court viewed some forms of 
Samsung’s conduct in a negative light (i.e., no specific basis for calculation of the 
royalty rate was provided to Apple), it determined that such conduct did not 
amount to an abuse of rights that would prevent Samsung from seeking an 
injunction. Consequently, Apple’s defense was dismissed. The court enjoined the 
sale of certain older models of Apple and Samsung products, but the injunction 
was immediately stayed pending de novo appellate review, which is ongoing.  
In application of French law, the court further came to the conclusion that the 
FRAND commitment does not give cause for a license agreement to be concluded 
by mere implementation of the standard. The court did not view the FRAND 
commitment as a contractual obligation of the SEP holder to provide a license, 
but rather as a declaration of the general principle to negotiate in good faith 
under FRAND terms. A FRAND commitment neither confers a license to 
unspecified third parties nor constitutes a binding contractual offer to license.  
On 26 February 2014, the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) issued its first 
decision on the question whether seeking injunctive relief on a FRAND-
encumbered SEP constitutes a violation under the Korean Fair Trade Law. In the 
Samsung case, the KFTC concluded that, because Apple failed to engage in good 
faith negotiations, Samsung’s injunction claims against Apple on SEPs related to 
3G and 4G mobile communication technology do not constitute an abuse of 
dominance or unfair trade practice. 75  In particular, Apple was not a willing 
licensee based on a series of reasons: i) it initiated a patent infringement action 
against Samsung while negotiations were still underway; ii) it proposed licensing 
terms that devalued Samsung’s patent, and iii) it engaged in reverse hold-up as 
supported by the fact that it did not intend to pay out any royalties until the 
litigation was concluded. In contrast, the KFTC found that Samsung negotiated in 
good faith as demonstrated by the following conduct: i) prior as well as after the 
infringement actions, Samsung proposed various licensing terms to Apple and 
sustained substantial negotiations, and ii) Samsung proposed non-excessive 
royalty rates.  
It is noteworthy that, in its reasoning, the KFTC made reference to the 
commitments Samsung had made to the European Commission in the Samsung 
case; the opinion of the US International Trade Commission affirming the 
infringement of Samsung's 3G-essential patent in In the Matter of Certain 
Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music 
and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers (Inv. No. 337-TA-794); and 
the decision of the US Department of Justice to close its investigation into 
Samsung’s alleged abuse of SEPs (Statement of the Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of Samsung’s Use of 
Its Standards-Essential Patents, dated February 7, 2014). 
Following the above decision, the KFTC amended in 2014 its Guidelines on Unfair 
Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights (enacted in 2000), in which it identified 
certain types of licensing practices by SEP holders that may be deemed to be 
abusive under Korea’s Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, i.e., unreasonably 
avoiding or circumventing the granting of a license on FRAND terms, imposing 
                                           
75  Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), Decision of 26 February 2014, Samsung 
Electronics Co., Ltd. 
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discriminatory conditions when licensing SEPs, and restricting the licensee's 
exercise related patents. 
 
iii) Japan 
In January 2016, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) revised 
its Guidelines for the use of Intellectual Property under the Antimonopoly Act to 
specifically address the harm from breaches of FRAND commitments.76 Notably, 
these revised guidelines state that a refusal to license or seeking an injunction 
against a party who is “willing” to take a license based on FRAND terms can 
violate Japan’s Antimonopoly Act. The same types of conduct also can be deemed 
unfair trade practices even if they do not substantially restrict competition in the 
relevant product market and are not considered to be unlawful monopolization. 
The JFTC indicates that whether a prospective licensee is “willing” will be judged 
on a case-by-case basis by the conduct of both parties in the negotiations. The 
Guidelines however explain that:  
i) a party is deemed to be “willing” if it shows its intention to have the 
FRAND license conditions determined by a court or through arbitration 
procedures in case that the parties do not reach an agreement on the 
license conditions even after a certain period of negotiations; 
ii) challenges to the validity, essentiality or possible infringement of the SEP 
do not render “unwilling” a party intending to license on FRAND terms. 
The question whether the licensee could be regarded as “willing” had already 
been addressed in the Japanese jurisprudence, which looked closer into the 
negotiation process. The following landmark decisions rendered down by the 
courts in Japan appear in line with the CJEU in Huawei v. ZTE and the more 
restrictive approach to injunctions adopted by the European national courts. 
However, Japanese courts have not yet established which facts are relevant in 
such inquiries and which are not, as their European counterparts have done. 
In Apple v. Samsung, the IP High Court of Japan did not allow unrestricted 
assertion of rights to injunctive relief on the grounds that it would unreasonably 
prejudice the infringer who invests into the production facilities in the belief that 
the license is offered under FRAND conditions.77 The court held that the proprietor 
of a FRAND-encumbered patent could seek injunctive relief, if the 
infringer/licensee proves its willingness. Under these circumstances, seeking 
injunctions is regarded as an abuse of right under Art. 1 (3) Civil Code - a 
fundamental principle of Japanese civil law applied to all areas of private assertion 
of rights. The court based its ruling on the balance of protection between the 
proprietary right of the SEP holder and the trust of the implementers in the 
FRAND declaration: To allow unrestricted assertion of rights to injunctive relief 
based on FRAND-encumbered patents would unreasonably prejudice the infringer, 
which makes significant investments in the production facilities with the belief 
that the license is offered under FRAND conditions.  
Whether the IP High Court has succeeded in striking the right balance of 
interests, was questioned in the Japanese scholarship. It is questionable whether 
the abuse of right defense should have been applied in Apple v. Samsung, it is 
questionable whether similar exemptions should be granted in subsequent cases 
                                           
76  For the full text version of the partial amendments to the IP Guidelines see, 
www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-
2016/January/160121.files/IPGL_Frand_attachment.pdf 
77  Apple v Samsung, Japanese IP High Court, Decision of 16 May, 2014, Case No. 
2013[Ne] 10043. This is an appeal case from the judgment of Tokyo District Court, 
February 28, 2013 [Case No. 2011 [Wa] 38969]. 
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on the same basis. The consideration of objective factors was not thorough and 
this left SEP owners and implementers in an unbalanced relation. It may be 
possible to adequately protect the rights of SEP owners without injunctions by 
providing additional protective measures, but merely denying injunctions under 
the Japanese system may have severe consequences for owners and may result 
in less standardization and fewer SEPs (Nagakoshi & Tamai, 2016).  
In the case Imation v. One Blue, the Tokyo District Court affirmed examined 
whether the parties met exercised their rights in good faith thereby affirming the 
willingness of the licensee.78 Although the burden of proof for “willingness” lay 
with the infringer/licensee, the court stated that the “unwillingness” should be 
interpreted narrowly. In this particular case, the defendant One-Blue was a patent 
pool which, after the negotiations with Imation failed, sent out a notice to three 
retailers in Japan, warning them that the sales of Blu-ray discs were produced 
without a license, constituted an infringement of the patents managed by the 
defendant, and that the patent proprietor had the right to seek damages and 
injunctions with immediate suspension of sales. The Tokyo district court ruled 
that the above notice contained a “false allegation”, prohibited as unfair 
competition by antitrust law. Specifically, the court based the willingness of the 
licensee on the following facts:  
Imation had clearly stated that it was willing to take a license on FRAND terms, 
and counter-proposed a royalty rate, which it regarded as fair and reasonable. On 
the other end, One-Blue not only had it initiated a lawsuit in the US, but sent the 
above-mentioned notice to retailers in Japan without prior negotiation. One-Blue 
failed to substantiate its position that its rates should be considered FRAND. It did 
not submit any documents proving it had licensing contracts with other parties in 
place based on the proposed royalty rates. Even though the royalties offered by 
both parties were far apart, as in the case of Apple v. Samsung, that difference 
had existed for a long time and could not be interpreted as unwillingness on 
behalf of the licensee. Although specifying “unwillingness” based on the facts of 
the case at hand, the Japanese court did not expand on the determination of 
what constitutes a willing licensee in the general context of FRAND. “Willingness”, 
as opposed to “unwillingness”, is hard to be defined by an outsider/adjudicator as 
it essentially relies on assumptions about the conduct of the parties during the 
negotiations (Nagakoshi & Tamai, 2016). 
 
iv) India 
The law on injunction in India is based on the principles of equity; the remedy 
available to the SEP holder occurs in the form of royalty. The use of injunctive 
relief against a willing licensee constitutes prima facie breach of a FRAND 
commitment, an action that also qualifies as an abuse of a dominant position and 
a violation of competition laws. Therefore, an injunction could only be sought 
either in the case of an unwilling the licensee which refuses to pay the judicially 
determined FRAND royalty or where monetary compensation is not an adequate 
remedy.  
In a series of proceedings initiated by Ericsson against Micromax, Xiaomi and 
Intex alleging infringement of its patents essential to the 2G and 3G standards, 
the High Court of Delhi dealt with issues pertaining to SEPs and their availability 
on FRAND.79 In the suit against Micromax, the Single Bench of the High Court of 
                                           
78  Imation Corporation Japan v One-Blue LLC, Tokyo Dist. Ct., 18 February, 2015, Case 
No. 2013 (Wa) 21383. 
79  Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v Micromax Informatics Ltd. and Mercury Electronics 
Ltd., High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, Court order of 12 March 2013, Docket no. C.S. 
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Delhi ordered an ex parte interim injunction in favor of Ericsson against Micromax 
for alleged infringement of eight patents purportedly essential wireless standards. 
The court also issued an order authorizing the seizure of documents. The court 
order, however, neither provided any reason for the prima facie finding of patent 
infringement, nor clarified why the balance of convenience lies in favor of the 
plaintiff. Micromax’ appeal to a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court was 
dismissed. The order dismissing the appeal did not mention FRAND. Eventually, 
the interim injunction was lifted following an interim arrangement between the 
parties, according to which Micromax had to deposit the royalties at the 
demanded rates. Simlarly, injunctions were granted in the cases against Xiaomi 
and Intex.  
 
3.2.2.5.  Frequency and predictability of injunctive relief in the United 
States post-eBay 
In its eBay v. MercExchange decision, the US Supreme Court put an end to the 
practice of “automatic” injunction awards in the context of patent infringement.80 
The Supreme Court rejected unanimously the presumption of irreparable harm 
and other categorical approaches in favor of a case-by-case application of 
“traditional equitable principles”. In this regard, it proposed a framework for use 
in court practice that would help mitigate the risk of patent hold-up. The decision 
namely required district courts to exercise their discretion before awarding an 
injunction by applying a four-factor test whereby the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that:  
1. it has suffered an irreparable injury; 
2. remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury;  
3. considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a 
remedy in equity is warranted; and  
4. the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.  
Post-eBay, US courts no longer grant injunctions as a matter of right, but weigh 
the above four equitable factors. Both Judge Robart in Microsoft v. Motorola and 
Judge Posner in Apple v. Motorola have expressed the view that, under eBay and 
as a general rule, a commitment to license an SEP on FRAND terms means that 
the patent owner cannot obtain an injunction but must rather settle for damages 
only. Judge Posner, in particular, expressed paradigmatic distrust of injunctions in 
the FRAND context81:  
“I don’t see how, given FRAND, I would be justified in enjoining Apple from 
infringing the ‘898 unless Apple refuses to pay a royalty that meets the FRAND 
requirement. By committing to license its patents on FRAND terms, Motorola 
committed to license the ‘898 to anyone willing to pay a FRAND royalty and thus 
implicitly acknowledged that a royalty is adequate compensation for a license to 
use that patent.” 
                                                                                                                         
(OS) 442/2013; Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v Xiaomi Technology and others, 
Interim Application No. 24580 of 2014 in Civil Suit (Original Side) No. 3775 of 2014, 
High Court of Delhi (8 December 2014); Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v Intex Techs. 
(India) Ltd, Interim Application No. 6735 of 2014 in Civil Suit (Original Side) No. 1045 
of 2014, High Court of Delhi (13 March 2015). 
80  eBay Inc. v MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (US Supreme Court 2006). 
81  Apple, Inc. v Motorola Mobility, Inc., 869 F. Supp.2d 901 at 913-914, U.S. District 
Court, N.D. Illinois (2012). 
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On appeal in both of the aforementioned cases, the Circuit courts adopted a more 
flexible approach to injunctive relief. 
On appeal in Microsoft v. Motorola, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the Federal Circuit’s 
view in ebay that a FRAND commitment does not always preclude an injunctive 
action to enforce the SEP.82 For example, if an infringer refused to accept an offer 
on RAND terms, seeking an injunctive relief could be consistent with the FRAND 
agreement, even where the commitment limits recourse to litigation. The 
pertinent question is whether SEP holder’s obligation of good faith and fair dealing 
under its FRAND agreements precluded it from seeking an injunction in these 
circumstances. That question was for the jury to decide. 
On appeal in Apple v. Motorola, the Federal Circuit revisited the case and weighed 
in on the questions of failed negotiations, unreasonable conduct, and injunctive 
relief.83 The court explicitly rejected a per se rule against granting injunctive relief 
to FRAND-encumbered patent holders, on the grounds that where an infringer 
unilaterally refuses a FRAND royalty or unreasonably delays negotiations to same 
effect, the patent holder no longer bears singular responsibility for concluding a 
contract and subsequently should receive appropriate relief for infringement. 
Furthermore, the court found the existing strict standard for permanent 
injunctions “provides ample strength and flexibility for addressing the unique 
aspects of FRAND-encumbered patents and industry standards.” Clearly, an SEP 
holder does have the right to seek an injunction and it's up to the court to decide 
on a case-by-case basis whether an injunction is warranted, based, e.g., on 
whether the infringer is deemed to have engaged in patent hold-out.  
Much along the same lines as Judge Robart in the aforementioned Microsoft v. 
Mototola, subsequent case law in Ericsson v. D-Link Systems and Realtek v. LSI 
granted the SEP holder a certain degree of flexibility:  
In his post-trial opinion dated 6 August 2013, Judge Davis noted in the case 
Ericsson v. D-Link that initial offers should be viewed as a starting point in the 
negotiations and that FRAND licensing is a two-way street that requires good faith 
by both parties. 84  In this context, even if a court or jury must ultimately 
determine an appropriate rate, merely seeking a higher royalty than a potential 
licensee believes is reasonable is not a RAND violation. In the case at hand, Judge 
Davis determined that there was no need to rule on D-Link’s request for a ban on 
injunctive relief against Ericsson for violation of its FRAND obligations because 
Ericsson had not sought injunctive relief on any of the patents in suit.  
In Realtek v. LSI, Judge Whyte held that Realtek was harmed as a result of the 
breach of the FRAND commitment because the pending threat of an exclusion 
order gave the defendants inherent bargaining power in any FRAND licensing 
negotiation that may take place. The judge found no indication that Realtek was 
not willing to accept a FRAND license. In fact, Realtek admitted that it would 
accept a FRAND license as long as it may preserve its rights to appeal and to 
maintain its defenses at the International Trade Commission, the venue in which 
the defendants elected to pursue their infringement claims. According to the 
court, Realtek could simultaneously pursue a determination of the FRAND royalty 
rate while denying infringement or asserting invalidity, even though those issues 
may ultimately obviate the need for a license.85 
                                           
82  Microsoft Corp. v Motorola Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
2012). 
83  Apple Inc. v Motorola Mobility, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
84  Ericsson v D- Link, Memorandum Opinion and Order (dated August 6, 2013), at *50-51 
Case no. 6:10-CV-473. 
85  Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998 at 1004-1007 (United 
States District Court, N.D. California (2013)). 
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While the stricter standards prevailing in the US since eBay v. MercExchange do 
not necessarily rule out the grant of permanent injunctions for the owner of an 
infringed SEP, they have clearly made it very difficult for SEP owners in practice 
to obtain injunctive relief. In an empirical analysis of smartphone-related patent 
litigation cases, Gupta and Snyder (2014) found that no SEP owner was granted 
injunctive relief, while injunctions were granted for smartphone-related patents 
that were not SEPs. 
 
3.2.2.6.  Availability of injunctive relief from an SDO perspective 
In February 2015, IEEE amended its IPR policy to include, among others, the 
definition of “prohibitive order” as an interim or permanent injunction, exclusion 
order or similar adjudicative directive that limits or prevents a party from making, 
having made, using, selling, offering to sell or importing a compliant 
implementation or service that conforms to any mandatory or optional portion of 
a normative clause of an IEEE standard.  
Except for circumstances envisaged by the IEEE policy, a patentee that claims to 
own an essential patent claim may not seek, or seek to enforce, a Prohibitive 
Order “unless the implementer fails to participate in, or to comply with the 
outcome of, an adjudication, including an affirming first-level appellate review 
[...] by one or more courts [...]” that have appropriate, specified authority. The 
scope of the adjudication can relate to a host of issues, such as license terms, 
patent validity and patent essentiality. The patent holder is not precluded from 
conditionally requesting a prohibitive order where failure to do so would 
permanently waive its rights.  
On the one hand, the policy explicitly states that prohibitive orders should not be 
available against a willing licensee. Thereby, the policy is intended to help avoid 
situations where an injunction is used as a means of enhancing negotiation 
power, putting additional pressure on an implementer to agree to a license that it 
may not believe is consistent with the terms of the IEEE policy. On the other 
hand, the policy implies that a patent holder may not seek a prohibitive order 
before seeking adjudication, including adjudication on royalty rates, by one or 
more courts. Only if an implementer continues to refuse to pay a reasonable 
royalty after adjudication by one or more courts, is the submitter not restricted 
by the policy from seeking a Prohibitive Order (Karachalios, 2016). The policy 
thus endorses a practice whereby courts determine the FRAND royalty rates to be 
paid by a standard implementer unwilling to participate in bilateral negotiations.  
Other SDOs have taken a different approach. In their 2016 position paper, CEN 
and CENELEC have clarified their view on the implications of FRAND commitments 
for the ability to seek injunctive relief, and stress that “it shall be understood that 
a FRAND commitment does not bar an SEP owner from seeking injunctive relief, 
or of introducing legal proceedings with a view to obtaining the rendering of 
accounts or an award of damages.”86 CEN and CENELEC refer to the Huawei v. 
ZTE decision as guidance for “rudimentary best practices”, whereby parties of a 
licensing negotiation who have reached a deadlock “may, by common agreement, 
request that the amount of the royalty be determined by an independent third 
party, by decision without delay”.87 Accordingly, there is no objection to an SEP 
owner seeking injunctive relief against an unwilling licensee with third-party 
adjudication of a dispute between an SEP owner and a willing licensee being 
merely an option that requires common assent. 
                                           
86  http://www.cencenelec.eu/News/Policy_Opinions/PolicyOpinions/EssentialPatents.pdf 
87  Id. 
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3.3.  QUANTIFYING FRAND ROYALTIES 
US courts have largely focused on the determination of specific royalty rates. The 
determination of royalty rates takes place either in the context of past 
infringement damages or in the context of setting a FRAND royalty rate. With 
regards to patent damages, in general, there are two different standards: lost 
profits for sales the patentee would have made (e.g., as a competitor) or 
reasonable royalties for sales the patentee would not have made. All FRAND cases 
have so far been dealt with as reasonable royalty cases. Even though specific 
methodologies may be requested to calculate FRAND royalties, the royalty 
determination nevertheless follows the principles of reasonable royalty 
determination. This is significant in particular with respect to the discussion of the 
royalty base given that lost profits calculations allow calculations based on the 
entire market value of the end product if the end product is a functional unit. In 
contrast, the calculation of reasonable royalties is no exact science. The Federal 
Circuit has repeatedly insisted that courts have discretion in the determination of 
reasonable royalties. This discretion is, however, subject to significant 
constraints: the calculation of royalties must be based on factual evidence and it 
is subject to several substantive principles and evidentiary rules, which will be 
reviewed in the following sections. 
 
3.3.1.  Incremental value 
The purpose of the FRAND requirements is to confine the patentee’s royalty 
demand to the value of the patent itself (i.e., the value of the underlying 
technology) as distinct from the additional value (i.e., the hold-up value) 
conferred by the patent’s being designated as standard-essential.88 However, the 
use of the term “incremental value of the patent” in the US jurisprudence as an 
important benchmark for the calculation of FRAND royalty rates tends to conflate 
two concepts, which should be analyzed separately, namely, the apportionment 
to the stand-alone value of the patent and the incremental value added to the 
standard over the next-best alternative.89 
The first concept is the stand-alone value of the patent, which reflects the 
requirement that the FRAND royalty rate should be the result of a double 
apportionment: First, like in other reasonable royalty cases, the royalty should be 
apportioned between the patented feature and other features of the standard, 
including unpatented features and features protected by other patents. Second, 
going beyond this usual apportionment, courts carry out an additional 
apportionment between the “intrinsic” value of the patent and the value 
associated to its inclusion in the standard. Only the value of the patent itself, i.e., 
the value of the patent as not part of the standard, is the basis for the FRAND 
royalty. The courts have reiterated this principle in different formulations: 
In Microsoft v. Motorola, Judge Robart stated that, under a RAND obligation, the 
reasonable parties to a hypothetical negotiation would not consider the value 
associated with incorporation of the patented technology into the standard, but 
the economic value – based on the technology’s contribution to the standard and 
the implementer’s product itself.90 In Ericsson v. D-Link, the court determined 
that the jury must be instructed to consider the difference between the added 
                                           
88  See, e.g., Apple Inc. v Motorola Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Innovatio 
IP Ventures, LLC, 921 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
89  The difference between incremental value and essentiality is that the latter may be 
inherently valuable, but commercially trivial. 
90  Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., Order of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, April 
25, 2013, No. 10-cv-1823 at para 258 (W.D. Wash.). 
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value of the technological invention and the added value of that invention’s 
standardization. Consequently, it is essential to disaggregate “the value of 
standardization” from the value of the technologies incorporated into the 
standard: First, the patented feature must be apportioned from all of the 
unpatented features reflected in the standard; and, second, the patentee’s royalty 
must be premised on the value of the patented feature, not any value added by 
the standard's adoption of the patented technology.91 Therefore damages awards 
for SEPs must be premised on methodologies that attempt to capture the 
asserted patent’s value resulting not from the value added by the standard’s 
widespread adoption, but only from the technology’s “superiority”.92 
The latter reference to the patented technology’s superiority could not only imply 
the patent’s “superiority” over prior art, but also the superiority of the adopted 
technical solution covered by the patent over alternative technologies at the time 
of the adoption. The above formulation brings us closer to the second concept 
behind the notion of the incremental value of the patent, namely the incremental 
value that the patent adds to the standard by comparison to the next-best 
alternative.93 
Approaching this notion in the context of the hypothetical negotiation, Judge 
Robart clarified in Microsoft v. Motorola that a reasonable royalty rate for an SEP 
committed to a FRAND obligation must value the patented technology itself, 
which necessarily requires considering the importance and contribution of the 
patent to the standard. If alternatives available to the patented technology would 
have provided the same or similar technical contribution to the standard, the 
actual value provided by the patented technology is its incremental contribution.94 
Thus, comparison of the patented technology to the alternatives that the SSO 
could have written into the standard is a consideration in determining a FRAND 
royalty. Such reasoning implies that if a different technological solution also 
provides value to the standard, this value should be entirely removed from the 
damages award. This seems to presume that the SDO would have been able to 
incorporate the alternative technology at no cost, and therefore in a hypothetical 
negotiation would have been willing to pay no more for the superior technology it 
ended up choosing than the strict value of its superiority.  
In In re Innovatio, Judge Holderman deepened the analysis, stating that it would 
be unreasonable to assume that the owner of an alternative patented technology 
would have given that technology away for free, or that the two competing patent 
owners would have competed down to zero. Therefore, the existence of patented 
alternatives does not provide as much reason to discount the value of Innovatio's 
patents as the existence of alternatives in the public domain does.95 For practical 
reasons, the In re Innovatio approach restricted the consideration of available 
alternatives to the options that were discussed in the SSO; the court should 
assume that technology that did not even merit a mention by the respective SDO 
                                           
91  Ericsson v D- Link, 773 F.3d 1201 at 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
92  Id. at 1233. 
93  Contreras and Gilbert (2014) advocate a general return to the incremental value rule 
whose central role has – in their opinion - faded from view only after the emergence 
and popularization of the fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors. Contreras and Gilbert define 
the incremental value as the willingness to pay for one technology relative to its next 
best alternative. The willingness to pay can be derived from a performance benefit or 
cost-savings attributed to the technology, but it is not greater than the cost of 
inventing around the patented technology if the alternative offers similar performance 
benefits. 
94  So Judge Robart in Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., Order of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, April 25, 2013, No. 10-cv-1823 at para 80 (W.D. Wash.). 
95  In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., MDL No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609, at 
*37 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (sealed version filed Sept. 27, 2013). 
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in its deliberations about the standard was not likely to have been a serious 
contender for adoption into the standard. 
Multi-dimensional technologies introduce a number of difficulties implementing an 
incremental value rule for FRAND licensing due to downstream competition and 
the presence of network effects. While the pricing of SEPs at incremental value 
may facilitate the dissemination of the standard in the short-term, concerns are 
expressed that the licensing fee resulting from the incremental value of the SEP 
holder’s technology would not be enough to properly compensate the investment 
costs and risks a company incurred during the development of its (superior) 
technology; neither would it be enough to drive further investment in new 
technologies (Geradin, 2014). The perceived detrimental impact of the 
incremental value rule on innovation incentives and standards appears to be 
exacerbated in the light of the composite value of multi-component products: an 
SEP has “combinatorial” value related to its operation with the other proprietary 
technology in the standard and, therefore, its incremental value is practically zero 
until it operates in combination with all other SEPs - as opposed to “incremental” 
additions of each non-SEP to the end product outside the standard (Sidak, 2013). 
No SEP holder could accept a zero face value for any individually protected 
technology, since each patent still carries incremental cost burdens to the owner: 
innovators must be compensated for their investment in research and 
development. Accordingly, Sidak suggests that to reach an efficient result, fair 
royalty rates that focus solely on the “incremental” value of the SEP holder are 
not sufficient.  
Similar concerns regarding the application of the incremental value benchmark 
were addressed in the jurisprudence. In Microsoft v. Motorola, Judge Robart 
noted that there are practical difficulties in actually doing an ex ante analysis, not 
the least of which is the fact that SSOs do not actually conduct those kinds of 
negotiations as part of the standard setting process. The ex ante incremental 
value rule lacks “real-world applicability” given that “explicit multilateral ex ante 
negotiations cannot be conducted under the auspices of many SSOs,” and is 
impractical with respect to implementation by courts.96 
 
3.3.2.  Apportioning value from the royalty base 
3.3.2.1.  Apportionment requirement 
The calculation of FRAND royalties is subject to the requirement of 
apportionment. The apportionment requirement ensures that a patentee is 
normally awarded damages in proportion to the value that its patent contributed 
to the infringing article, and not based on any value attributable to the infringer’s 
own inventions or the prior art (Love, 2007). Even though particularly relevant to 
FRAND calculations, the apportionment requirement is not specific to FRAND or 
SEPs. 
The apportionment requirement is not specific to the FRAND calculation. The US 
Supreme Court has recognized that if patent damages were not calculated after 
apportioning value between the patented invention and the prior art, the 
unfortunate mechanic who sells a complex device may be compelled to pay treble 
his whole profits to each of a dozen or more several inventors of some small 
improvement in the device he has built. 97  Apportionment can, however, be 
particularly challenging in the case of SEPs given the large number of SEPs 
                                           
96  Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., Order of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, April 
25, 2013, No. 10-cv-1823 at para 77 (W.D. Wash.). 
97  Seymour v McCormick, 57 U.S. 480 at 490-491 (1853). 
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embedded in standards as well as the high number of standards implemented by 
some products.  
Pinning down the portion of the value of an infringing product attributable to a 
patented feature as opposed to all other elements that make up the value of the 
product is further complicated by the fact that the same standard is not equally 
important for the different products that implement it. For instance, the WiFi 
standard is indispensable for the full operability of a modern handset, but less 
critical for the performance of an MP3 player.  
The US jurisprudence has developed different methodologies for the calculation of 
FRAND royalties in order to help implementing the apportionment rule and to 
determine the incremental value attributable to the patented invention: 
In the context of the hypothetical negotiation, Judge Whyte instructed the jury in 
Realtek v. LSI 98  to adopt a double apportionment in determining the FRAND 
royalty for two of the LSI’s WiFi standard-essential patents: 1) Consider the 
importance of the two LSI patents to the standard as a whole, comparing the 
technical contribution of the two LSI patents to the technical contributions of 
other patents essential to the standard; 2) Consider the contribution of the 
standard as a whole to the market value of Realtek’s products utilizing the 
standard. The jury established a royalty of 0.19% of the total sales price of 
Realtek’s WiFi chips (0.12% for one patent plus 0.07% for the other), or an 
estimated $0.0019 to $0.0033 per chip, as compared to LSI’s initial demand for a 
royalty exceeding the $1-1.75 price of Realtek’s WiFi chips.99 
A more prevalent practice in the US case law is to articulate and meet the 
apportionment requirement through the application of the Entire Market Value 
Rule (EMVR). The EMVR states that apportionment is required when a patented 
feature does not constitute the entire market value of the infringing product. Over 
time, courts have increasingly restricted the circumstances under which a 
patented feature can be deemed to drive the entire market value of a product. 
Furthermore, in order to assist US courts with implementing the apportionment 
requirement, the Federal Circuit has expressed a preference for damages 
calculations based on the price of the Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Unit 
(SSPPU), although, in one case, the court ruled that the application of SSPPU 
does not exclude evidence-backed reference to end product prices. In several 
recent decisions, the Federal Circuit also clarified that the preference given to the 
SSPPU does not preclude damages calculations based on comparable licenses - 
even if these licenses are based on end product prices.  
In the following sections, we address the above evidentiary rules in detail. 
 
3.3.2.2.  Entire Market Value Rule (EMVR) 
The EMVR arose from lost profits cases decided long before the reasonable royalty 
measure of damages (Fahrenkrog et al., 2015). In Garretson v. Clark, the 
respective substantive patent law rule was defined as follows100:  
“The patentee [...] must in every case give evidence tending to separate or 
apportion the defendant’s profits and the patentee’s damages between the 
patented feature and the unpatented features, and such evidence must be 
reliable and tangible, and not conjectural or speculative; or the [sic] must show, 
                                           
98  Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, United States District 
Court, N.D. California (2013). 
99  Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v LSI Corp., Jury verdict dated February 26, 2014, Case 
no. C-12-3451-RMW. 
100  Garretson v Clark, 111 U.S. 120 (1884). 
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by equally reliable and satisfactory evidence, that the profits and damages are to 
be calculated on the whole machine, for the reason that the entire value of the 
whole machine, as a marketable article, is properly and legally attributable to the 
patented feature.” 
The EMVR recognizes the economic reality that sometimes a single patent may 
drive the demand for an entire product. With time, the Federal Circuit became 
more critical of damages calculations by the district courts based on the price of 
end products including more than the patented feature, and tightened the 
definition of the EMVR to reduce the risk of extreme and unfounded damage 
awards.  
In Lucent v. Gateway, Lucent accused Microsoft’s Outlook, Money and Windows 
Mobile software of using the patented “date picker” feature, of which Microsoft 
sold approximately 110 million units. Sales of these three products amounted to 
approximately $8 billion. Lucent’s royalty base at trial was based on the entire 
market of these sales. Lucent applied an 8% royalty against sales revenue for the 
accused software, and asked the jury to award $561.9 million. The Federal Circuit 
rejected Lucent’s application of EMVR, citing lack of evidence that the date-picker 
was the basis - or even a substantial basis - of any consumer demand for 
Microsoft’s products.101 According to the court, common sense suggests that no 
one reasonably bought these Microsoft products just because they could pick a 
date in Outlook.102 Nonetheless, the jury awarded Lucent a lump-sum royalty 
payment of approximately $358 million. 
In LaserDynamics v. Quanta Computer, the Federal Circuit stated that the EMVR 
allowed damages calculations based on the value of the entire product only in 
“narrow” circumstances. In this case, the Federal Circuit noted that, in any case 
involving multi-component products, patentees could not calculate damages 
based on sales of the entire product without showing that the demand for the 
entire product is fully attributable to the patented feature. In this case, the 
Federal Circuit addressed a demand for a 2% royalty on the price of an entire 
notebook computer for a single patent that read on a method for identifying the 
type of optical disc inserted into a disc drive. The court concluded that “[…] where 
small elements of multi-component products are accused of infringement, 
calculating a royalty on the entire product carries a considerable risk that the 
patentee will be improperly compensated for non-infringing components of that 
product.”103 The value of the entire apparatus is not necessarily limited to the 
value of the direct downstream product. In principle, it could include any 
complementary product or service for which the patent holder can prove that the 
customer’s decision to buy results primarily from the existence and use of the 
patented component. Finding that LaserDynamics failed to show the patent 
“drove demand for the laptop computers,” the court denied application of EMVR 
and set a high evidentiary hurdle for plaintiffs.104  
The EMVR affirms the requirement to apportion the value of the infringing end 
product to the incremental value added by the patented feature; but it does not 
necessarily prescribe a specific methodology for this apportionment. In particular, 
if the product or component does not satisfy the EMVR, the patentee may 
apportion the value to the patented feature “by careful selection of the royalty 
base to reflect the value added by the patented feature, where that differentiation 
                                           
101  Lucent Techs., Inc. v Gateway, Inc., 580 F. 3d 1301 at 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
102  Lucent Techs., Inc. v Gateway, Inc., 580 F. 3d 1301 at 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
103  LaserDynamics, Inc. v Quanta Computer Inc., 694 F. 3d 51 at 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
104  LaserDynamics, Inc. v Quanta Computer Inc., 694 F. 3d 51 at 63 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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is possible; by adjustment of the royalty rate so as to discount the value of a 
product’s non-patented features; or by a combination thereof.” 105 
In Lucent v. Gateway, the Federal Circuit recognized the probative value that the 
end product may have in royalty calculation cases, including in cases where the 
invention is only a small portion of the product106:  
“Although our law states certain mandatory conditions for applying the entire 
market value rule, courts must nevertheless be cognizant of a fundamental 
relationship between the entire market value rule and the calculation of a running 
royalty damages award. Simply put, the base used in a running royalty 
calculation can always be the value of the entire commercial embodiment, as long 
as the magnitude of the rate is within an acceptable range (as determined by the 
evidence) […] Some commentators suggest that the entire market value rule 
should have little role in reasonable royalty law […] But such general propositions 
ignore the realities of patent licensing and the flexibility needed in transferring 
intellectual property rights.” 
In several decisions, the Federal Circuit nevertheless referenced the EMVR to 
mandate damages calculations based on royalty bases smaller than the price of 
the end product. In Uniloc v. Microsoft, the Federal Circuit expressed the concern 
that a very large base has the potential to “skew the damages horizon for the 
jury, regardless of the contribution of the patented component to this 
revenue”. 107  According to the Federal Circuit, precedents did not allow 
consideration of the entire market value of accused products for minor patent 
improvements simply by asserting a low enough royalty rate. In this case, the 
plaintiff's damages expert performed a “check” as to whether his determination of 
a royalty of approximately $565 million was reasonable by comparing it to his 
calculation of Microsoft's approximate total revenue for Office and Windows of 
$19.28 billion during the relevant period. The Court ruled that Uniloc's use of the 
entire $19 billion revenue base in its check was improper under the entire market 
value rule. 
In Ericsson v. D-Link, the Federal Circuit described the EMVR as having two 
separate parts: 1) a “substantive legal rule” that the “ultimate reasonable 
royalty”, i.e., combination royalty rate and royalty base, ”must be based on the 
incremental value that the patented invention adds to the end products”; and 2) 
an “evidentiary principle” applied to the choice of the royalty base that is intended 
“to help our jury system reliably implement” the substantive legal rule of 
apportionment.108 This evidentiary principle (covered by Federal Rule of Evidence 
403) requires an appropriate balance between the probative value of admittedly 
relevant damages evidence and the prejudicial impact of such evidence caused by 
the potential to mislead the jury into awarding an unduly high royalty. The point 
of the evidentiary principle is to help the jury system reliably implement the 
substantive statutory requirement of apportionment of royalty damages to the 
invention's value109: 
“The principle, applicable specifically to the choice of a royalty base, is that, 
where a multi-component product is at issue and the patented feature is not the 
item which imbues the combination of the other features with value, care must be 
taken to avoid misleading the jury by placing undue emphasis on the value of the 
entire product. It is not that an appropriately apportioned royalty award could 
                                           
105  Ericsson v D- Link, 773 F.3d 1201 at 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  
106  Lucent Techs., Inc. v Gateway, Inc., 580 F. 3d 1301 at 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
107  Uniloc USA, Inc. and Uniloc Singapore Private Limited v Microsoft Corp., 632 F. 3d 
1295 at 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
108  Ericsson v D- Link, 773 F.3d 1201 at 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
109  Id. 
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never be fashioned by starting with the entire market value of a multi-component 
product - by, for instance, dramatically reducing the royalty rate to be applied in 
those cases - it is that reliance on the entire market value might mislead the jury, 
who may be less equipped to understand the extent to which the royalty rate 
would need to do the work in such instances.” 
Beyond the US jurisdictions, the end-product-based calculation of FRAND 
royalties has faced scrutiny in the context of antitrust investigations both in India 
and China.  
In a series of decisions involving Ericsson’s 2G and 3G WiFi standards, the 
Competition Commission of India (CCI) regarded a royalty calculation based on 
the downstream product’s sales price as excessive and without link to the value of 
the SEP. The investigations alleged that Ericsson seemed to be acting contrary to 
the FRAND terms by imposing royalties linked with cost of product of user for its 
patents. Regarding the use of GSM chip in a phone costing Rs 100, royalty would 
therefore be Rs. 1.25. However, if this GSM chip is used in a phone of Rs. 1000, 
royalty would be Rs. 12.5. According to the CCI, charging of two different license 
fees per unit phone for use of the same technology prima facie is discriminatory 
and also reflects excessive pricing vis-à-vis high cost phones.110 The CCI decision 
appears to favor the use of the smallest saleable patent practicing unit (SSPPU) 
as the royalty base for the calculation of FRAND royalties, but lacks the necessary 
economic reasoning and evidence. Not so the Delhi High Court in its Ericsson 
decisions: following the relevant US case law in CSIRO v. Cisco and relying on 
comparable licenses, the court found that Ericsson’s practice of charging a royalty 
based on the price of the downstream product is FRAND.111 Albeit nascent in the 
field of SEP licensing, the Indian court’s jurisprudence is deemed economically 
sound and in line with major jurisdictions in the rest of the world (Sidak, 2015-1; 
Gupta, 2016).  
The royalty base issue was one of the issues addressed by China’s National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in connection with its antitrust 
investigation of Qualcomm. According to an unofficial translation of the NDRC’s 
decision, the NDRC determined that it was “unfair of [Qualcomm] to use as base 
for calculating royalty the net wholesale price of the whole device, which is 
beyond the coverage of the SEPs held by [Qualcomm], while insisting on a 
relatively high royalty rate at the same time [...]”. The NDRC barred Qualcomm 
from “insisting on comparatively high royalty rates” while using devices’ 
wholesale prices as the royalty base”.112 
 
                                           
110  Best It Worlds (India) Private Ltd. v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Case No. 4 of 
2015, Competition Commission of India (12 May 2015); Intex Techs. (India) v 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Case No. 76 of 2013, Competition Commission of 
India (16 January 2014); Micromax Informatics, Ltd v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 
Case No. 50 of 2013, Competition Commission of India (12 November 2013). 
111  Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v Micromax Informatics Ltd. and Mercury Electronics 
Ltd., High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, Court order of 12 March 2013, Docket no. C.S. 
(OS) 442/2013; Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v Xiaomi Technology and others, 
Interim Application No. 24580 of 2014 in Civil Suit (Original Side) No. 3775 of 2014, 
High Court of Delhi (8 December 2014); Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v Intex Techs. 
(India) Ltd, Interim Application No. 6735 of 2014 in Civil Suit (Original Side) No. 1045 
of 2014, High Court of Delhi (13 March 2015). 
112  Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) v Qualcomm, Decision 
of 10 February 2015. 
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3.3.2.3.  Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Unit (SSPPU) 
As part of the EMVR jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit and lower US courts have 
developed the principle that calculations of patent damages for multicomponent 
products should be based on the price of the “smallest saleable infringing unit” or 
the “smallest saleable patent practicing unit” (SSPPU). 113  Whereas the EMVR 
allows the value of the end product to be apportioned to the patented feature 
either by selecting a smaller royalty base or choosing a lower royalty rate, the 
doctrine of the SSPPU states that in many cases it is preferable to carry out this 
apportionment starting from the price of the smallest possible component.  
The main idea behind the SSPPU is a theory of cognitive bias, which is particularly 
relevant to the US jury system. Recent jurisprudence defines the purpose of the 
SSPPU as a means of avoiding prejudicing a jury with large royalty base figures 
that result from the sales of the downstream product containing the SSPPU 
component. 114  The concern here is that the market price of the downstream 
product can reflect a great deal of value to consumers derived from other sources 
– value that the SEP holder can expropriate through hold-up (Ordover et al., 
2014). In this regard, the SSPPU was designed as a step towards mitigating the 
risk of hold-up (Layne-Farrar and Wong-Ervin, 2014). 
Hence, where the entire value of a machine as a marketable article is “properly 
and legally attributable to the patented feature”, the damages may be calculated 
by reference to that value. But where this is not the case, the royalty base “must 
insist on a more realistic starting point for the royalty calculations by juries - 
often, the smallest saleable unit and, at times, even less.” In these words, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed in Ericsson v. D-Link the application of a strong SSPPU 
principle.115 However, it declined to apply it in the specific case because royalties 
were calculated based on comparable licenses, not product prices. 
In VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, the Federal Circuit explained that the 
reasonable royalty may have to be apportioned even further than the SSPPU, 
when a patented feature does not drive the entire value of the component. Thus, 
where the smallest saleable unit is, in fact, a multi-component product containing 
several non-infringing features with no relation to the patented feature, the 
patentee must do more to estimate what portion of the value of that product is 
attributable to the patented technology. In this decision, the court makes it clear 
that using the SSPPU is no guarantee that the EMVR is satisfied. In other words, 
additional apportionment may be required even if the product component used as 
a royalty base is the patent’s SSPPU. District courts performing reasonable 
royalty calculations are “cautioned [...] and must account for differences in the 
technologies and economic circumstances of the contracting parties.”116 
In the Cornell v. Hewlett-Packard case, Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit 
excluded at trial testimony that the entire market value of HP’s servers and 
workstations should be used as the royalty base. The court found that the 
processor was an appropriate royalty base because the infringing part was an 
important component. 117  Thus, the processor represented the SSPPU and 
damages could be calculated by multiplying the 0.8% royalty rate against the 
processor as the royalty base. The court applied that rate and reduced the jury 
award by one-third to approximately $53.5 million.  
                                           
113  Cornell University v Hewlett-Packard, 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 at 287-88 (N.D.N.Y. 2009); 
LaserDynamics, Inc. v Quanta Computer Inc., 694 F. 3d 51 at 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In 
re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC , 921 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
114  See, e.g., Ericsson v D- Link, 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
115  Ericsson v D- Link, 773 F.3d 1201 at 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
116  VirnetX, Inc.v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 at 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
117  Cornell University v Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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Whether the SSPPU is adequate to compensate for high value SEPs was equally 
questioned in CSIRO v. Cisco.118 In the trial before the District Court, CSIRO’s 
expert had proposed a damages model premised on the profit difference between 
(1) Cisco products using versions of the 802.11 WiFi standard that incorporated 
the patented technology (IEEE 802.11 versions a and g) and (2) Cisco products 
using versions of the WiFi standard that did not use the patented technology 
(IEEE 802.11 version b). CSIRO, an R&D specialist firm, argued that the 
difference between the two versions was primarily attributable to the patented 
technology. This led to CSIRO proposing a volume-tiered royalty ranging from 
$1.35 to $2.25 per end unit (totalling about $30 million for past infringement). 
According to CSIRO, the end products (network interface cards, routers, access 
points) were the smallest saleable patent practicing unit. 
In the district court, Judge Davis highlighted that - in the case of computer chips 
- basing a royalty solely on the chip price is like valuing a copyrighted book based 
only on the costs of the binding, paper, and ink needed to actually produce the 
physical product; while such a calculation captures the cost of the physical 
product, it provides no indication of its actual value.119 The district court judge 
explicitly restricted “reliable” calculations of royalty rates to calculations based 
either on the SSPPU or comparable licenses - even if these are expressed as 
portion of the end product price. It clarified that the SSPPU royalty-base “rule” 
would conflict with prior approvals of a methodology that values the asserted 
patent based on comparable licenses.  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court did not violate 
apportionment principles in employing a damages model that took account of the 
parties' informal negotiations with respect to the end product. Recognizing that 
each case presents unique facts, the Federal court affirmed the SSPPU principle 
by highlighting two justifications based on its prior jurisprudence: i) where small 
elements of multi-component products are accused of infringement, calculating a 
royalty on the entire product carries a considerable risk that the patentee will be 
improperly compensated for non-infringing components of that product; ii) it is 
the important evidentiary principle that care must be taken to avoid misleading 
the jury by placing undue emphasis on the value of the entire product. 
Fundamentally, the SSPPU principle states that a damages model cannot reliably 
apportion from a royalty base without that base being the smallest saleable 
patent practicing unit. However, according to the Federal court, that principle was 
inapplicable in the specific case, as the district court had not apportioned from a 
royalty base at all. Instead, the district court had begun with the parties' 
negotiations. The rule Cisco advanced - which would require all damages models 
to begin with the smallest saleable patent practicing unit – was deemed 
untenable. It conflicted with the Federal court’s prior approvals of a methodology 
that values the asserted patent based on comparable licenses. Such a model 
begins with rates from comparable licenses and then accounts for differences in 
the technologies and economic circumstances of the contracting parties. Where 
the licenses employed are sufficiently comparable, this method is typically reliable 
because the parties are constrained by the market's actual valuation of the 
patent.120 In this respect, the court reaffirmed its earlier decision in Ericsson v. D-
Link that otherwise comparable licenses are not inadmissible solely because they 
express the royalty rate as a percentage of total revenues, rather than in terms of 
the smallest saleable unit.121 
 
                                           
118  CSIRO v Cisco, 809 F. 3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 3, 2015). 
119 See the district court decision, CSIRO v Cisco, 2014 WL 3805817 at *11. 
120  CSIRO v Cisco, 809 F. 3d 1295 at 1302-1303 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 3, 2015). 
121  See, Ericsson v D- Link, 773 F.3d 1201 at 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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CSIRO v. Cisco, 809 F. 3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 3, 2015) 
Patent owner Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization 
(“CSIRO”) is the principal scientific research organization for the Australian 
Federal Government. The US patent-in-suit addressed multipath problems in a 
wireless local area network, a technology incorporated into certain versions of the 
IEEE 802.11 WiFi standard. In 1998, CSIRO provided the IEEE with a letter of 
assurance that it would license the specific patent-in-suit on RAND-terms if the 
patent were essential to the 802.11a standard. IEEE sought additional letters of 
assurance from CSIRO for later revisions of the standard, but CSIRO declined to 
provide them. Following the patent grant, CISCO participated in the formation of 
Radiata Communications that was intended to commercialize the patented 
technology. CSIRO entered a Technology License Agreement (TLA) with Radiata 
in February 1998 that, among other things, had a per-WiFi chip royalty payment, 
decreasing from 5% royalty per chip to 1% as the volume of licensed chips 
increased. In 2001, Cisco acquired Radiata and started paying Radiata’s license 
fees under the TLA license agreement for Radiata products. This agreement was 
renegotiated several times, always keeping the general concept of a per-chip 
royalty base. 
In 2003, CSIRO offered industry participants a license on FRAND terms on all 
versions of the standard - at first indicating that it had agreed with IEEE to do so, 
but later clarifying there was no FRAND obligation. By June 2004, CSIRO 
developed a Voluntary Licensing Program offering licenses to the said under “a 
flat-fee royalty, charged per end product unit sold” under what it called a “Rate 
Card” structure. The lowest royalty rate under this structure was $1.40 to $1.90 
per unit. In lack of any licensees willing to pay under the Rate Card schedule, 
CSIRO approached Cisco with a licensing offer, which Cisco did not accept. During 
discussions in 2005, Cisco informally suggested that $0.90 per unite might be an 
appropriate royalty rate (a rate about equal to what Cisco had been paying 
Radiata under the initial TLA agreement). 
In July 2011, CSIRO sued Cisco for infringing the patent-in-suit. Both parties 
stipulated to a bench trial solely on damages and that Cisco would not challenge 
the patent’s infringement or validity. In February 2014, Judge Davis held a four-
day bench trial on damages. Judge Davis of the District Court awarded a royalty 
structure that ranged between $0.65 and $1.90 per unit and resulted into a total 
damages amount of approx. $16 millions for past infringement. 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed multiple aspects of value apportionment 
in the context of damages, including SSPPU and comparable licenses. The Federal 
Circuit stated that there are “unique considerations that apply to apportionment 
in the context of a standard-essential patent”, and these considerations applied 
even for standard-essential patents that did not have a FRAND or other standard-
setting obligation - as is the case of the CSIRO patents at issue. The Federal 
Circuit rejected Judge Davis’ royalty range. On remand, the district court should 
consider whether the initial rates taken from the parties’ discussions should be 
adjusted for standardization and give more weight to the TLA as “the only actual 
royalty agreement between Cisco and [CSIRO] […] contemporaneous with the 
hypothetical negotiation.”  
 
 
The practicability (and traceability) of the SSPPU is questionable in the context of 
portfolio licensing: it is often not possible to map a portfolio of hundreds or even 
thousands of diverse patents to a single SSPPU. The patents in a typical large 
portfolio cover multiple different components of a smartphone, including SEP for 
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communication standards, SEPs for non-communications standards as well as 
non-SEPs. Each family of patents in a portfolio would potentially map to a 
different SSPPU, and the implied royalty base for the portfolio would therefore be 
the aggregate of all those components. Furthermore, trying to determine a 
portfolio royalty based on the SSPPU for every patent in a substantial portfolio of 
SEPs and non-SEPs would be an unmanageable task (Stark, 2015). Petit (2016) 
points out the adverse transactions cost effect of the SSPPU, which itemizes SEP 
licensing by requiring a different value for each component – information typically 
privy to the firm that practices the patent. 
The debate around the proper royalty base for calculating FRAND damages is 
particularly accentuated in the context of the recently amended IEEE policy. The 
amendments recommend the consideration of three non-mandatory factors for 
the determination of FRAND royalties: 1) the value contributed “to the value of 
the relevant functionality of the smallest saleable Compliant Implementation that 
practices the Essential Patent Claim,” 2) the value contributed “in light of the 
value contributed by all Essential Patent Claims for the same IEEE Standard 
practiced in that [smallest saleable] Compliant Implementation,” and 3) “Existing 
licenses” that “were not obtained under the explicit or implicit threat of a 
Prohibitive Order” and “otherwise sufficiently comparable” circumstances and 
resulting licenses. With this licensing framework, IEEE is the first SSO that 
specifies methodologies to be used to determine FRAND rates in specific cases. 
Whereas the applicability of the SSPPU principle had so far been limited to the US 
case law, the introduction of a very similar wording in the IEEE bylaws broadens 
the scope of the principle, igniting further controversy around its usefulness and 
applicability. 
 
3.3.3.  Judicially defined FRAND rates 
3.3.3.1.  Bottom-up approach and the proportionality contribution 
method 
The proportional contribution method or the so-called “bottom-up” approach 
begins with the price of the “end user” product. The patent constitutes part of a 
standard, which in turn typically forms part of a package of standards necessary 
to develop and manufacture a commercial product. The market price a firm can 
charge, comprised of considerations of distribution, overhead, sales costs, and 
other incidentals, informs the value of the product to the licensee. 
The bottom-up approach suggests determining the costs of implementing 
reasonable alternatives to the patents at issue that could have been adopted into 
the standard, and dividing that cost by the total number of infringing units to 
determine the maximum per unit royalty. The “bottom-up” approach is typically 
favored by manufacturers and has been proposed for the calculation of FRAND by 
the defendant’s expert in In re Innovatio.122 In this case, the bottom up involved 
considering the value of the patents compared to the alternatives, but relied on 
proxies in the lack of precise alternatives and direct evidence. Judge Holderman 
regarded the recommended approach as correct from an economic point of view, 
but opted in his decision for an alternative, top-down method (see below in 
detail). 
In a series of cases filed by Ericsson involving its patents essential to the 2G and 
3G standards, the High Court of Delhi used the net sales price of the downstream 
device as royalty base for the calculation of FRAND royalties payable to Ericsson. 
                                           
122  In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC , 921 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
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For the purpose, the court examined relevant cases across various jurisdictions 
worldwide and relied on the comparable licenses.123  
Similarly, courts in Japan and China have handed down landmark decisions and 
defined FRAND royalties based on benchmarks such as the total sales amount of 
the infringing products and the percentage of the SEPs’ contribution to the 
standards124 or 0.019% of the sales price of the end product.125  
 
3.3.3.2.  Top-down approach 
A broad range of different rates may be compatible with different considerations 
related to FRAND. In Microsoft v. Motorola, for instance, the court held that 
FRAND could describe a range of royalty rates and that a patentee complied with 
his FRAND commitments if he agreed to a rate within this range.126  
In other cases, the courts were asked to determine damages and therefore 
calculate a specific rate. In In re Innovatio, the manufacturers suggested a “Top 
Down” approach to calculating royalties: with regards to the end-products in this 
case that included at least one Wi-Fi chip, the court should determine the 
weighted average selling price of a Wi-Fi chip over time. The court should then 
determine the percentage of that price attributable to the average operating 
profit of a chipmaker, and then apportion the resulting amount, which represents 
the maximum royalty for all SEPs, to account for the patented features in this 
case. The result of the methodology is a royalty of between .72 cents and 3.09 
cents per chip, significantly less than Innovatio's proposed royalties.127 According 
to the order, Innovatio's proposed method would have resulted in royalties on 
average of approximately $3.39 per access point, $4.72 per laptop, up to $16.17 
per tablet, and up to $36.90 per inventory tracking device (such as a bar code 
scanners).  
Judge Holderman applied a three-step approach for the determination of the 
FRAND royalty. First, he considered the importance of the patent to the standard. 
Second, he considered the importance of the alleged infringer’s accused products. 
Third, he examined other licenses for comparable patents, using the first and 
second steps’ decisions to determine which patents are comparable. In the 
absence of comparable licenses, Judge Holderman adopted an alternative “top-
down” valuation method by starting with the average sales price of a WiFi chip. 
As a second step, he took the average sale price of the end product and 
calculated the average profit, the portion of sales available to pay RAND royalties. 
From there, the average profit was multiplied by the ratio of the total number of 
SEPs from the owner in question over the total number of SEPs from all owners. 
                                           
123  Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v Micromax Informatics Ltd. and Mercury Electronics 
Ltd., High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, Court order of 12 March 2013, Docket no. C.S. 
(OS) 442/2013;Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v Xiaomi Technology and others, 
Interim Application No. 24580 of 2014 in Civil Suit (Original Side) No. 3775 of 2014, 
High Court of Delhi (8 December 2014); Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v Intex Techs. 
(India) Ltd, Interim Application No. 6735 of 2014 in Civil Suit (Original Side) No. 1045 
of 2014, High Court of Delhi (13 March 2015). 
124  Japanese IP High Court, Decision of 16 May, 2014 Case No. 2013[Ne] 10043 - Apple v 
Samsung. 
125  Huawei v InterDigital, Judgments of 28 October 2013, Guangdong Higher People’s 
Court of China (Yue Gaofa Minsan Zhougzi Nos. 305 and 306). 
126  Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993 (W.D. Wash. 2012). 
127  In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., MDL No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609, at 
*23-24 ff. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (sealed version filed Sept. 27, 2013). 
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The opinion noted that the denominator of this ratio could be modified to account 
for differences in value among the SEPs.128  
Judge Holderman found that the price per component, a WiFi chip, was $14.85; 
the profit margin was 12.1%; and the contribution was 19 of approximately 3,000 
SEPs. Accounting for the percentage of value of Innovatio’s patents to the total 
number of electronics patents in the 802.11 standard, the top-down formula 
generated a net royalty of 9.56 cents per WiFi chip - about three times the rate of 
3.471 cents per unit -, which Judge Holderman stated was “comfortably within” 
the range of 0.8 – 19.5 cents decided in Microsoft v. Motorola case. 129  By 
declining to find a percentage of the end product price, the top-down method 
provides a less favorable lower bound for the SEP holder. However, the court saw 
several significant advantages in the adopted methodology: First, by taking the 
profit margin on the sale of a chip for a chip manufacturer as the maximum 
potential royalty, the approach accounts for both the principle of non-
discrimination and royalty stacking concerns in RAND licensing. A second 
advantage of this top-down approach is that it apportions to the value of 
Innovatio's patented features without relying on information about other licenses 
that may or may not be comparable to accomplish the apportionment. Finally, the 
method requires verifiable data points as inputs (number of SEPs, average price 
of a chip, average profit of a chip manufacturer) thus allowing the court to base 
its RAND rate on objective considerations and sound hypotheses, rather than on 
mere speculation.130  
 
3.3.3.3.  Comparable licenses and patent pools 
Using sufficiently comparable licenses is a generally reliable method of estimating 
the value of a patent because it inherently accounts for market conditions at the 
time of the hypothetical negotiation, including a number of factors that are 
difficult to value, such as the cost of available, non-infringing alternatives. 
Comparable licenses can be admissible as long as there is some “basis in fact to 
associate the royalty rates used in [the] prior licenses to the particular 
hypothetical negotiation at issue in the case.”131 
In Realtek v. LSI132, Judge Whyte instructed the jury to consider other licenses for 
patents comparable to the two FRAND-encumbered 802.11 patents at issue. In 
determining the comparability of other licenses, the following factors may be 
taken into account: 1) the patents included in the license agreement, 2) the date 
of the license, 3) any limitations on the use of the licensed technology, 4) the 
inclusion of other consideration in the agreement, 5) whether the license was part 
of a settlement of litigation or arbitration, 6) whether the royalty was a lump sum 
or a running royalty rate, 7) opinion testimony of qualified experts. 
According to Ericsson v. D-Link, excluding real-world, relevant licenses as 
inadmissible would often make it impossible for a patentee to resort to license-
                                           
128  In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., MDL No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609, at 
*73 ff. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (sealed version filed Sept. 27, 2013). 
129  Explaining the difference, Judge Robart concluded that Motorola's patents were only of 
minimal value to the standard, whereas Innovatio's patents are of moderate to 
moderate-high importance to the standard; In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent 
Litig., MDL No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609, at *86 ff. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (sealed 
version filed Sept. 27, 2013). 
130  In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., MDL No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609, at 
*74 ff. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (sealed version filed Sept. 27, 2013). 
131  Apple Inc. v Motorola Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 25, 2014). 
132  Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, United States District 
Court, N.D. California (2013). 
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based evidence. In this respect, he Federal Circuit ruled that any concerns about 
the licenses proffered in the case go to the weight of evidence of those licenses – 
not its admissibility. At the same time, the court stressed that prior licenses, 
however, are almost never perfectly analogous to the infringement action. For 
example, allegedly comparable licenses may cover more patents than are at issue 
in the action, including cross-licensing terms, cover foreign intellectual property 
rights, or – as in the case at issue - be calculated as some percentage of the 
value of a multi-component product. Hence, testimony relying on licenses must 
account for such distinguishing facts when invoking them to value the patented 
invention. In each case, district courts must assess the extent to which the 
proffered testimony, evidence and arguments would skew unfairly the jury’s 
ability to apportion the damages to account only for the value attributable to the 
infringing features. Where expert testimony explains to the jury the need to 
discount reliance on a given license to account only for the value attributed to the 
licensed technology, the mere fact that licenses predicated on the value of a 
multi-component product are referenced in that analysis (and the district court 
exercises its discretion not to exclude the evidence) is not reversible error.133 
A more recent decision has challenged the admissibility of comparable license 
agreements as key evidentiary standard in relation to FRAND royalty 
determinations. In CSIRO v. Cisco, the district court had rejected at the first 
instance any application of the proposed licensing agreement with a third party-
licensee as non-comparable on the grounds that it was crafted as related-party 
agreement between CSIRO, an R&D specialist, and one of its former scientists. 
The said agreement was dated long before any hypothetical negotiation between 
Cisco and CSIRO and royalty rates were based on the price of chips rather than 
the value of the invention embodied by the SEP. Interestingly, while dismissing 
rates of the proposed licensing, the district court used later licenses as a basis for 
the structure of the hypothetical negotiation, because all of the licenses were 
based on per-unit royalties with volume discounts. On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
rejected most of the District Court’s reasoning, stating that a license may not be 
excluded from the fact finder’s consideration solely because of its chosen royalty 
base.134  
Prior to that, in the appeal case Microsoft v. Motorola, the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
district court’s exclusion of allegedly comparable license agreements to which 
Motorola was a party for reasons including the fact that some agreements i) 
entered into to resolve an ongoing infringement dispute between the parties, ii) 
included cross-licenses and the royalty rate represented a blended rate for all 
Motorola patents (SEPs and on-SEPs), included in the products covered by the 
agreement, iii) included monetary caps, and provided licenses for Motorola 
patents that expired before Motorola and Microsoft's hypothetical agreement 
would have occurred.135 
In Europe, German courts have equally highlighted the importance of comparable 
licensing agreements as an important indicator of the adequacy of the license 
terms offered. In St Lawrence Communication v. Vodafone, the Düsseldorf 
District Court was presented with (anonymized) licensing agreements of six 
mobile telecommunication companies with a comparable royalty. In the Court’s 
view, there was no sufficient indication that the claimed royalty is not in line with 
the commercial practice in the mobile communication sector. In addition, a 
comparison between the claimed royalty and the lower (per patent) royalty of 
                                           
133  Ericsson v D- Link, 773 F.3d 1201 at 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
134  CSIRO v Cisco, 809 F. 3d 1295 at 1307 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 3, 2015). 
135  Microsoft Corp. v Motorola Inc., 795 F.3d 1024 at 1044 (US Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit 2015) (Microsoft II). 
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the SIPRO pool also offering SEPs to the AMR-WB-standard, could not convince 
the court that the claimed royalty is not FRAND. 136 
In Sisvel v. Haier, the Düsseldorf District Court had to consider Sisvel’s motion for 
an injunction against German and European distribution companies of the Haier 
group, enjoining them from selling the accused UMTS- and GPRS-compliant 
smartphones and tablets in Germany. 137  Sisvel runs various patent licensing 
programs, including a wireless licensing program that includes more than 350 
patents originally acquired from Nokia that Sisvel claims have been declared 
essential to second, third, and fourth generation. Haier tried to defend itself by 
pointing to a license granted by Nokia to Haier’s chipset supplier Qualcomm. 
Since at least part of Haier’s mobile phones use Qualcomm chipsets and the 
patented invention is essentially embodied in these chipsets, Haier argued that 
phones with Qualcomm chipsets should be covered by the prior license between 
Nokia and Qualcomm, which is also binding for Sisvel. Haier’s problem was that it 
could not produce the agreements between Nokia and Qualcomm and Nokia and 
Sisvel in court, but had to rely on relevant press releases by Nokia. In the 
absence of further proof, the court ruled that Haier’s defense based on the Nokia 
press releases was merely speculative and therefore irrelevant. Despite the 
existence of the unavailable prior licensing agreement, the court neither consider 
ordering its disclosure for evidentiary purposes, nor did it shift the burden of 
proof to Sisvel as Nokia’s successor-in-title to the patent. The outcome of the 
case points to an information gap in German court proceedings given the 
relevance of prior licenses to the non-discriminatory aspect of FRAND. 
Along with comparable licenses, patent pool rates have also been deemed as a 
reliable indicator of the FRAND rate. 
In Germany, the Mannheim District Court in NTT v. HTC granted injunctions 
based on the FRAND-compliance of the claimant’s license offer that drew on pool 
licenses.138 In the case at hand, NTT’s license offer covered patents that were 
part of the WCDMA SIPRO pool as well as the LTE “Via” license pool. In its license 
offer, NTT had specified the share of its patents in the aforementioned patent 
pools, calculated the royalty rate for using NTT’s patents based on the royalty 
rates for licensing all patents in the pools and specified the overall royalty rates 
for licensing SEP’s for the WCDMA and LTE standards. This outcome differs form 
the aforementioned decision by the Düsseldorf District Court in St Lawrence 
Communication v. Vodafone in that it takes into account the patent pool royalties 
as useful FRAND benchmarks in favor of an injunctive relief. 
In the US, the question whether pool licenses provide information regarding the 
value of a FRAND royalty rate has been raised in at least two cases:  
In Microsoft v. Motorola, Judge Robart used two pool licenses as comparable 
licenses. The IEEE 802.11 pool (Via Licensing pool), which has not achieved wide 
coverage in the market, was considered only somewhat probative, whereas the 
H.264 pool, which includes a significant number of patent holders, was considered 
as an appropriate comparable license. The judgment recognizes that pool rates 
are typically lower than rates achieved bilaterally, in particular because pool 
members obtain other benefits from pool membership than the royalty revenue 
(such as grant-backs). Furthermore, many pools, including the pools used as 
comparable licenses, practice patent-counting sharing rules, and thus fail to 
                                           
136  See, e.g., Düsseldorf District Court, 31 March 2016, 4a O 73/14 - St. Lawrence 
Communication v Vodafone. 
137  Düsseldorf District Court, Decisions of 3 November 2015, 4a O 144/14 und 4a O 93/14 
- Sisvel v Haier. 
138  Mannheim District Court, Decision of 29 January 2016, 7 O 66/15 - NTT DoCoMo v 
HTC. 
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account for the significance of each patent. Based on these arguments, Motorola 
objected the use of pool licenses as comparable licenses, because it argued that 
pool patents are likely to be of lower significance and thus don’t provide reliable 
evidence for truly comparable rates. According to the court, however, the claim 
that pool patents are of lower quality needs to be corroborated by factual 
evidence. Since the patents in this particular case had been determined to be 
SEPs of minor significance, the pool license was deemed a comparable license.139 
Using a very similar argument, Judge Holderman in In re Innovatio concluded 
that the same IEEE 802.11 pool (Via Licensing pool) did not constitute a 
comparable license for the patents in dispute, because these patents had been 
considered to be of moderate to moderate-high importance. In addition, the Via 
Licensing pool was relatively unsuccessful in attracting licensors and had thus 
limited utility for determining a RAND rate.140  
 
3.3.3.4.  Will the European courts set a FRAND royalty rate? 
European courts are not inclined to engage in any simple arithmetic nor do they 
emulate any US rate-setting opinion as a blueprint. They rather look for 
pragmatic solutions and – with the help of experts – use their understanding of 
the relevant technologies and competitive dynamics in order to assess the FRAND 
compliance of the proposed rates. German courts, in particular, would rather 
derive the value of the SEP at issue based, e.g., on established licensing practices 
and existing agreements, than actively determine it. In any case, these courts do 
not generally perceive royalty determinations as the derivative of simulated 
negotiations.  
In the recent case St Lawrence Communication v. Vodafone, the Düsseldorf 
District Court held that specifying the way the royalty is calculated, as required 
under Huawei v. ZTE, should not be interpreted too strictly. 141  As FRAND is 
usually not an exact amount but rather a range, the claimant is not required to 
disclose a mathematical derivation. It is, therefore, in principle sufficient to 
disclose the basic considerations that led to the amount of the claimed royalty. 
Saint Lawrence Communication was held to have fulfilled this obligation by 
referring to a standard licensing royalty and its acceptance in the market. 
If deemed necessary, European courts may choose to perform a basic plausibility 
test over a full-fledged valuation. In Samsung v. Apple, the Hague District Court 
rejected Samsung’s the proposed royalty rate of 2.4% of the chip price for each 
of its asserted patents, the court held that Samsung's offer was so far out of the 
FRAND ballpark that the company failed to honor its obligation to make an offer 
on FRAND terms.142 
                                           
139  Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., Order of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, April 
25, 2013, No. 10-cv-1823 at paras 425 ff., 465 ff. (W.D. Wash.). 
140  In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., MDL No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609, at 
*69-70 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (sealed version filed Sept. 27, 2013). 
141  Düsseldorf District Court, Decision of 31 March 2016, 4a O 73/14 - St. Lawrence 
Communication v Vodafone. 
142  The Hague District Court, Decisions 14 March 2012 and 20 June 2012, Doc. no. 
400367/HA ZA 11-2212 - Samsung Electronics v Apple Inc. et al. 
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3.3.4.  Compliance of patent portfolio licensing with the 
notion of FRAND  
3.3.4.1.  Cumulative rates and royalty stacking  
Before examining the interface of portfolio licensing with FRAND, it is important to 
understand the background of cumulative rates and the associated concern of 
royalty stacking.  
Cumulative rates represent the value of all SEP portfolios an Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) has to pay in order to sell its product. Especially in the area 
of cellular standards where portfolio licensing is an established practice, there are 
three categories of mobile phones sold worldwide143: 
i) Phones sold by OEMs with own basic wireless R&D and SEP portfolios. Many 
(other) asserting SEP portfolio holders are themselves implementers, and thus 
need a “grantback” license to these OEMs' SEP portfolios with a "royalty-netting" 
effect: the cumulative royalty for this category of phones is somewhere in the 0-
10% interval. 
ii) Phones sold by OEMs without own basic wireless R&D and SEP portfolios. 
Instead of doing heavy investments in cellular wireless R&D, these OEMs have 
chosen to focus their business efforts on, e.g., design, brand management, 
localization, feature development, marketing or logistics. The cumulative royalty 
is estimated at 10%. 
iii) Phones sold by OEMs that are “unwilling licensees”. Due to factors such as 
patent hold-out and the emergence of major localized OEMs in jurisdictions with 
less effective IPR enforcement regimes, a number of phones sold globally today 
are unlicensed. That is, they constitute infringing devices and no royalty at all is 
paid for them (0%). 
Based on the above, SEP-holding OEMs ultimately pay a lower net cumulative 
royalty rate than non-SEP-holding OEMs. This is not a violation of the non-
discriminatory aspect of FRAND since the value of a license is transferred back in 
place of some royalties.  
However, in situations when cumulative rates may lead to a higher aggregate 
royalty under scenario (ii), royalty stacking becomes a concern for both judicial 
and administrative authorities from the US over to India. In this context, "royalty 
stacking" basically means that OEM of standards-compliant products need to 
obtain licenses from several SEP holders, and the aggregate royalty then 
becomes the sum of the individual royalties paid to the different SEP holders. 
SEPs are complementary and an OEM must obtain licenses to all SEP portfolios in 
order to be fully licensed. Royalty stacking poses a problem when the cumulative 
SEP license royalty fee can become too high for an OEM to bear while maintaining 
a reasonable profit margin. The situation is difficult to observe and reliable 
evidence is lacking. Nevertheless, the courts consider royalty stacking as a way of 
checking the accuracy of a proposed RAND royalty's correspondence to the 
technical value of the patented invention.144 
 
3.3.4.2.  Complexities of value apportionment for large portfolios 
Apportioning value for a diverse patent portfolio that bundles SEPs and non-SEPs, 
patented and non-patented features, infringing and non-infringing components is 
                                           
143  See, e.g., http://patentperspectives.blogspot.com 
144  So Judge Holderman in In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., MDL No. 2303, 
2013 WL 5593609, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (sealed version filed Sept. 27, 2013). 
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an arduous task. This is particularly evident in court practice given the differences 
inherent to licensing negotiations and patent infringement lawsuit: Whereas only 
a subset of SEPs can be litigated, patent portfolios are licensed based on complex 
license agreements that seek to provide the license with comprehensive freedom 
to operate on the defined technical field. Only subsets of subsets of global 
portfolios, sometimes only a handful patents, can feasibly (from a time- and cost 
perspective) be processed per jurisdiction. The relevant question here is whether 
the SEP owner will have to claim the infringement of all portfolio patents in order 
to “force” the alleged infringer to take the portfolio license or whether the alleged 
infringement of one or several (major) portfolio patents is enough if a portfolio 
license is the standard license on the market.  
In the context of a licensing disagreement between Apple and Ericsson, the US 
district courts are asked to determine FRAND with regards to Ericsson’s wireless 
SEP portfolio. Specifically, on 12 January 2015, Apple filed a complaint with a 
California district court of California asking the court to issue a declaratory 
judgment that seven Ericsson LTE patents are neither essential nor infringed.145 
On 14 January 2015, Ericsson countered with a FRAND-declaration complaint filed 
with a Texas district court. 146  These complaints trigger a process of FRAND 
determination where the courts are confronted with two different approaches to 
an SEP portfolio license valuation: an individual patent license value adjudication 
(“patent-by-patent approach”), as requested by Apple, and a whole portfolio 
license value adjudication (“one-stop-shopping approach”), as requested by 
Ericsson. As to the background of the conflict, the parties began negotiations to 
renew the license to Ericsson’s 2G and 3G SEPs long before the expiration of a 
five-year term licensing agreement. During the negotiations, Ericsson offered a 
global portfolio license, which Apple refused. The parties have not exchanged any 
offers or requests to license individual patents; nor has Apple ever made a 
request for Ericsson to provide a license offer on a patent-by-patent basis. Hence, 
Ericsson filed this suit against Apple in order to obtain a declaration that it its 
offer of a global portfolio license on FRAND terms is consistent with both its 
FRAND commitment as well as standard industry practice. From Apple’s 
perspective, Ericsson refuses to adapt its long-standing licensing practices to the 
current technological and legal environment and instead i) demands royalties for 
FRAND-encumbered patents based on a percentage of the value of entire 
smartphones or tablet computers, and ii) asserts its patents as SEPs when they 
are not – no royalties should be owed for such patents.  
Recently, the “one-stop-shopping” approach has indeed gained support from 
courts and agencies worldwide. In Microsoft v. Motorola, the district court 
determined a global FRAND rate to Motorola's SEP portfolio.147 Outside the US, 
German Courts have held that offering a worldwide portfolio license may seem 
reasonable or, in principle, appropriate given that licensing agreements are 
usually concluded on a worldwide basis, cover entire portfolios and are concluded 
between groups of companies.148 In China, the National Development and Reform 
                                           
145  Apple v Ericsson, Case no. CV 15 0154 (complaint filed January 12, 2015 with the 
District Court for the Northern District of California); http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/files/2015/01/applevericsson-complaint.pdf 
146  Ericsson v Apple, Civil action no. 2:15-cv-17 (complaint filed January 14, 2015 with the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas); available at 
https://regmedia.co.uk/2015/02/27/apple_lawsuit_contract.pdf 
147  Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993 (W.D. Wash. 2012). 
148  Mannheim District Court, 2 O 103/14, Decision of 10 March 2015 - St Lawrence v 
Deutsche Telekom; Düsseldorf District Court, 31 March 2016, 4a O 73/14 - St. 
Lawrence Communication v Vodafone. In the latter, the court held in the context of 
injunctions that the security deposit had to match the geographical scope of the 
respective worldwide license in offer. 
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Commission (NDRC) adopted a similar favorable approach to the offer of a global 
portfolio license in the field of SEPs.149  
From a policy perspective, the conundrum lies with striking a balance between 
the efficiencies tied to global portfolio licensing, i.e., avoiding the minutia of 
lengthy bilateral licensing negotiations that frustrate the pace of innovation, and 
the harm stemming from an SEP owner’s abusive behavior, i.e., abuse of 
dominant position may be triggered by extensive and strong patent portfolios. 
The latter may speak to the scope of antitrust liability, particularly with respect to 
the legality of patent bundling or tying. Generally speaking, patent bundling is a 
common practice that takes up two forms: either as pure bundling that leaves the 
licensee with no option but to accept a license on all patents within the bundle, or 
as mixed bundling that allows potential licensees to opt either for a license to 
FRAND-encumbered patents alone or for a license to the full portfolio. A patent-
holder can engage in pure bundling/tying of licenses to FRAND-encumbered and 
non-RAND encumbered patents and still honor its FRAND commitments provided 
that it charges a royalty that would be FRAND for the FRAND-encumbered patents 
alone. The patent owner cannot deduct the value of non-FRAND encumbered 
patents from the license fee for the bundle and argue that it has honored its 
FRAND commitment as long as the difference is FRAND for the FRAND-
encumbered patents (Layne-Farrar & Slinger, 2015). 
 
3.3.4.3.  Privateering – FRAND enforceability, royalty stacking and 
portfolio splitting 
The practice of privateering involves the transfer of patents by operating firms to 
non-practicing entities that typically assert the related IP rights against the 
operators’ rivals. This practice allows companies to maximize IP monetization 
without incurring any of the risks. Overall, the benefits accrued to practicing firms 
from assigning patents to the privateers are twofold, namely strategic as patent 
assertion against competitors can be carried out in a concealed way via the 
establishment of shell companies; and reputational as some practicing firms may 
wish to maximize the monetization potential of their IP assets without the 
reputational costs typically associated with infringement (EC Report 2016). 
When privateering deals covering SEPs become part of a scheme to circumvent 
FRAND licensing obligations, antitrust authorities raise a red flag. Privateering is 
one of the issues the US Federal Trade Commission and the European 
Commission are investigating in connection with patent assertion entities (PAEs). 
Studies commissioned by both institutions on the matter deal with the substantial 
concerns that patent privateering raises from a competition perspective and 
possible antitrust solutions.150 
Scholars raise further concerns over privateering transfers and strategic 
outsourcing practices as part of a scheme to maintain or obtain monopoly 
power. Essentially, privateering companies are considered to be a type of Patent 
Assertion Entities (PAEs) given their incentive and ability to engage in strategic 
conduct that is prevented by current market forces (Popofsky & Laufert, 2014). 
                                           
149  Huawei v InterDigital, Judgments of 28 October 2013, Guangdong Higher People’s 
Court of China (Yue Gaofa Minsan Zhougzi Nos. 305 and 306). 
150  Federal Trade Commission, Patent Assertion Entity Activity: An FTC Study (October 
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Regarding the motives or tactics behind patent privateering, it has been 
suggested that SEP selling to separate entities is largely a rational response to 
patent hold-out, which could explain why some (but not all) significant SEP-
holders with unique market position have so far engaged in this type of 
outsourcing. It is, for example, argued that Qualcomm’s has not yet come under 
a pressure of patent hold-out great enough to forcibly resort into patent 
privateering.151 
Another concern over private privateering is related to the threat of royalty 
stacking, which may be further compounded though the creation of new licensing 
entities that enlarge the circle of SEP owners seeking royalties for the assigned 
patent portfolios. In a recently filed complaint with the US District Court of 
Delaware, Microsoft alleges that InterDigital transferred “hundreds” of patents to 
another licensing entity without reducing the licensing demand for its patent 
portfolio that no longer included those transferred patents, even though 
InterDigital previously licensed Microsoft’s competitors without charging more 
when those patents were part of InterDigital’s portfolio. In April 2016, Judge 
Andrews issued an order that denied InterDigital’s motion to dismiss Microsoft’s 
complaint that alleged violation of antitrust laws based on InterDigital’s 
enforcement of patents alleged to be essential to 3G and 4G cellular ETSI 
standards and subject to FRAND commitments. 152  Albeit still at an early 
procedural stage, the case will be an interesting one to watch on the subject. 
Prominent (and litigated) examples of privateering in the SEP market are the 
portfolio transfers of Nokia to Sisvel and Vringo as well as those of Ericsson to 
Unwired Planet:  
The UK Courts currently deal with various aspects of patent privateering and have 
provided useful guidance on the subject. In particular, they have considered the 
transfer of FRAND-commitments and the admissibility of “portfolio splitting”. The 
latter typically refers to the assignment of only parts of an SEP-portfolio so that it 
is eventually split up between different licensors, who can negotiate license 
agreements separately. The courts have also considered whether the 
phenomenon of patent privateering amounts to a breach of European competition 
law.  
On 21 July 2015, the UK High Court handed down an interim judgment in 
Unwired Planet v. Huawei et al, which stands out for its consideration of issues 
surrounding the transfer of an ETSI FRAND obligation.153 The case concerned an 
SEP portfolio that had been acquired from Ericsson by Unwired Planet in a Master 
Sale Agreement (MSA) dated 10 January 2013. Unwired Planet alleged that the 
defendants had infringed five SEPs related to 2G, 3G and 4G wireless data 
technology as well as a further non-SEP. Whereas Ericsson sought to strike out 
allegations of breaches of Article 101 TFEU, the defendants basically contended 
that: 
i) in transferring patents to Unwired Planet, there was a failure to ensure the 
complete, proper and effective transfer of an enforceable FRAND 
obligation;  
ii) by dividing Ericsson’s patent portfolio and transferring only part, a breach 
of competition law had taken place in that unfair higher royalties would be 
earned and competition would be restricted or distorted;  
                                           
151  See, e.g., http://patentperspectives.blogspot.com 
152  Microsoft Mobile, Inc. v InterDigital, Inc., District Court of Delaware, Civil Action No. 
15-723-RGA, Memorandum Order dated 13 April 2016.  
153  Unwired Planet International Ltd. v Huawei Technologies Co, Samsung Electronics Co, 
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iii) certain terms in the MSA were standalone infringements of Article 101 
TFEU.  
In a summary decision, the court stated that Unwired Planet’s renewed ETSI 
FRAND commitment – coupled with the terms of the MSA – indicated that there 
was no violation of Art. 101 TFEU based merely on the fact, that the FRAND 
obligation itself had not been transferred. Six trials are scheduled in the course of 
2016, five of them are technical trials whereas the sixth one scheduled for 
October 2016 will address commercial questions, including the licensing principles 
of FRAND and the damage claims at issue in this series of cases. The outcome of 
the commercial case will establish the measure of damages to be awarded.  
So far, Unwired Planet has been successful in parallel proceedings before the UK 
and German courts, although some trials are still pending in the course of 2016. 
In three decisions dated 19 January 2016, the Düsseldorf District Court found the 
partial assignment of SEP-portfolios generally admissible under FRAND-aspects.154 
According to the facts of the case, Unwired Planet sued Samsung for infringement 
of its wireless SEPs, which it had previously acquired from Ericsson. The transfer 
agreements set out that the Ericsson’s FRAND-obligations have to be adopted by 
Unwired Planet. Samsung argued that Ericsson’s portfolio “splitting” was a way of 
unduly increasing the royalty rates and therefore at odds with the purpose of Art. 
101/102 TFEU. In the court’s view, the assignment at issue was not intended to 
establish excessive pricing in the market and remained legitimate, even if 
the SEP-proprietor seeks to acquire a better position in the negotiation process. 
The (partial) assignment of SEPs to a non-practicing entity such as Unwired 
Planet does not lead to an imbalance of the FRAND-negotiation process.  
The dispute between Vringo and ZTE is another example of patent privateering 
litigation. Similar to the Ericsson/Unwired Planet arrangement, Vringo had 
acquired its wireless global SEP portfolio relating from Nokia under a revenue 
sharing scheme. Asserting the acquired patents, Vringo initiated litigation against 
ZTE in the UK, but the parties ultimately decided to settle. 
 
3.3.5.  Evidentiary challenges in the context of SEP litigation 
3.3.5.1.  Evaluation of expert testimony and jury instructions 
US Courts rely largely on expert testimony and related evidence for the 
calculation of damages and reasonable royalties. Further challenges include lack 
of or limited access to market and SDO data that are informative in the support of 
valuation, design-around (patented) alternatives, cost of non-infringing 
alternatives, consumer demand etc. Federal courts have authority to appoint 
neutral expert witnesses and technical advisors (Snow 2009): 
 Federal Rule of Evidence 706 establishes a procedural framework for the 
function of the expert witness. For example, the expert witness must advise 
the parties of any findings, and the expert witness may be deposed, called to 
testify, and cross-examined by any party. Through findings and testimony, the 
court-appointed expert witness plays an evidentiary role in the case and may 
be deposed or cross-examined. 
 Technical advisors are appointed pursuant to the inherent authority of the 
courts. Court-appointed technical advisors are scientific or technical experts 
who work directly with the district court judge and help the court with the 
jargon and theory disclosed by the testimony. Technical advisors do not 
                                           
154  Düsseldorf District Court, Decisions of 19 January 2016, 4b O 120/14, 4b O 122/14 
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themselves contribute testimony or any other form of evidence. They may not 
be appointed in every case. 
In order to temper undue influence and enable a meaningful appellate review, the 
Federal Circuit has suggested a few guidelines regarding the proper use of 
technical advisors: 1) choosing a technical advisor by a fair and open procedure 
in which the parties’ counsel may participate; 2) clearly defining and limiting the 
technical advisor’s duties in writing to all parties, for example, by means of pre- 
and post-appointment affidavits; 3) requiring the technical advisor to confine his 
or her information sources to those of record; and 4) making explicit, perhaps 
through a written report or record, the nature and content of the technical 
advisor’s tutelage concerning the technology.155 
The US judicial system gives a prominent role to juries. In the course of jury 
trials, evidentiary challenges are particularly accentuated as they often involve 
technological or commercial issues that few jurors understand, for example, in 
the case of the application of the entire market value or the construct of 
hypothetical negotiations. In addition, there is uncertainty around the type of 
evidence and market-related data that would constitute an admissible and reliable 
in the context of damage calculations and royalty determination. As opposed to 
bench trials where a sole judge calculates a FRAND royalty rate or royalty range 
based on a developed methodology (see, e.g., in the Microsoft v. Motorola and In 
re Innovatio cases), damages in jury trials are determined by a jury based on 
instructions given by the court. In this context, district courts must assess 
whether the proffered testimony, evidence and arguments are permissible 
evidence to be presented to the jury or whether they would unfairly skew the 
jury’s ability to apportion damages.  
As a general rule, evidence must be reliable and tangible - not conjectural or 
speculative. When considering expert testimony that introduces scientific, 
technical or other specialized knowledge, “the trial court acts as a ‘gatekeeper’ by 
assessing the soundness of the expert's methodology to exclude junk science”.156 
In the US, the applicable rule is the so-called Daubert standard (Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702). Under Daubert, courts consider 1) whether a theory or technique 
"can be (and has been) tested;" 2) "whether the theory or technique has been 
subjected to peer review and publication;" 3) "the known or potential rate of 
error;" and 4) whether there is "general acceptance" of the methodology in the 
"relevant scientific community." When an expert meets the threshold established 
by Rule 702 as explained in Daubert, the expert may testify so that the jury can 
decide how much weight to give that testimony.  
The Federal Circuit counsels district courts to give cautionary instructions to the 
jury, if requested, and explain the importance of apportionment. District courts 
should ensure that the instructions fully explain the need to apportion the 
ultimate royalty award to the incremental value of the patented feature from the 
overall product. According to Ericsson v. D-Link, the jury instructions should shift 
focus from what a RAND commitment should be to what the actual RAND 
commitment is157: 
“Rather than instruct the jury to consider ‘Ericsson’s obligation to license its 
technology on RAND terms,’ the trial court should have instructed the jury about 
Ericsson’s actual RAND promises. ”RAND terms” vary from case to case. A RAND 
commitment limits the market value to (what the patent owner can reasonably 
charge for use of) the patented technology. The court therefore must inform the 
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jury what commitments have been made and of its obligation (not just option) to 
take those commitments into account when determining a royalty award.” 
[Emphasis in original] 
In Apple v. Motorola, Judge Posner used a hypothetical non-litigation analysis to 
exclude Apple’s expert’s proposed testimony based on the grounds that the 
procedures used to calculate damages failed to consider alternatives to paying a 
royalty, failed to isolate the value of individual product features encompassed by 
the claims and relied on information obtained from a biased source, i.e., Apple’s 
technical expert. He also excluded Motorola’s expert report for failure to consider 
the full range of plausible alternatives to paying a royalty.158 
In the non-adversarial legal systems of Continental Europe and Japan, the judges 
usually appoint a “neutral” expert who will educate the court on highly technical 
issues. This is rarely the case in Germany, where the judges of the Federal Patent 
Court have both a technical and a legal background that allows them to rely on 
self-acquired knowledge and be less dependent on expert testimony. In China, 
although economic experts have started to play a role in antitrust cases, they are 
still largely absent in IP litigation. In order for the judges to implement a more 
rigorous and scientific calculation of royalty rates in FRAND settings and other 
complex intellectual property infringement cases, the parties need to tender 
sufficient evidence and in-depth economic analyses (Deng & Sun, 2014).  
 
3.3.5.2.  Assumptions of essentiality, validity and infringement 
 
i) Assumption of essentiality 
Both IEEE's and ETSI's IPR policies reject any verification or certification of the 
validity, essentiality or infringement of any patent claim declared as essential by 
a patentee. The IEEE policy, in particular, takes no responsibility for the 
assessment of FRAND compliance of a patentee's licensing terms. Importantly, 
the IEEE policy states that, "[…] nothing in this policy shall be interpreted as 
giving rise to a duty to conduct a patent search". Equally with ETSI, there is no 
assessment of the “essential” nature of the patents declared as such by the 
owners. In other words, individual SEP declarations cannot be regarded as 
evidence of actual essentiality of the declared patents.  
For their part, courts do not generally examine, but assume essentiality for the 
sake of procedural economy. Nevertheless, essentiality was addressed in the 
context of FRAND in three cases:  
In In the Matter of Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof, 
Administrative Law Judge Essex equated the defendants’ claim of non-
infringement to a claim of non-essentiality.159 Examining the issue of whether the 
patents-in-suit are essential to a standard, he noted that the ETSI declaration 
does not create a duty that any patent so declared must be licensed on FRAND 
terms. Moreover, the declaration itself is not proof that the patents in suit are 
standard-essential. The duty to license on FRAND terms, if there is one, is a 
springing duty and can only be triggered by the essentiality of the patents to the 
standard. If the patents in suit are valid but not standard-essential, they can still 
be infringed and the burden of proof of their essentiality is subject to 
                                           
158  So Judge Posner in his opinion of 22 May 2012, Apple Inc. v Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-
cv-08540, 2012 WL 1959560 at *11 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
159  U.S. International Trade Commission, Initial determination on Remand issued April, 27 
2015, In the Matter of Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof (Inv. n° 
337- TA-613). 
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consideration by the administrative judge. In the specific case, the respondents 
failed to present evidence that the patents in suit were standard-essential and 
could therefore not claim any licensing rights available under ETSI FRAND policy. 
In Core Wireless v. LG Electronics, the Paris District Court confirmed that proof of 
essentiality remains a prerequisite when addressing FRAND. 160  In the case at 
hand, Core Wireless and LG failed to reach a licensing agreement regarding a 
large SEP portfolio that Core Wireless had acquired from Nokia back in 2012 
(1,261 SEPs relating to 2G, 3G and 4G ETSI standards). Core Wireless claimed to 
have engaged in discussions and meetings with LG, but did not at any point 
receive a precise counter-proposal. As a result, Core Wireless asked the court to 
set a FRAND rate for its portfolio license. LG responded that the patents were 
invalid or, at least, non-essential to the standards. Given that ETSI (its IPR policy 
was applicable in the particular case) does not perform any verification of the 
essentiality or the validity of the relevant patents, the burden of proof for the 
essentiality of the allegedly infringed patents lies with the SEP owner. Since Core 
Wireless failed to demonstrate that any of the asserted patents was essential to 
any of the standards, there was no need for the court to set a royalty rate. 
Despite the clarity provided by the French court on the burden of proof, the 
determination of how essentiality of a patent should be proven remains an 
outstanding issue.  
In Nokia v. InterDigital, the English High Court ruled on the essentiality of 
InterDigital’s European Patents to the 3G standard. 161  Nokia initiated the 
proceedings before the Patents Court seeking declarations of essentiality while 
merely reserving the right to challenge validity. Pumfrey J regarded the requested 
declarations as genuinely useful: A decision on essentiality would be material to 
the parties’ licensing negotiations. Out of the four patents in suit, only one was 
held standard-essential. For the rest of the patents, the court noted that the 
declaration of non-essentiality should not be interpreted as a declaration of non-
infringement.  
In the US system, essentiality is assumed when not challenged. It is, however, 
unclear whether essentiality should also be assumed when courts apply the 
construct of hypothetical negotiation to determine FRAND. The distinction 
between the technology and products that enable the implementation of an 
essential patent claim and those that actually implement an essential patent claim 
ultimately depends on the specific court and circumstances under which the 
judicial FRAND determination is made.  
In Microsoft v. Motorola, the court considered whether Motorola’s licensing offer 
constituted a breach of contract. At the time Motorola made the licensing offer, 
Microsoft was confronted with uncertainty about the essentiality of Motorola’s 
patents. At trial, Motorola presented scant evidence that its patens were essential 
to the 802.11 standard. Even though the parties to a hypothetical negotiation 
would examine the patents for their importance to the standard, their value would 
be diminished by the lack of evidence regarding their relevance. 162 Based on its 
evaluation, Judge Robart ultimately discounted the RAND rate due to pre-
litigation uncertainty regarding the essentiality of the patent at issue. 
The approach is different in damage cases where the courts apply a principle from 
the general determination of reasonable royalties, namely that facts known at the 
                                           
160  Paris District Court, Decision of 17 April 2015, n° 14/14124, Core Wireless v LG 
Electronics. 
161  Nokia v Interdigital Technology, UK High Court, Patents Court, Decision of 21 
December 2007, [2007] EWHC 3077 (Pat).  
162  So Judge Robart in Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., Order of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, April 25, 2013, No. 10-cv-1823 at para 338 (W.D. Wash.). 
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time of the ruling must equally be considered as known at the time of the 
hypothetical negotiation. In LaserDynamics v. Quanta Computer, the court held 
that the hypothetical negotiators were presumed to know that the patents were 
essential to the standard. It concluded that, in considering the fifteen Georgia-
Pacific factors, it is presumed that the parties had full knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the infringement at that time. 163  
Similarly, in In re Innovatio, the court considered whether it should adjust the 
license rate for patents whose essentiality was questionable prior to the court's 
adjudication. Although it may be reasonable to argue that ex ante the parties 
should account for that uncertainty, the court found that he problem with that 
argument was that the hypothetical negotiation is a counter-factual that the court 
usually relies on only after establishing liability. At the time of the hypothetical 
negotiation, the parties would not have known whether a given patent is valid or 
infringed, and the alleged infringer would have had the option of contesting these 
issues in court. Nonetheless, by the time the damages phase of an infringement 
suit arrives, the court has determined infringement and validity, thus foreclosing 
the hypothetical negotiator from benefiting from any uncertainty as to future 
court rulings. The difference to the Microsoft v. Motorola decision – mentioned 
above – is that Judge Robart's discounting assumes that an implementer would 
choose not to license a non-essential patent because it could practice the 
standard without that patent. In an infringement context, the alleged infringer 
has already allegedly chosen to implement the non-essential patent. In that 
context, the licensing rate should be increased for patents of doubtful essentiality, 
on the ground that the infringement damages for such a patent would not be 
limited to a RAND rate, and that the patent owner could therefore seek typical 
patent damages for that patent.164  
 
ii) Assumptions of validity and infringement 
Assumptions of validity and infringement are particularly common in German and 
Japanese proceedings that operate under a bifurcated system, in which 
infringement and nullity proceedings are conducted in separate, parallel 
procedures before various courts. Particularly in the context of injunctions, patent 
validity and infringement are assumed since the opposite would contravene the 
nature and purpose of such expedite measures.  
 In contrast, assumptions of validity and infringement are not necessarily the case 
in legal systems of conjoined procedure such as the UK. In Vringo v. ZTE, Birss J 
of the Patents Court held that a defendant is entitled to challenge the patent's 
infringement and validity before any FRAND license is settled since the court 
needs to know the basis on which the hypothetical negotiation would have taken 
place: in the knowledge that the patent is indeed valid and infringed, or on the 
pragmatic basis that it is worth paying something to eliminate the risk. 165 
Accordingly, the judge differentiated between two kind of analysis: i) setting an 
appropriate royalty rate in a licensing scheme, the only issue being the tariff 
terms without challenge of the underlying rights (similar kinds of analysis are 
done in the United Kingdom Copyright Tribunal); or ii) determining the rate (and 
terms) which would be arrived at as the outcome of a notional negotiation 
between a willing licensor and a licensee who is willing to negotiate without a trial 
on the merits about the underlying rights. Under the second type of analysis, the 
                                           
163  LaserDynamics, Inc. v Quanta Computer Inc., 694 F. 3d 51 at 76 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
164  In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., MDL No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609, at 
*12 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (sealed version filed Sept. 27, 2013). 
165  Vringo Infrastructure Inc. v ZTE (UK) Ltd., UK High Court, Patents Court, Decisions of 6 
June 2013, [2013] EWHC 1591 (pat). 
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hypothetical negotiation takes place with a licensee who is willing to agree on a 
license prior to a declaration of patent validity and infringement and the court has 
to determine what the outcome of the real negotiation would be. This exercise 
would produce a different royalty rate than the first one - the royalty rate would 
be discounted in view of the uncertainty. Although the UK Court managed to build 
momentum on the determination of FRAND, the issue was never fully decided 
after the parties entered a settlement in December 2015. 
Vringo and ZTE have a long litigation history and are still engaged in a long series 
of parallel infringement and injunction proceedings in Europe (Germany, UK, The 
Netherlands, France, Romania), Asia (India, China, Malaysia), Brazil and the 
United States. Vringo’s European patents declared essential to wireless standards 
have been challenged for validity and infringement across various jurisdictions 
with different outcomes. In the parallel Dutch proceedings between Vringo v. ZTE, 
The Hague District Court examined the validity and infringement of Vringo’s 
European patent EP 119 as declared essential to the UMTS standard.166 In its 
summary decision, the court preliminary held the infringement to be sufficiently 
demonstrated and the patent validity not to be sufficiently in doubt, given that 
both the Opposition Division and the Technical Board of Appeal of the European 
Patent Office had previously confirmed the validity. However, a year later, the 
same court declared the Dutch part of the EP 119 invalid due to lack of inventive 
step.167 Vringo has announced plans to file an appeal. 
Finally, a French court dismissed in Apple v. Samsung a motion for preliminary 
injunction after examining the facts of the alleged infringement.168 Specifically, 
Samsung filed for preliminary injunctions against Apple with the Paris District 
Court, attacking the iPhone4S. Apple argued that Samsung‘s claim would 
constitute an abuse of a dominant position. The Court did not address the issue 
on the grounds – following a summary assessment of the facts - that there were 
serious doubts against infringement and that, consequently, the grant of a 
preliminary injunction could not be justified. The Court found that the likelihood of 
the infringement alleged by Samsung was not established, because Apple brought 
serious enough challenges as to the exhaustion of Samsung's rights under the 
patents in suit. In view of sufficient evidence that the chips used in the iPhone 4S 
were Qualcomm-originated and FRAND-encumbered, the court clarified that 
Samsung could neither revoke nor limit the scope of the license granted to 
Qualcomm in order to exclude a chipset customer such as Apple; in compliance 
with ETSI rules, the licenses granted for patents as being essential are 
irrevocable. 
Across the Atlantic, validity and infringement are not examined when the relevant 
challenges are not brought before the US courts. Moreover, there is no clarity on 
whether courts should try to reconstruct the royalty the parties in the context of 
hypothetical negotiation and under application of the Georgia-Pacific factors 
based on the assumption that the patent was valid and infringed. It has been 
argued that, in an infringement trial, it is economically correct to indulge this 
counterintuitive assumption in order to avoid a double discounting problem. 
However, if a court is trying to reconstruct the royalty outside the context of an 
infringement action - as in the case Microsoft v. Motorola - it is correct to do as 
Judge Robart did and consider the probability of validity and infringement as 
relevant factors in determining the licensing rate (Cotter, 2013; Akemann et al., 
2016). Real-world negotiations take place in the shadow of uncertainty regarding 
                                           
166  The Hague District Court, Decision of 24 October 2014, C/09/470109 / KG ZA 14-870 - 
ZTE v Vringo. 
167 The Hague District Court, Decision of 28 October 2015, C/09/481474 - Vringo v ZTE.  
168  Paris District Court, Decision of 8 December 2011, no. RG 11/58301, Samsung 
Electronics Co Ltd, et al. v Apple France Sarl. 
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validity and infringement. Assuming away that uncertainty unrealistically inflates 
the royalty (Gates, 2015). 
 
3.3.5.3.  Evidence for hold-up, royalty stacking and hold-out 
 
i) Incentive compatibility  
In his pioneer analysis of FRAND royalty determination, Judge Robart in Microsoft 
v. Motorola heard extensive testimony on the purpose of FRAND policies. The 
conclusion drawn from the presented evidence was that FRAND policies aim to 
achieve a balance between the incentives to contribute technology to standards 
and the incentives to adopt standards including patented technology: “A FRAND 
royalty should be set at a level consistent with the SSOs goal of promoting 
widespread adoption of their standards […] To induce the creation of valuable 
standards, the RAND commitment must guarantee that holders of valuable 
intellectual property will receive reasonable royalties on that property.”169 In this 
regard, Robart assessed that patent pool licensing rates provide relevant 
benchmarks because patent pools have the same policy goal of encouraging 
standard adoption while remaining sufficiently attractive to SEP holders to 
voluntarily contribute their patented technology. 
Subsequent case law has corroborated this analysis: In In re Innovatio, after 
considering the role of FRAND in mitigating the risks of patent hold-up and 
royalty stacking, Judge Holderman highlighted that the third guiding principle for 
the FRAND determination is that “the FRAND rate must be set high enough to 
ensure that innovators in the future have an appropriate incentive to invest in 
future developments and to contribute their inventions to the standard-setting 
process.”170 
Establishing incentive compatibility as part of the policy rationale behind FRAND 
has direct implications for the calculation of royalties. The resulting tendency is to 
achieve a balance of interests for both SEP holders and implementers given the 
strong societal and welfare aspects of standardization. Courts show concern about 
overcompensating SEP holders, typically citing two potential forms of ex post 
opportunism - “hold-up” and “royalty stacking”. Although both forms could occur 
in theory with little evidence to back them, courts seem to suggest their existence 
in view of an actual violation of RAND commitments and abuse of market 
power. For instance, US courts have modified the Georgia-Pacific factors based on 
the recognition that the purpose of FRAND is to mitigate the risks of patent hold-
up and royalty stacking while ensuring both reasonable royalties for SEP holders 
as well as appropriate incentives for participants to invest in future development 
and contribute to standard-setting.171 
 
ii) Hold-up 
Despite the academic controversy whether the risk of hold-up is theoretically 
plausible and empirically relevant, the hold-up concept plays an important role in 
the case law regarding FRAND royalty determination. While both hold-up and 
hold-out are symmetrical risks stemming from the incomplete contract between 
                                           
169  So Judge Robart in Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., Order of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, April 25, 2013, No. 10-cv-1823 at para 113 (W.D. Wash.). 
170 In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC , 921 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
171  In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., MDL No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609, at *9 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (sealed version filed Sept. 27, 2013). 
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SEP owners and standard implementers, the judicial analysis has predominantly 
focused on hold-up considerations: 
In Microsoft v. Motorola, Judge Robart regarded patent hold-up and royalty 
stacking as “potential concerns”, clarifying that patent hold-up exists when the 
SEP holder demands excessive royalties after companies are locked into using a 
standard whereas royalty stacking can arise when a standard implicates 
numerous patents, perhaps hundreds, if not thousands172:  
“When the standard becomes widely used, the holders of SEPs obtain substantial 
leverage to demand more than the value of their specific patented technology.” 
[…] “The ability of a holder of an SEP to demand more than the value of its 
patented technology and to attempt to capture the value of the standard itself is 
referred to as patent “hold-up.” 
In In re Innovatio, Judge Holderman states that “one of the primary purposes of 
the RAND commitment is to avoid patent hold-up” and that “the court concludes 
that patent hold-up is a substantial problem that RAND is designed to prevent.”173 
The Federal Circuit reaffirms this analysis in Apple v. Motorola174:  
“The purpose of the FRAND requirements, the validity of which Motorola doesn’t 
question, is to confine the patentee’s royalty demand to the value conferred by 
the patent itself as distinct from the additional value - the hold-up value - 
conferred by the patent’s being designated as standard-essential.” 
Parties often disagree over the relevance of hold-up to the case at issue. In the 
aforementioned case Microsoft v. Motorola, a jury trial (separated from the bench 
trial on the royalty determination) established that Microsoft was entitled to 
damages because of Motorola’s breach of a FRAND commitment. Motorola, which 
had initiated parallel proceedings before a German court, disputed that its 
conduct constituted hold-up. In the court's view, Motorola's German litigation was 
“vexatious or oppressive” to Microsoft and interfered with “equitable 
considerations” by compromising the court's ability to reach a just result in the 
case before it, free of external pressure on Microsoft to enter into a hold-up 
settlement before the litigation was complete. According to the district court, 
Motorola's argument that hold-up did not exist in the real world did not trump the 
evidence presented by Microsoft that hold-up took place in the particular case. On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit recently ruled that Microsoft presented “significant 
evidence” for a jury to infer that the injunctive actions violated Motorola’s good 
faith and fair dealing obligations. The jury could conclude that Motorola’s actions 
were intended to induce hold-up, i.e., to force Microsoft into accepting a higher 
RAND rate than what was objectively merited, and thereby frustrate the purpose 
of the contract.175 It was for the jurors to assess witness credibility, weight the 
evidence and make reasonable inferences.176 
In Ericsson v. D-Link, Judge Davis addressed the evidentiary aspect of patent 
hold-up and royalty stacking. According to the judge, FRAND rate calculations 
need not account for royalty stacking or patent hold-up unless relevant evidence 
                                           
172  See, Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., Order of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
April 25, 2013, No. 10-cv-1823 at para 52 (W.D. Wash.). 
In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., MDL No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609, at 
*16 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (sealed version filed Sept. 27, 2013). 
174  Apple, Inc. v Motorola Mobility, Inc., 869 F. Supp.2d 901 at 913, U.S. District Court, 
N.D. Illinois (2012). 
175  So Judge Brezon of the Ninth Circuit in Microsoft Corp. v Motorola Inc., 795 F.3d 1024 
at 1045 (US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 2015) (Microsoft II); see also, 
Microsoft Corp. v Motorola Inc., 696 F.3d 872 at 877 (US Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit 2012) (Microsoft I). 
176  Id. Microsoft II, at 1047. 
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is presented to the court. In this regard, the burden of proof shifts to the 
defendant who has to prove the SEP owner’s opportunistic conduct. The Federal 
Circuit agreed with the district court’s decision not to instruct the jury on patent 
hold-up or royalty stacking because there was no evidence of either. Absent such 
evidence, an instruction would neither be necessary nor appropriate177: 
“In deciding whether to instruct the jury on patent hold-up and royalty stacking, 
again, we emphasize that the district court must consider the evidence on the 
record before it. The district court need not instruct the jury on hold-up or 
stacking unless the accused infringer presents actual evidence of hold-up or 
stacking. Certainly something more than a general argument that these 
phenomena are possibilities is necessary. Indeed, a court should not instruct on a 
proposition of law about which there is no competent evidence. Depending on the 
record, reference to such potential dangers may be neither necessary nor 
appropriate.” 
The Federal Circuit ruled there was no evidence of patent hold-up in the case at 
issue, e.g., showing that the patent holder started seeking higher royalty rates 
after the 802.11(n) standard was adopted. Equally, there was no evidence of 
royalty-stacking since D-Link did not present any other licenses it had taken 
under the 802.11 standard: The mere fact that thousands of patents are declared 
to be essential to a standard does not mean that a standard-compliant company 
will necessarily have to pay a royalty to each SEP holder. 
The above case law does not provide specific guidance with regards to how the 
risk of hold-up should be factored into royalty calculations, i.e., what steps courts 
should precisely take to identify the hold-up value and exclude it from the 
damages award. Given the wide range of rates compatible with the fundamental 
principles of FRAND and the important latitude that courts and juries have in their 
calculations of damages, taking hold-up concerns into account adds - alongside 
considerations of the incremental value, royalty base and the use of comparable 
licenses – to the nexus of evidence, data analysis and fact assessment that guide 
and frame the methodology used by the courts for the determination of FRAND. 
In jurisdictions outside the US, reference to the hold-up risk is generally made in 
the context of antitrust investigations in order to justify regulatory intervention. 
In contrast, courts in Europe and Asia neither cite “hold-up” directly in their 
decisions, nor require related evidence. This does not exclude, though, the 
possibility that they consider it when drafting their reasoning. For instance, in 
Huawei v. InterDigital, both the Shenzhen district court and the Guangdong 
appellate court held that the SEP holder is not entitled to profit that derives from 
the value of the standard itself and noted that the appropriate valuation of the 
SEP should only be based on the value of the patent itself, because the 
contribution by the holder of the SEPs lies in its innovative technology - not in the 
standardization.178 The courts also stressed that the added value of an SEP that 
derives from its inclusion in the standard should be disregarded. From the 
analogy to Judge Robart’s reasoning in Microsoft v. Motorola (see above citation) 
one could plausibly infer that the Chinese courts do consider hold-up when 
defining the meaning of FRAND (Lee & Li, 2015). 
 
iii) Royalty stacking 
According to the case law in Microsoft v. Motorola, the FRAND commitment should 
also address the aspect of royalty stacking and the need to ensure that the 
                                           
177  Ericsson v D- Link, 773 F.3d 1201 at 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
178  Huawei v InterDigital, Judgments of 28 October 2013, Guangdong Higher People’s 
Court of China (Yue Gaofa Minsan Zhougzi Nos. 305 and 306). 
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aggregate royalties associated with a given standard are reasonable court: “In 
the context of standards having many SEPs and products that comply with 
multiple standards, the risk of the use of post-adoption leverage to extract 
excessive royalties is compounded by the number of potential licensors and can 
result in cumulative royalty payments that can undermine the standards.”179 
Although subsequent case law affirms the importance of mitigating the risk of 
royalty stacking as one of the principal goals of a FRAND policy and the courts – 
as analyzed above under ii) – often mention the threat of patent hold-up and 
royalty stacking in a single breath, the relevance of royalty stacking in the 
context of FRAND determination is somewhat secondary and not regarded as a 
starting point for royalty calculation. This is most apparent in In re Innovatio:  
“The court should consider royalty stacking as a way of checking the accuracy of 
a proposed FRAND royalty's correspondence to the technical value of the 
patented invention.”180 Accordingly, the court should first establish a royalty rate 
compatible with the other principles of FRAND and then assess whether this rate 
needs to be adjusted based on evidence of royalty stacking. The evidentiary 
aspect of this adjustment is emphasized in Ericsson v. D-Link: “A jury, moreover, 
need not be instructed regarding royalty stacking unless there is actual evidence 
of stacking.”181 
More recent case law of the Federal Circuit reaffirms that, as damages models are 
fact-dependent, abstract recitations of royalty stacking theory, and qualitative 
testimony that an invention is valuable - without being anchored to a quantitative 
market valuation - are insufficiently reliable.182 
 
iv) Hold-out  
The potential problem of reverse hold-up or patent hold-out has also been 
addressed in various jurisdictions, albeit to a limited extent. Specifically, in Apple 
v. Motorola, dissenting Chief Judge Rader commented that hold-out is equally as 
likely and as disruptive as a hold-up. Judge Rader’s defined the terms “hold-out” 
versus “hold-up,” which he believed to be questions for a fact finder. Specifically, 
hold-out refers to an unwilling licensee of an SEP seeking to avoid a license based 
on the value that the technological advance contributed to the prior art, whereas 
hold-up refers to an SEP owner demanding unjustified royalties based solely on 
value contributed by the standardization.183  
As opposed to royalty stacking and patent hold-up, procedural allegations of hold-
out have not been supported so far by relevant evidence, placing this risk outside 
the calculation of FRAND royalties.184  
 
                                           
179  Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., 2013 WL 2111217, at *11 (W.D. Wash. 2013), 
affirmed, No. 14-35393 (9th Cir. Jul. 30, 2015); In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC 
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3.4.  FRAND-COMPLIANCE AND ANTITRUST CONCERNS 
3.4.1.  European Commission – competitive enforcement 
priorities  
Europe lacks a comprehensive intellectual property regime for the protection of 
patents. The European Patent Convention, a non-EU agreement, harmonizes to a 
certain extent the requirements of patent eligibility and streamlines procedures 
for the grant of European patents. The interpretation of substantive patent law, 
however, lies with the respective national jurisdiction that deals with validity and 
infringement issues. The future Unified Patent Court is expected to fill in gaps in 
the interpretation of the law and restore legal certainty in the European patent 
and - by extension - SEP market. 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) grants the European 
Union exclusive competence over competition and the internal market. The 
European Commission has used this power to regulate IP and FRAND licensing, 
mainly through antitrust investigations and the Horizontal Guidelines. The 
Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal cooperation 
agreements (revised in 2010) provide a framework for the analysis of the most 
common forms of horizontal co-operation. One of the key features of the reform 
is a substantial revision of the chapter on standardization agreements, 
particularly when involving intellectual property rights. The purpose of that 
chapter on standardization agreements is to give guidance on how to ensure that 
the process of selecting industry standards is competitive and that, once the 
standard is adopted, access is given on FRAND terms to all interested users.  
During the drafting of the Guidelines, the EC was charged with the task to bridge 
divergent interests and views amongst stakeholders regarding key aspects of the 
rules governing standard-setting agreements. As a result, the Guidelines 
emphasize the often pro-competitive nature of many standard-setting 
agreements, but caution against their ability to reduce price competition or 
foreclose innovative technologies. They also address the detrimental impact that 
hold-up may have on the effective access to the standard through refusal of a 
license or through the extraction of excessive royalty fees.  
The contributions of the European Commission to the definition of the 
circumstances in which licensing conduct and litigation strategy around standard-
essential patents are laid out in its decisions on Rambus, Samsung and Motorola.  
In the 2007 Rambus case 185 , the Commission sent Rambus a Statement of 
Objections, setting out its preliminary view that Rambus may have infringed then 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty (now Article 102 TFEU) by abusing a dominant position 
in the market for DRAMs. In particular, the Commission was concerned that 
Rambus had engaged in a so-called "patent ambush", intentionally concealing 
that it had patents and patent applications which were relevant to technology 
used in the JEDEC standard, and subsequently claiming royalties for those 
patents. 
To address the Commission's concerns, Rambus committed to putting a 
worldwide cap on its royalty rates for products compliant with the JEDEC 
standards for five years. As part of the overall package, Rambus agreed to charge 
zero royalties for the SDR and DDR chip standards that were adopted when 
Rambus was a JEDEC member, in combination with a maximum royalty rate of 
                                           
185  European Commission, Decision of 9.12.2009 relating to a proceeding under Article 
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA 
Agreement, Case COMP/38.636 – RAMBUS. 
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1.5% for the later generations of JEDEC DRAM standards (DDR2 and DDR3), 
which is substantially lower than the 3.5% Rambus is charging for DDR. 
A different contribution that seems to balance concerns about hold-up and 
reverse hold-up has emerged in the context of injunctions, more specifically in 
the Samsung case before the European antitrust authorities.186 Samsung owns 
SEPs related to various mobile telecommunication standards and has committed 
to licensing those on FRAND terms. In April 2011, Samsung sought injunctive 
relief against Apple on the basis of its ETSI 3G UMTS standard. The European 
Commission regarded Apple as a willing licensee and expressed its concerns that 
Samsung’s behavior may constitute abuse of a dominant position in breach of Art. 
102 TFEU. 
In response to these competition concerns, Samsung offered commitments 
pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. Under its commitments, 
Samsung undertakes not to seek injunctions before any court or tribunal in the 
European Economic Area ("EEA") for infringement of its SEPs (including all 
existing and future patents) implemented in smartphones and tablets ("Mobile 
SEPs") against a potential licensee that agrees to (and complies with) a particular 
licensing framework ("Licensing Framework") for the determination of FRAND 
terms. The Licensing Framework encompasses either a unilateral licensing 
agreement covering Samsung's Mobile SEPs or, if either Samsung or the potential 
licensee so requests, a cross-licensing agreement covering both Samsung’s 
Mobile SEPs and certain of the potential licensee’s Mobile SEPs. 
The Commission accepted the commitments offered by Samsung as legally 
binding under EU antitrust rules. The commitments provide for a "safe-harbor" 
available to all potential licensees of Samsung's Mobile SEPs – as long as they 
submit to the Licensing Framework, they are protected by the commitments. The 
solution proposed in the Opinion seems to be concrete enough to significantly 
clarify what is meant for a potential licensor to be “unwilling” and hence to clarify 
the conditions under which an injunction can be sought. As such, it was regarded 
as a welcome framework (and precedent) for the settlement of disputes over 
FRAND terms in line with EU antitrust rules (European Commission, Press 
Release, 29 April 2014). 
In the Motorola case187, the Commission found that it was abusive for Motorola to 
both seek and enforce an injunction against Apple in Germany on the basis of an 
SEP which it had committed to licensing on FRAND terms and where Apple had 
agreed to take a license and be bound by a determination of the FRAND royalties 
by the relevant German court. Without going into more detail of the scope and 
exact framework of such a possible adjudication process, the Commission found 
that “the acceptance of binding third party determination for the terms of a 
FRAND license in the event that bilateral negotiations do not come to a fruitful 
conclusion is a clear indication that a potential licensee is willing to enter into a 
FRAND license”. The Commission also found it anticompetitive that Motorola 
insisted, under the threat of the enforcement of an injunction, that Apple give up 
its rights to challenge the validity of Motorola’s SEPs: Implementers of standards 
and ultimately consumers should not have to pay for invalid or non-infringed 
patents, and that implementers should therefore be able to ascertain the validity 
of patents and contest alleged infringements. 
However, the Commission clarified that injunctions for infringement of a FRAND- 
encumbered SEP should be available against unwilling licensees. It emphasized 
                                           
186  European Commission, DG Competition, Commitment Decision of 29 April 2014, 
C(2014) 2891 final, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., et. al. 
187  European Commission, DG Competition, Decision of 29 April 2014, C(2014) 2892 final, 
Motorola Mobility Inc. 
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that it is not questioning the use or pursuit of injunctions by patent holders, 
noting that recourse to injunctive relief is generally a legitimate remedy for 
patent holders in infringement cases. The Commission also made clear that 
whether a company can be considered a “willing licensee” is to be determined on 
a case-by-case basis. Although Motorola was found to be engaged in 
anticompetitive behavior and ordered “to eliminate the negative effects resulting 
from its conduct”, the Commission did not impose a fine, reasoning that there is 
no EU case law on the issue and European national courts have reached different 
conclusions on the issue on the grounds that i) there is an absence of case law by 
EU courts dealing with the legality of SEP-based injunctions under pertinent 
antitrust law prohibiting abusing a dominant position and ii) European national 
courts have issued diverging opinions on the issue.  
The Commission’s decision is intended to provide a safe harbor for standard 
implementers who are willing to agree that a court or a mutually agreed 
arbitrator adjudicates the dispute. However, “the fact that an act by an 
autonomous judicial body (e.g., the granting of an injunction by a court) is a 
precondition for the likely anti-competitive effects resulting from the conduct to 
materialize cannot affect the abusive nature of the conduct.” The Commission is 
of the opinion that national courts and arbitrators are better positioned to decide 
on FRAND terms. They may, however, seek guidance from the Commission 
regarding the interpretation of EU law.  
So far, the Commission has not provided guidance to adjudicators as to what 
constitutes a FRAND royalty rate or, more importantly, how these rates ought to 
be calculated. While it is reasonable to leave this task to a competent judicial 
body, providing more clarity on FRAND would enhance legal certainty and 
convergence of practice.  
 
3.4.2.  US antitrust authorities – from enforcement to 
advocacy 
Recognizing early on both the value of intellectual property and the importance of 
dynamic competition, US antitrust agencies have equally tried to ensure that 
adequate enforcement takes place in the area of patents and SEPs and that 
competition is not harmed. The intention to strike that balance is evident in the 
policies of the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC).188 Over time, the US antitrust agencies have established an 
effective and praiseworthy record of competition advocacy over the years. Their 
role in the work of international organizations such as OECD and ICN reflects a 
positive contribution to sound global antitrust convergence. Advocacy, however, 
must be based on sound factual and economic analysis and correct legal 
principles. In this respect, concerns are voiced whether agency advocacy 
concerning SSOs and essential patents satisfies these criteria (Rill & Botts, 2015). 
The US Federal Trade Commission takes on an advocacy role through expert 
research and regular reports such as the 2011 Report, The Evolving IP 
Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition. The Report 
suggests improvements in specified areas of patent law, outlines antitrust action 
and offers guidance to courts for the calculation of reasonable royalty damages in 
  
                                           
188  See, e.g., the 2007 and 2015 DoJ Business Review letter to IEEE as well as the official 
policy statements of DoJ Commissioner Wright, FTC head of the Justice Department's 
Antitrust Division, Renata Hesse and FTC Chairwoman Ramirez. 
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infringement cases. In particular, it recommends that courts apply the concept of 
the hypothetical negotiation as the proper framework for royalty determination 
and treat the other Georgia-Pacific factors as information relevant to the outcome 
of the hypothetical negotiation. The FTC further clarifies that an incremental value 
benchmark must often reflect both a royalty rate and a royalty base and that the 
two are closely linked. With reference to the royalty base, it is suggested that 
courts identify the base that “the parties would have chosen in a hypothetical 
negotiation as best suited to appropriately valuing the technology.” As a result of 
the Report, several federal district courts have weighed in on a framework for 
determining a reasonable royalty for FRAND-encumbered SEPs. 
The FTC approved in the matter Robert Bosch GmbH189, an order settling charges 
that Robert Bosch GmbH’s acquisition of the SPX Service Solutions business of 
SPX Corporation would have given it a virtual monopoly in the market for air 
conditioning recycling, recovery, and recharge devices for vehicles. In the context 
of the merger between two companies that make automotive air conditioning 
recharging products, the FTC investigated Robert Bosch GmbH’s request 
injunctive relief when it enforced SEPs subject to a voluntary RAND licensing 
commitment. Under a settlement with the FTC, Bosch agreed to resolve 
allegations that, before its acquisition by Bosch, SPX harmed competition in the 
market for this equipment by reneging on a commitment to license key, 
standard-essential patents on FRAND terms. The FTC alleged that SPX reneged on 
its obligation to license on FRAND terms by seeking injunctions against willing 
licensees of those patents. Bosch agreed to abandon its claims for injunctive relief 
and voluntarily agreed to license its SEPs and non-SEPs royalty free and not to 
seek injunctive relief for FRAND-encumbered SEPs, unless the third party refuses 
in writing to license the patent consistent with the letter of assurance, or 
otherwise refuses to license the patent on terms that comply with the letter of 
assurance as determined by a process agreed upon by both parties (e.g., 
arbitration) or a court. 
Similarly, in the Motorola Mobility case190, the FTC required Google to resolve 
disputes over FRAND licensing terms before a neutral third party before seeking 
an injunction and outlined specific negotiation procedures in the interest of both 
parties. According to the facts of the investigation, the FTC alleged that before its 
acquisition by Google, Motorola Mobility (MMI) breached commitments to license 
patents essential to implementing various cellular, video, and WiFi standards on 
FRAND terms by seeking injunctions and exclusion orders against implementers 
that were willing to abide by a FRAND license. Google continued the same 
conduct after acquiring MMI in June 2012.  
 
3.4.3.  Evolving antitrust landscape in the emerging SEP 
markets 
3.4.3.1.  China  
Regarded as positive step towards a coordinated effort of addressing various 
aspects of FRAND at the intersection of IP, antitrust and competition law, the 
following key regulatory initiatives have taken place in the last two years: 
- On 1 January 2014, the Interim Regulations on National Standards Involving 
Patents drafted by the Standardization Administration of China (SAC) and the 
State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) entered into force. The Interim 
                                           
189  Federal Trade Commission, Robert Bosch GmbH, Dkt No. C-4377 (F.T.C. Apr. 24, 
2013). 
190  Federal Trade Commission, Motorola Mobility LLC, No. C-4410 (F.T.C. July 23, 2013). 
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Regulations require: 1) the disclosure of essential patents owned or known about; 
2) that patents included in national standards must be licensed on FRAND terms; 
and 3) that, for mandatory national standards, if an essential patent holder does 
not agree to license on FRAND terms, the SAIC, SIPO, and relevant authorities 
must negotiate with the patent holder regarding a method for the patent holder 
to divest the relevant patents. 
- On 13 April 2015, China’s State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
(SAIC) released the Regulation on the Prohibition of Conduct Eliminating or 
Restricting Competition by Abusing Intellectual Property. Dated 7 April 2015, and 
entered into force on 1 August 2015, the Regulation implements the high-level 
principle in the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML)191 that the law does not apply to the 
lawful exercise of intellectual property rights, but does apply to anti-competitive 
IPR abuses. In this context, the Regulation confirms that the ownership of an IPR 
does not necessarily confer market dominance, but that an IPR’s nature as a 
legally authorized “monopoly” over a technology or product is an important factor 
in determining dominance. AML violations include excessive royalties, 
discriminatory treatment and the use of injunctive relief or abuse of the litigation 
process by SEP holders. Some key provisions of the Regulation include (Li, 2015):  
Article 10 of the Regulation lists a number of types of licensing conditions that 
dominant licensors cannot insert in agreements absent valid reasons – for 
example, exclusive grant-backs to improved technology, no-challenge clauses, 
non-compete clauses, etc. Article 13 addresses standard-essential patents, 
standard-setting and standard implementation. This provision embeds the general 
principle that IPRs shall not be used to prohibit or restrict competition during the 
setting and the implementation of standards. It also deals in detail with two 
specific prohibitions: i) The assertion of SEPs after failure to disclose the 
essentiality of the patents in violation of SSO rules; and ii) the IPR holder’s 
refusal to license SEPs under FRAND terms.  
- SAIC and China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) have 
drafted separate (and to some extent competing) versions of the AML guidelines 
on abuse of IPR. 192  Following approval by the State Council’s Anti-Monopoly 
Committee, the final text of the AML guidelines will be mandatory for all three 
enforcement agencies, i.e., SAIC, NDRC and China’s Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM). Whereas SAIC’s current draft guideline adds to the list of the 
aforementioned AML violation three more types of abusive practices, namely 
excessive royalties, discriminatory treatment and the use of injunctive relief or 
abuse of the litigation process by SEP holders (Article 28), the NDRC’s current 
draft addresses potential collusion among participants in standards development, 
but without requiring proof of consumer harm. In addition, the NDRC’s draft 
contains various provisions referring to potentially abusive practices such as 
unfairly high prices, refusal to license, tie-in sale, unreasonable trading conditions 
and discriminatory treatment. However, it does not specify to what extent these 
provisions apply to FRAND-encumbered patents. On the issue of injunctive relief, 
the draft recognizes its negative impact on competition when an SEP holder uses 
                                           
191  The AML is China’s comprehensive competition law that came into effect on 1 August 
2008. The AML is enforced by three agencies, namely the NDRC, SAIC and MOFCOM 
(Ministry of Commerce). 
192  SAIC, Guideline on Antitrust Enforcement against IP Abuse, February 2, 2016, 
www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/zyfb/qt/fld/201602/t20160204_166506.html (in Chinese); 
NDRC, Anti-Monopoly Guideline on Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights (Exposure 
Draft), December 31, 2015, available as English summary at 
www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/Standards_and_Open_Source/Committee
%20Documents/IPR%20Guideline%20(draft)%2020151231-EN.PDF  
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injunctions as a means of coercing standard implementers to accept excessive 
royalties or other unreasonable conditions.  
Chinese courts and authorities have largely addressed antitrust concerns over the 
licensing practices of large foreign firms in the domestic markets, including 
excessive pricing and portfolio bundling: 
In its 2013 decision InterDigital v. Huawei 193 , the Guangdong Higher Court 
confirmed the judgment of the Shenzhen Intermediate Court finding InterDigital 
liable for abuse of dominance arising out of unfairly high pricing and improper 
tying or bundling in the licensing of its standard-essential patents. The court 
ordered InterDigital to pay RMB 20 million in damages (approx. USD 3.2. million). 
The Guangdong People’s Court held that InterDigital violated China’s antitrust 
laws by filing a lawsuit with the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) 
against Huawei, while negotiations were still in progress regarding InterDigital’s 
Chinese SEPs on 2G, 3G and 4G technologies. The appellate court affirmed the 
determination of FRAND royalties based on 0.019% of the sales price of the end 
product – it is unclear how the Shenzhen Court reached this number.194 Moreover, 
there is no insight into how the Guangdong Higher People’s Court addresses 
Huawei’s tying claims or whether these claims were affirmed. The court appears 
to regard SEP bundling as justified on efficiency grounds and under certain 
circumstances that render it compliant with antitrust law. 
In the context of an antitrust investigation, InterDigital submitted to NDRC a set 
of commitments dated on March 3, 2014. Specifically, InterDigital agreed 1) to 
offer a worldwide portfolio license of only its SEPs and to comply with FRAND 
principles while negotiating license agreements with Chinese manufacturers; 2) 
not to require royalty-free, reciprocal cross licenses; and 3) before seeking 
exclusionary or injunctive relief, to offer expedited binding arbitration under fair 
and reasonable procedures to resolve disputes over FRAND terms and conditions 
of a worldwide license under InterDigital’s 2G, 3G, and 4G SEPs. If the Chinese 
manufacturer accepts the arbitration offer, InterDigital will not seek an injunction 
or similar relief. The investigation is now formally suspended. 
In the context of another investigation against a foreign SEP holder, the 
Qualcomm case 195 , NDRC determined Qualcomm’s dominant position in two 
markets: i) the license market of SEPs for wireless communication technology, 
which is a collection of each independent license market constituted by each SEP 
held by Qualcomm, and ii) baseband chip market, including CDMA baseband chip 
market, WCDMA baseband chip market, and LTE baseband chip market. NDRC’s 
opinion mainly focused on factors including market share, Qualcomm’s control 
over the relevant market, downstream customers’ reliance on Qualcomm’s 
technology/products and market entry barriers. Qualcomm is required to cease 
anticompetitive conduct, pay a fine of RMB 6.088 billion and implement 
rectification measures agreed upon by Qualcomm and NDRC. The rectification 
measures inter alia a ban on cross-licensing of non-SEPs (against the licensees’ 
will and without fair compensation) and unjustified tying practices. Qualcomm is 
also obliged to modify its sales terms for baseband chips and lower the royalty 
base: royalty rates for its SEP covering 3G and 4G technologies should be 
                                           
193  Huawei v InterDigital, Judgments of 28 October 2013, Guangdong Higher People’s 
Court of China (Yue Gaofa Minsan Zhougzi Nos. 305 and 306). 
194  Although relied on it in theory, the Chinese court did not apply the proportionality 
principle in royalty calculation. Specifically, it did not analyze how many SEPs were 
implicated by the standards; how many of these SEPs were granted in China and 
owned by InterDigital; how many of InterDigital’s Chinese SEPs were used by Huawei 
etc. (Lee & Li, 2015). 
195  Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) v Qualcomm, Decision 
of 10 February 2015. 
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calculated on the basis of 65% instead of 100% of the wholesale price of 
standard-incorporating handsets sold for use in China in licensing agreements 
with Chinese customers. 
Qualcomm’s fine marks an enforcement milestone, the largest fine ever imposed 
on a single company by a competition authority in the world. This precedent is 
singular, also due to the particularities of NDRC-led investigations and the 
broader industrial policy context of market price regulation and local subsidies.196 
Apparently, the pricing enforcement responds to pressure by government and 
local firms, but it remains to be seen whether the implementer-friendly drivers of 
the Qualcomm decision effectively protect Chinese smartphone makers in the 
short term, or China’s emerging innovators in the long run (Hou, 2015; Sokol & 
Zheng, 2016). Hou highlights a less noticeable aspect within the Qualcomm 
decision: the NDRC seemed to place high burden of proof on Qualcomm. When 
evaluating the anti-competitive harm of Qualcomm’s conduct, the NDRC did not 
further substantiate its position, but shifted the burden of proof to Qualcomm, 
which failed to submit relevant evidence. According to Hou, the abusive conduct 
listed in the AML may have both anti-competitive and pro-competitive 
implications; unreasonably high prices, predatory prices, refusal to deal, tying 
and discrimination can easily go two ways. A proper assessment of abusive 
conduct should thus adhere to a comparison between its pro-competitive effects 
with its anti-competitive ones, and be based on solid evidence rather than 
theoretical arguments.  
 
 
NDRC v. Qualcomm, Decision of 10 February 2015  
Following complaints by competitors and industry associations - most notably 
Mobile China Alliance and the Internet Society of China in early November 2013 - 
NDRC’s investigation of Qualcomm began in November 2013 with a dawn raid at 
the company’s Beijing and Shanghai offices. NDRC devoted substantial resources 
to the process, including teaming up with external advisors that combed through 
the substantial volume of collected data. Throughout the investigation, NDRC 
cooperated closely with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
(MIIT, i.e., the Chinese telecom and internet regulator) and had several meetings 
with Qualcomm.  
After lengthy investigations and discussions, NDRC imposed a record-penalty of 
RMB 6.088 billion (USD 975 million) and an additional set of remedies and 
commitments, including offering wireless SEP licenses separately from non-SEP 
licenses and presenting a patent list during negotiation. The terms of the 
settlement apply only to smartphones sold in China by companies based in China. 
They neither apply to Chinese headsets sold in other countries nor to foreign 
handsets sold in China. 
 
                                           
196  Since the China’s Antimonopoly Law (AML) entered into force in 2008, NDRC has 
gradually increased its enforcement efforts. NDRC focused initially on local cartels, 
fining an international cartel (LCD panels) for the first time in January 2013. Since 
then, NDRC has investigated in various cases of domestic and international cartels and 
resale price maintenance matters. In 2014, NDRC and its local agencies imposed total 
fines of approximately RMB 1.8 billion (~USD 293 million) for AML violations. NDRC 
had not dedicated significant resources in the investigation of market abuse until June 
2013, when it launched proceedings against InterDigital, a U.S.-based patent licensing 
entity. Since then, NDRC has increased its scrutiny of intellectual property rights, as 
evidenced most recently by its investigation against Qualcomm and the ongoing 
investigation against Vringo. 
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3.4.3.2.  Japan 
In January 2016, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) revised 
its Guidelines for the use of Intellectual Property under the Antimonopoly Act to 
specifically address the risks emanating from breaches of FRAND commitments. 
The revised IP Guidelines state that a refusal to license or pursuit of injunctions 
against a party who is “willing” to take a license based on FRAND terms can 
violate the Japanese Antimonopoly Act. Moreover, this type of conduct can be 
deemed unfair trade practice, even if it does not substantially restrict competition 
in the relevant product market and does not constitute unlawful monopolization. 
The JFTC indicates that whether a prospective licensee is “willing” will be judged 
on a case-by-case basis by the conduct of both parties in the negotiations. The 
Guidelines however explain that:  
i) A party is deemed to be “willing” if it shows its intention to have the FRAND 
license conditions determined by a court or through arbitration procedures in case 
that the parties do not reach an agreement on the license conditions even after a 
certain period of negotiations; 
ii) Challenges to the validity, essentiality or possible infringement of the SEP, 
doesn’t make a party, which intends to be licensed on FRAND terms “unwilling”.  
 
3.4.3.3.  Korea 
In December 2014, the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) revised the Review 
Guideline on Unfair Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights (enacted in 2000). The 
IPR Guidelines specify abusive practices in the field of patents, including patent 
ambush, refusal to license, excessive licenses, discriminatory terms, unlawful 
concerted act in standardization etc. Section 3 of the amended IPR Guidelines 
applies specifically to patents relevant to technical standards. As a primary 
framework for the enforcement of the Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade 
Act (MRFTA) in the field of IPR, the Guidelines identify certain types of licensing 
practices that may be deemed abusive such as unreasonably avoiding or 
circumventing the granting of a license on FRAND terms, imposing discriminatory 
conditions when licensing SEPs, or restricting the licensee's exercise related 
patents. Further provisions address the issues of unreasonable royalty calculation, 
unreasonable conditions against patent exhaustion doctrine, unreasonable tying 
or bundling, unreasonable restraints on competition for innovation as well as the 
activities of Non-Practicing Entities (NPE). 197  The Guidelines establish abusive 
practices by NPEs as a separate category of IPR abuse and provide examples of 
such anti-competitive conduct. Despite the KFTC’s effort to define NPEs and 
regulate their activities, NPEs remain unchartered territory in Korea and 
practitioners still have to cope with a certain degree of ambiguity and legal 
uncertainty. 
Albeit not an enforceable law, the above Guidelines are significant in that they 
reflect both the general policy stance as well as the Korean regulator’s willingness 
to step up action. 
 
                                           
197  The IPR Guideline reiterates the vague term “unreasonable” without further specifying 
the types of conduct prohibited by law, introducing relevant benchmarks or allowing for 
timely notice of the conduct from which an enterprise must refrain in order to avoid 
administrative sanctions (Hong, 2015). 
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3.4.3.4.  India 
In India, the royalty burden owed to foreign firms is often viewed as inequitable 
by local firms and government, particularly when local competitors do not own 
their own SEPs. In a series of antitrust complaints filed with the Competition 
Commission of India (CCI), Micromax, Intex and Best It Worlds alleged that 
Ericsson abused its dominant position in violation of Section 4 Competition Act by 
imposing excessive royalties for the use of its patents essential to 2G, 3G, and 4G 
standards in the Indian market.198 The complaint alleged that Ericsson “seem[s] 
to be acting contrary to the FRAND terms by imposing royalties linked with cost of 
product of user for its patents.” Thus, “for the use of GSM chip in a phone costing 
Rs 100, royalty would be Rs. 1.25 but if this GSM chip is used in a phone of Rs. 
1000, royalty would be Rs. 12.5.” 
Stating that Ericsson enjoyed a complete dominance over its present and 
prospective licensees in the relevant market, CCI deemed the firm’s royalty rates 
both excessive and discriminatory, given that they were set as a percentage of 
the price of the downstream product instead of a percentage of the price of the 
GSM or CDMA chip. Furthermore, Ericsson’s refusal to share commercial terms 
and royalty payments on the grounds of non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) was 
deemed “strongly suggestive of the fact that different royalty rates/commercial 
terms were being offered to the potential licensees belong to the same category.”  
The CCI decisions have undergone scrutiny due to lack of reasoned analysis and 
economic methodology (see, e.g., Pai & Daryanani, 2016). It is therefore 
suggested that Indian authorities improve their institutional capabilities, rely 
more on economic expertise and refine their case law to reflect economic 
principles (Ghosh & Sokol, 2016).  
On the policy level, the Indian regulator is preparing to take action and introduce 
important changes in the standardization setting. The Indian Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry recently launched a paper that discusses SEPs and their 
availability on FRAND terms.199 The paper aims at raising awareness around the 
importance of regulating the SEP market while facilitating access to relevant 
technologies on FRAND terms, and invites stakeholders and the general public to 
contribute to the emerging policy dialogue with comments and suggestions.  
  
                                           
198  Best It Worlds (India) Private Ltd. v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Case No. 4 of 
2015, Competition Commission of India (12 May 2015); Intex Techs. (India) v 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Case No. 76 of 2013, Competition Commission of 
India (16 January 2014); Micromax Informatics, Ltd v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 
Case No. 50 of 2013, Competition Commission of India (12 November 2013). 
199  Discussion Paper on Standard Essential Patents and their availability on FRAND Terms, 
at http://dipp.nic.in/english/Discuss_paper/standardEssentialPaper_01March2016.pdf 
(2016). 
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3.5.  CONCLUSIONS - EVOLUTION OF CASE LAW AND 
CONVERGING TRENDS 
Most cases before courts and competition authorities concerning SEPs are related 
to patent infringement damages, injunctions or antitrust. A comprehensive 
comparative analysis of a wide body of case law reveals the following:  
Idiosyncrasies of SEP litigation: Complexities in the technologies and licensing 
practices of SEPs have challenged well-established methodologies and doctrines 
applicable in the general context of patent infringement. Over time, courts have 
questioned the “real-world applicability” of existing frameworks and evidentiary 
rules, leading to modifications and adjustments in the specific context of FRAND. 
As a result, courts have introduced economic guideposts into the legal analysis. 
Moreover, within the context of SEP litigation, different standards have different 
dispute profiles - with the IEEE 802.11 standards attracting the most litigation 
across various jurisdictions. Portfolio licensing as an established market practice 
is also becoming the norm in FRAND litigation. The mix of SEP and non-SEPs 
(FRAND and non-FRAND-encumbered patents) imposes an additional burden on 
value apportionment and damage calculation.  
Incentive compatibility and fair balance of interests: Across various 
jurisdictions worldwide, policymakers aim for a definition of FRAND that strikes a 
balance between the need to make standards available on the one hand, and 
fairly compensate SEP holders on the other. This approach is motivated by the 
necessity of protecting the rights and legitimate interests of patent owners and 
standard users, taking into account the broader public interest and welfare. 
Policymakers recognize the importance of the FRAND definition for economic 
incentives, including the incentives to innovate, to participate in standard 
development, and to rapidly implement and adopt innovative technology 
standards. Moreover, the risk of hold-up is considered a significant factor for the 
determination of FRAND royalties, even though its empirical relevance is 
disputed. US courts require supporting evidence that a party behaved in bad faith 
before considering hold-up for damages calculation. 
Converging practice on injunctions: The decision of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in Huawei v. ZTE has enhanced convergence across the 
European national jurisdictions by emphasizing the need for good faith in 
negotiations toward an actual result over the initial offer of the licensee: 
injunctions are no longer granted automatically without further consideration of 
the parties’ conduct in the light of their relevant bargaining power. The economic 
analysis of FRAND licensing highlights the pivotal role of injunctions in mitigating 
potential harm stemming from bargaining failure and patent hold-up. At the same 
time, the jurisprudence of the CJEU and national courts in Europe increasingly 
leverage the award of injunctive relief against unwilling licensees as a means of 
strengthening bilateral negotiations as the principal forum for determining FRAND 
licensing terms. The availability of injunctive relief for SEP owners is more 
restricted in other jurisdictions, including the US, Japan and China. Especially in 
the US, where injunctions are generally considered inappropriate when a patent 
owner is committed to licensing his patents, the courts play a more active role in 
determining the licensing terms when negotiations come to an impasse. 
Evaluation of conduct v. emphasis on royalty rates: In the US, reasonable 
royalties are the most frequent kind of damages awarded in patent cases and 
comprise a greater share with each passing year. Reasonable royalties aim to 
award the owner of an infringed patent damages that are proportional to those 
that the patent owner and the infringer would have agreed upon in a hypothetical 
negotiation before infringement began. While the guiding principle of the 
hypothetical negotiation framework is theoretically viable, it is inherently difficult 
to implement in practice. In order to determine a single royalty rate deriving from 
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a hypothetical agreement of this kind, US courts are methodologically 
sophisticated when they approach FRAND. In contrast, European courts are more 
reluctant to define a single royalty rate. Instead, they focus on the conduct of the 
parties during the bilateral negotiations and assess whether it complies with the 
specific FRAND commitments made prior to awarding injunctions. 
Core principles of FRAND: FRAND does not describe a single rate, but a range 
of rates. Therefore, courts suggest a specific analysis for the FRAND calculation 
that extends beyond the apportionment of the value of the infringing product to 
the infringed patent typical for the determination of royalties in the general 
context of damages. In addition to preventing hold-up, this specific analysis 
follows the two core principles of the ex ante negotiation benchmark: 
i) every judicial analysis of FRAND should take place in the framework of the 
hypothetical bilateral negotiation set prior to standard development if there is 
evidence that the patent owner modified its royalty requests in response to the 
standard adoption, and 
ii) the incremental value of the patent, i.e., the FRAND royalty rate should be 
apportioned to the incremental value of the patent.  
In the interpretation by the courts, however, the notion of the patent’s 
“incremental value” tends to conflate two concepts, which should be analyzed 
separately: the stand-alone (intrinsic) value of the patented technology and the 
value added by the patent to the standard (incremental). Both are relevant for 
the definition of the FRAND range. 
Methodologies for calculating the FRAND royalty: Acceptable methodologies 
use two sources of observable data, namely the prices of comparable licenses and 
a royalty base (prices of either the infringing product or a component of this 
product that practices the patented technology). Although subject to correctives, 
they reveal useful benchmarks to actual values and established practices and help 
the courts inform their decisions on the many aspects of royalty calculation. Not 
measurable directly but approached through proxies, royalty determination has 
become more technical and fact-intensive, revealing existing evidentiary 
challenges and data constraints. Related evidence must be reliable and tangible, 
not conjectural or speculative. There is uncertainty around the appropriateness 
and sufficiency of submitted evidence (comparable licenses, economic modelling 
based on market and survey data, etc.). Most royalty determinations establish a 
FRAND royalty by determining the share of the value of a specific royalty base 
that is attributable to the patented feature. Regarding the royalty base, the 
choice between the price of the end product and the price of a smaller component 
lies at the heart of an ongoing controversy in the US – it should also be 
remembered that the new IEEE policy chooses the smallest saleable patent 
practicing unit (SSPPU). Both approaches, however, are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, and provide useful pointers for the FRAND determination. 
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4.  COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF FRAND 
LICENSING 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Based on the cases considered, the following provides a systematic overview of 
FRAND licensing. We take into consideration the available literature in the field to 
interpret the core concepts developed in the case law, and use economic analysis 
to assess whether the methodologies used by courts achieve the objectives set 
forth by their theoretical definition of FRAND. The purpose of this exercise is to 
combine the FRAND-defining concepts accepted by the courts into a unified 
framework for the interpretation of the obligations arising from FRAND 
commitments.  
In line with the case law, we proceed in two steps. First, we analyze the concepts 
defining FRAND licensing terms, and combine these concepts into a more distinct 
definition of a FRAND royalty range. We analyze how to implement the theoretical 
definition of the FRAND range in practice, using empirical data on comparable 
licenses and product prices. We conclude that there are fundamental challenges 
to any attempt of translating FRAND obligations into a specific royalty rate. 
Second, we analyze obligations arising from the FRAND commitment regarding 
the conduct of parties in licensing negotiations. We argue that this approach can 
encompass an analysis of a range of FRAND licensing terms. In this framework, 
FRAND licensing terms must be defined in bilateral negotiations, where the 
FRAND commitments set the boundaries within which the conduct of the 
negotiating parties can be deemed compliant. Against this background, we 
address the implications of a FRAND commitment for both litigation and the 
conduct of SEP licensing negotiations. 
 
4.1.  DEFINITION OF FRAND LICENSING TERMS 
In this section, we provide an analytical framework for the definition of FRAND 
licensing terms. First, we lay out the overarching principles of FRAND based on 
the teachings of our previous case law analysis and the judicial determination of 
SEP licensing terms. Courts in many jurisdictions – most predominantly in Europe 
- have so far restrained from setting FRAND licensing terms for specific licenses. 
The overarching principles applicable to a judicial adjudication on FRAND terms 
are therefore those distilled from the US court practice. Second, we interpret the 
core principles of FRAND in light of the legal and economic underpinnings of the 
current debate. Third, we develop a consistent framework that builds on the 
various approaches to FRAND to adequately support the definition of a FRAND 
range. Finally, we discuss how to implement this framework using data on 
product prices or comparable licenses.  
4.1.1.  Principles of FRAND licensing terms 
We have observed the following principles being repeatedly used in judicial 
FRAND analyses. A FRAND royalty rate shall reflect: 
1. Ex ante negotiation benchmark: the outcome of a hypothetical ex ante 
bilateral negotiation between the patent owner and the implementer of the 
standard practicing the patented feature; 
2. Incremental value added by the patented feature to the product implementing 
the standard (in particular the incremental value over the next best 
alternative); 
3. Ex ante value of the patented feature, i.e., the intrinsic value of the patented 
feature excluding any additional value resulting from the inclusion of the 
feature into the standard; 
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4. Incentive compatibility: a FRAND royalty rate preserves incentives to invent, 
to contribute patented technology to the standard, and to adopt technology 
standards including SEPs; 
5. Account for royalty stacking and concerns of patent hold-up. 
These concepts are useful for the determination of a FRAND royalty rate. In order 
to determine whether the rate charged to a specific implementer is FRAND, it is 
also necessary to analyze whether the royalty rate is non-discriminatory. The 
non-discriminatory part of FRAND characterizes a rate’s relationship to other 
rates, rather than to an intrinsic benchmark relative to the SEP’s ex ante value. 
The analysis of non-discrimination is therefore not part of the framework used to 
determine a FRAND rate.  
 
 
Comparison with other accounts of the case law on FRAND 
Certainly not all of these principles are unanimously accepted in the literature. 
Nevertheless, we observe that our list of principles underpinning the judicial 
FRAND analysis closely overlaps with the analysis of other authors. Siebrasse & 
Cotter (2016) also attempt to identify some basic FRAND principles as the 
appropriate starting point for the analysis of FRAND commitments in any given 
context: 
1. The royalty should prevent SEP owners from exercising patent “hold-up”; 
2. Courts should minimize the risk of “royalty stacking,” in which the aggregate 
royalty burden a seller incurs from marketing a product incorporating 
multiple, separately-owned patents is disproportionate to the value of the 
added technology; 
3. A FRAND royalty should reflect the incremental ex ante value of the 
technology in comparison with alternatives; 
4. The royalty should be proportionate variously to a) the technology’s 
importance to the standard, b) the technology’s importance to users of the 
standard and c) the value of the standard to the user (the “proportionality” 
principle); 
5. The royalty should not reflect “any value added by the standardization of that 
technology,” that is, “by the standard’s adoption of the patented technology”–
or, as another court puts it simply, the “value of the standard.”; 
6. The royalty should be adequate to preserve the patent incentive (the 
“incentive to invent” principle); and 
7. The royalty should provide an adequate incentive to participate in the 
standard setting process (the “incentive to participate” principle). 
 
 
4.1.2.  Interpretation of the concepts underlying the FRAND 
definition 
The various constructs and tests should not be applied in isolation, but help 
disambiguate the definition of FRAND in their combination/complementarity. The 
“fairness” aspect of FRAND imposes an overarching principle of regulating the 
effects of the various methods or tools applied for the calculation of reasonable 
royalty rates that are perceived as tipping the balance in favour of either the 
patent owner (i.e., EMVR) or the licensee (i.e., SSPPU, Georgia-Pacific factors). In 
other words, the assessment of the “reasonableness” of a royalty rate takes place 
in the shadow of the notion of “fairness”. Defining fairness as a balance of 
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interests among the stakeholders takes into account the overall market and 
standardization-specific dynamics, such as fragmentation of patent ownership 
(PAE, privateers), vertical integration of SEP holders which can be both inventors 
and implementers, downstream channels, de facto monopoly of strong portfolio 
owners, etc. In this context, it could also be asked whether and to what extent 
welfare-improving considerations may impact the determination of FRAND. 
Notwithstanding this need to analyze FRAND as a unified concept, it is important 
to resolve a number of interpretation issues regarding the individual concepts. 
Several of these principles can be interpreted in different ways, leading to 
different outcomes of the analysis: 
 
4.1.2.1.  Ex ante bilateral negotiation 
 
i) General  
An important constant in the US case law on FRAND adjudication is the reference 
to a hypothetical ex ante bilateral negotiation between the patent owner and the 
implementer. Using the construct of a hypothetical bilateral negotiation to 
determine a FRAND rate requires determining the bargaining range of the 
hypothetical negotiation, i.e., the range of values that would have been 
acceptable to both parties had the negotiation taken place ex ante. Defining the 
bargaining range is a prima facie set-up that seeks to reinstate the condition of 
ex ante competition. The bargaining range is the starting point that requires 
further qualitative adjustments and economic guideposts. The latter implies that 
the “range of reasonable values” is within the bargaining range and must be 
narrowed down through additional steps, as elicited below. Useful guideposts in 
this direction include:  
a) examining the commercial and competitive relationship of the parties in the 
downstream market at the ex ante point of negotiations; and b) defining the 
bargaining range, i.e., the range between the licensor’s minimum willingness to 
accept a reasonable license and the (would-be infringer) licensee’s maximum 
willingness to pay. 
 
ii) When is ex ante?  
The notion of a hypothetical bilateral ex ante negotiation (or a hypothetical ex 
ante auction) raises the question what is exactly intended by “ex ante”. There is a 
consensus that the ex ante negotiation (or auction) should be deemed to have 
taken place before the “lock-in” of the standard into a design choice requiring the 
use of the patented feature. There are however conflicting interpretations of ex 
ante which are consistent with this consensual definition.  
One interpretation is that the negotiation (or auction) takes place right before the 
patented technology is irreversibly included into the standard, i.e., before the 
SSO and standard implementers commit to incurring any sunk investment into 
the patented feature. Reference to a hypothetical negotiation taking place before 
any irreversible investment by the standard implementers, provides a safeguard 
against hold-up by the patent holder.  
Standard development is however a process taking place over time, involving 
multiple irreversible choices and costly investments. In particular, the “lock-in” of 
a standard into a particular design choice (e.g., the release of a standard version 
or the “freeze” date of a new standard under development) is preceded by earlier 
decisions in the SSO (e.g., the approval of a work item initiating the work on the 
 128 
development of a new feature of a standard), and many patented features result 
from R&D efforts carried out after such earlier decisions. 
A second possible interpretation of ex ante is therefore that the hypothetical ex 
ante negotiation takes place before the beginning of any standard development 
effort regarding the patented feature. This interpretation has the advantage that 
the negotiation takes place before any party incurs sunk investments into the 
standard, including the sunk R&D investments targeted exclusively at the 
standard. This would allow the patent holder to charge a royalty accounting for 
his investment in standard-specific R&D. The outcome of this hypothetical 
negotiation would typically exceed the outcome of a hypothetical negotiation that 
takes place after this sunk R&D investment was made. 
It is important to underline that under both interpretations, the ‘lock-in’ is not 
necessarily a single point in time. As standard development progresses, 
investments by implementers and patent holders become increasingly difficult to 
reverse. The best application of the ex ante negotiation benchmark is not to 
select a specific point in calendar time, but to conceptually specify the bargaining 
range of a negotiation taking place between the parties, assuming that neither 
party is irreversibly committed to specific choices made during standard 
development. 
 
iii) Assumptions about bargaining power in the negotiation  
The concept of the hypothetical ex ante negotiation generally determines a 
bargaining range defined by the willingness to pay of the implementer and the 
willingness to accept of the patent owner. For the hypothetical negotiation to 
result in an inclusion of the patented feature, the willingness to pay of the 
implementer must be at least equal to the willingness to accept of the patent 
owner. In many cases, the willingness to pay of the implementer will be 
substantially higher than the willingness to accept of the patent owner. In these 
cases, the concept of hypothetical negotiation leads to a potentially wide royalty 
range, instead of a single royalty rate.  
This royalty range is equivalent to the range of outcomes that would make both 
parties better off than the absence of a negotiated agreement. From an economic 
point of view, any outcome within this range (between the willingness to pay of 
the implementer and the willingness to accept of the patent holder) is a plausible 
negotiation outcome, and no single outcome can be singled out without using 
additional assumptions. The economic literature often uses the concept of Nash 
bargaining, which is a game-theoretic analysis supporting the presumption that 
ceteris paribus the outcome of a negotiation will be in the middle of the 
bargaining range. Courts have repeatedly rejected the concept of Nash bargaining 
for the purpose of damages calculations. The question how to single out a single 
rate within the bargaining range remains effectively unanswered to date. 
 
iv) Bilateral nature of ex ante negotiation is questionable 
The economic literature has advanced the notion of a hypothetical ex ante auction 
by the SSO (Baumol & Swanson, 2005; Layne-Farrar et al., 2007) to determine a 
FRAND royalty rate. The case law has made no use of this concept, and rather 
refers to the outcome of a hypothetical bilateral ex ante negotiation between the 
patent holder and the infringer. From an economic point of view, this is 
questionable for two reasons.  
First, the decision to incorporate the patented feature into the standard was 
never subject to a bilateral negotiation between the patent owner and a single 
implementer. It is therefore unclear why the royalty should be modelled as the 
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outcome of a bilateral negotiation. In contrast, it is quite clear that if the inclusion 
of the patented feature in the standard is to be conceived as a negotiated 
agreement, this agreement must be a (potentially incomplete) contract between 
the patent holder and the SSO (to the benefit of the entire set of implementers), 
rather than a series of different bilateral contracts between the patent holder and 
each of the potential implementers.  
Second, if the implementers are competing with each other in the product 
market, the outcome of a set of bilateral negotiations between the patent holder 
and each of the implementers would be higher than the outcome of an auction by 
the SSO, and it also would be higher than the collective benefit of the 
implementers from using the patented feature. A set of royalty rates compatible 
with the outcome of separate bilateral negotiations between the patent owner and 
each of the implementers would leave the implementing industry worse off as a 
result of the inclusion of the patented feature. It is doubtful that this is intended 
as outcome of a FRAND determination. The notion of ex ante auction by the SSO 
is thus clearly preferable over the notion of separate ex ante bilateral 
negotiations. 
 
4.1.2.2.  Ex ante incremental value of the patent 
The abstract construction of ex ante benchmarks is used to set the price that 
would have resulted from a hypothetical licensing negotiation between the 
litigating parties prior to the setting of the standard. Central to the various 
methodologies and applied criteria that attempt to define a FRAND royalty is the 
reference to the ex ante technological and market set-up of the negotiations, 
determining the ex ante value of the patent. The latter is further refined as the ex 
ante incremental value of the patented technology.  
In other words, court methodologies based on ex ante benchmarks attempt to 
“neutralize” the value of the patented technology, i.e., distance it from the 
standard setting process and the politically loaded environment of competing 
market players in which its takes place. Through the lens of the licensing parties 
and by reference to their bargaining power in advance of standard selection (ex 
ante competition), a set of assumptions and constructs is developed that recreate 
as best as possible the ex ante licensing negotiation scenario and resulting 
agreement.  
The notion of incremental value has been used in two different contexts. Most 
prominently, the concept of incremental value refers to the value added by the 
patented feature to the standard, i.e., the difference between the value of the 
standard including the patented feature and the value of the same standard 
without the feature. It is commonly understood that if the patented feature had 
not been available for inclusion into the standard, the SSO may have had the 
possibility to select a different feature and to set a different standard. The ex ante 
incremental value added by the patented feature to the standard should therefore 
be assessed with respect to the feature’s next-best alternative. Formally, the 
incremental value added to the standard can be defined as the value of the 
standard including the patented feature, minus the value of a hypothetical 
standard that would have been set if the feature had not been available. By 
extension, the incremental value added by the feature to the standard-compliant 
product is the value of the standard-compliant product minus the value of the 
product implementing the hypothetical standard (assuming that the hypothetical 
standard achieves the same network benefits that the factual standard provides 
for in reality).  
The notion of “incremental value”, however, is also used to refer to the value 
conferred to the patented feature by its inclusion into the standard. This is 
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apparent, e.g., in Microsoft v. Motorola, when Motorola’s expert acknowledges 
that an SEP owner is “not entitled to the incremental value that you get because 
you are part of the standard.”200 The exclusion of this incremental value results in 
the intrinsic value of the patented feature, i.e., the value of the patented feature 
that strictly results from the feature’s technical superiority, and does not result 
from the inclusion of the feature into the standard. We can define this intrinsic 
value as the value of the patented feature in the counterfactual scenario in which 
the feature is not selected for inclusion into the standard.  
These two concepts refer to two different values. The incremental value added by 
the feature to the standard is distinct from the stand-alone value of the patent if 
it is not selected for the standard. Assuming that it was beneficial to include the 
patented feature into the standard, the value added by the patent to the standard 
should be higher than the stand-alone value of the patent. In order to underline 
the distinction between these two different concepts, we prefer to use the notions 
of “incremental value added to the standard” and “stand-alone value of the 
patent”. 
 
 
Intrinsic and incremental value of the patent 
It is commonly accepted in FRAND interpretations that the patentee is entitled to 
the “value of the patented technology” itself, as contrasted with the value that 
arises from standardization. The value of standardization is presumably the 
incremental value resulting from the patent’s inclusion into the standard, which 
has to be disentangled from the patent’s intrinsic value resulting from its ex ante 
technological superiority. In addition, courts have emphasized the “incremental 
value added by the patent”, in particular with respect to the next-best alternative 
that was available at the time the standard was set. This value measures the 
increment in the value of the standard due to the inclusion of the patented 
feature, i.e., the difference between the value of a standard including this feature, 
and the same standard not including this feature, but its next-best alternative. 
The intrinsic value of the patented feature and the incremental value that it adds 
to the standard define the ex ante value of the patented feature. Nevertheless, it 
is crucial to understand the difference between the intrinsic value of the patent 
and the incremental value it adds to the standard. 
To see this, consider a standard including two components, a and b. The value of 
a hypothetical standard including only a is 𝑣𝑎, the value of a hypothetical standard 
only including b is 𝑣𝑏, and the value of the standard including both components is 
𝑣𝑎+𝑏 = 𝑣𝑎 + 𝑣𝑏 + 𝑣𝑐 , where 𝑣𝑐  is the combination value; or the added value from 
combining components a and b. The incremental value added by including 
component a is 𝑣𝐼𝑎 = 𝑣𝑎 + 𝑣𝑐 = 𝑣𝑎+𝑏 − 𝑣𝑏, i.e., the value of the standard including 
the feature a minus the value of the same standard not including feature a. 
Similarly, the incremental value added by component b would be calculated as 
𝑣𝐼𝑏 = 𝑣𝑎+𝑏 − 𝑣𝑎. The sum of both incremental values is 𝑣𝑎 + 𝑣𝑏 + 2𝑣𝑐, which is larger 
than the total value of the standard. Adding up incremental values thus may 
result in an excessive aggregate royalty.  
At the same time, remunerating each patent by its intrinsic (stand-alone) value 
may be insufficient. If developing the component a costs more than the stand-
alone value 𝑣𝑎 , a FRAND royalty of 𝑣𝑎  is insufficient to provide incentives to 
develop the patented feature. This may be the case in situations in which the 
value that the patented feature adds to the standard would justify the cost of its 
                                           
200  So Judge Robart in Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., Order of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, April 25, 2013, No. 10-cv-1823 at para 269 (W.D. Wash.). 
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development. Up to a value of 𝑣𝐼𝑎 = 𝑣𝑎 + 𝑣𝑐, it may be necessary and efficient to 
pay a royalty rate at least as high as to compensate for the cost of R&D. It is thus 
clear from this simple numerical example that an incentive-compatible FRAND 
royalty rate must be somewhere between 𝑣𝑎  and 𝑣
𝐼
𝑎 , i.e., between the stand-
alone value of the patent and the incremental value added by the patent to the 
standard-compliant product; even though both values may fall outside the range 
of efficient (incentive-compatible) royalty rates. 
 
 
In practice, the evaluation of both the stand-alone value and the (incremental) 
value added by the patent to the standard involves a nexus of assessments that 
seek to provide adjustments when defining the range of a reasonable royalty:  
a) examining for next-best alternative technologies. This aspect takes into 
account the ex ante competition and considers the utility and advantages of the 
patented technology over substitutes. The results are different for industries 
where effective alternatives are available vs. fundamental technologies with no 
close substitutes; 
b) establishing the incremental contribution of the patented technology to the 
value of the standard over the next-best alternative. This aspect refers to the 
proportionality principle: the royalty must be proportionate to the centrality of the 
SEP to the standard, the technology importance to users and the value of the 
standard to users; 
c) defining the upper boundaries of the royalty range by assessing the 
proportionality of the stand-alone value of the patent to the sales-based value of 
the end-product. Separating the intrinsic value of the standard from the full 
market value of the end-product narrows down the royalty range for the specific 
component based on its technical contribution to the downstream product; and 
d) defining the lower boundaries of the royalty range through ex ante 
benchmarks pertaining to the stand-alone value of the patent. This assessment 
refers to adjustments based on ex ante benchmarks such as the ex ante market 
value of the patent, defining the patent holder’s opportunity costs or best 
alternative to negotiated agreement (BATNA). This is the lower bound of the 
bargaining range, i.e., the patentee would not have accepted a lower royalty rate 
in a hypothetical ex ante negotiation. 
The first two steps are patent-related and address technical aspects, such as the 
existence of alternative technologies and the technical contribution of the SEP-
embedded technology to the standard, also in interaction with other components 
or features. The third and forth steps address the process of calculating FRAND by 
taking into account publicly available empirical data that can help us define the 
upper and lower boundaries of an actual price range. Here, it should be noted 
that the determination of the ex ante value does not necessarily exclude the use 
of ex post available information sources, such as standard-related documents and 
market data (sales/end product prices, ex ante transactions and licenses). Given 
that only very few negotiated licenses are publicly known, these data repositories 
provide useful pointers – if not the only pointers. In detail: 
 
a) Examine whether there are any alternative technologies for the specific 
standard  
The starting point for an economically sound definition of FRAND should be the 
consideration of the extent to which there were close substitute technologies. The 
setting of a standard necessarily excludes alternative technologies and locks an 
 132 
industry into a specific method of doing business over an extended period of time. 
Without the standard setting process, the owners of technologies A, B and C that 
provide the same level of technological performance can compete freely for 
market shares. In this hypothetical scenario, the competitive rate at which any of 
the three licenses its technology would be one that reflects the incremental 
advantage of one technology over the next-best alternative available ex ante.  
Defining the ex ante value of a specific technology in the light of FRAND is an 
exercise that takes into account this ex ante competitive situation that standard 
setting supplants in order to calculate the patented feature’s value that is stripped 
from the post-standardization benefits (exclusionary power of the standard 
owner, network effects of the implemented technology). As a first step, this 
requires a comparison of the patented technology to the alternatives that the SSO 
would have written into the standard if the patented feature had not been 
available. Specifically, the court should “consider the utility and advantages of the 
patented property over alternatives that could have been written into the 
standard instead of the patented technology in the period before the standard 
was adopted,” because “the presence of equally effective alternatives to the 
patented technology that could have been adopted into the standard will drive 
down the royalty that the patent holder could reasonably demand”.201  
Where alternative technologies could have been used instead of the standard, 
then the incremental value lies in the incremental profits gained by the use of the 
standard relative to the profits that could be attained by the use of alternatives. It 
may also occur – albeit in a few cases – that SEPs responsible for fundamental 
technologies have no close substitutes. This is widely acknowledged for 
Qualcomm’s CDMA patents, for instance (Bekkers et al., 2011). In this situation, 
the incremental value added by the patented feature is not bound by the 
existence of competing technologies, and substantially higher royalty rates could 
be considered fair and reasonable.  
 
 
Assumptions about costs of the next-best alternative 
As seen above, the incremental value added by the patented feature to the 
standard is assessed with respect to the value of the standard including the next-
best alternative. Also the willingness to pay of the implementer in a hypothetical 
ex ante negotiation is determined by the increment in implementer profits from 
using the standard including the patented feature over the profits from using a 
standard including the next-best alternative.  
It is however not always clear what must be assumed regarding the cost of the 
next-best alternative. While it is generally accepted that this cost is zero if the 
next-best alternative to the patented feature is in the public domain, there is an 
important ambiguity in the case that the next-best alternative is also patented. In 
different economic models, the presence of two competing features leads to 
different conclusions regarding the price of these features. In a simple model of 
perfect competition in prices, the price of the superior feature is strictly driven 
down to the incremental value of the feature over the next-best alternative (i.e., 
if two features are of equivalent value, they would both be available for free).  
Several courts have found these models to be unrealistic, and assume that the 
presence of alternative features drives down the price that would result from a 
hypothetical ex ante negotiation, but not as much as to drive down the price to 
                                           
201  In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., MDL No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609, at 
*36 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (sealed version filed Sept. 27, 2013). 
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zero.202 This analysis is compatible with a wide range of economic models of 
competition, but the precise extent to which the royalty rate must be reduced to 
account for the existence of alternative features is dependent on more specific 
assumptions regarding the nature of the competitive process. 
 
 
b) Assess the contribution of the patented technology to the value of the 
standard 
According to the proportionality principle, the royalty should be proportionate to 
the technology’s importance to the standard and to users of the standard. Central 
to the court’s analysis is the principle “that the parties in a hypothetical 
negotiation would set RAND royalty rates by looking at the importance of the 
SEPs to the standard and the importance of the standard and the SEPs to the 
products at issue”203 – the higher the importance, the higher the royalty. In In re 
Innovatio, the court's analysis does not include a separate section evaluating the 
importance of Innovatio's patents to the accused products, but instead merges 
that analysis into the inquiry about the importance of Innovatio's patents to the 
802.11 standard.204  
The reference to the centrality of the patented feature to the standard does not 
compromise the ex ante benchmark of the hypothetical negotiations, e.g., by 
taking into account the network externalities generated by the standardization of 
the patented technology. Instead, it helps measure how costly it would have been 
to design around the entire feature. Technical specifications included in standard- 
and patent-related documentation can reveal helpful information on this aspect.  
Given that ex post available empirical evidence can provide accurate and 
observable information on the value of the standard and, by extension, on the 
value of the embedded SEPs, it is important to clarify within an established 
common framework under which conditions ex post gained insight such as market 
sales and standard-related documentation can be leveraged to shed light into the 
hypothetical negotiation and maintain the appropriate incentives to invent without 
compromising the ex ante principles. 
Essentiality can also be factored in the incremental value of the SEP insofar it 
does not drive the rate determination beyond the value contributed by the 
patented technology: even if the patent is declared essential, or its essentiality is 
never tested in court, or the patent is perceived as de facto essential, it is always 
the value of the patented technology that drives the rate determination, not the 
essentiality.205 
                                           
202  “Accordingly, the court will consider patented alternatives, but will recognize that they 
will not drive down the royalty in the hypothetical negotiation by as much as 
technology in the public domain. In other words, the existence of patented alternatives 
does not provide as much reason to discount the value of Innovatio's patents as does 
the existence of alternatives in the public domain.”, so Judge Holderman in In re 
Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., MDL No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609, at *37 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (sealed version filed Sept. 27, 2013). 
203  So Judge Robart in Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., Order of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, April 25, 2013, No. 10-cv-1823, p. 7 (W.D. Wash.). 
204  In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC , 921 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
205  Cf. GPNE Corp. v Apple Inc., No.: 12-CV-02885-LHK, US District Court of the Northern 
District of California, August 6, 2014, where GPNE’s expert relied largely on the 
essentiality of the GPNE’s patents to the standard for his analysis. The court dismissed 
the expert testimony as “an impermissible black box without sound economic and 
factual predicates.” 
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Finally, large patent portfolios of SEPs and non-SEPs increase complexity and the 
difficulties to handle FRAND cases. Here, the plaintiff usually puts forward a small 
subset of their patents, and it is practically impossible to fight on the 
validity/infringement of each of them, all the more so as the plaintiff could then 
open another case with the next subset of claimed SEPs. As a consequence, 
courts have to adapt and eventually use FRAND determination methodologies that 
take into account the entire portfolio, possibly with some guess-weighting of the 
patents. 
 
c) Define the upper boundaries of the royalty range for the patented 
technology 
Once the relative technical contribution of the patented technology to the 
standard has been defined, we can assess the proportionality of the (incremental) 
value added by the technology to the sales of a specific product that implements 
the standard. We can only observe sales of products implementing the entire 
standard, often including multiple patented features. In other words, we use the 
sales-based value of the entire standard in order to apportion this value to the 
distinguished technical contribution of the specific patented feature to the 
downstream product, as defined in the previous steps. Market prices of standard-
compliant products or operational margins of standard implementers encompass 
the value of the patented technology that is (hypothetically) under FRAND 
negotiation and eligible to FRAND royalty. The challenge hereby is to correctly 
disentangle this value from other features and standardization benefits driving 
the full market value reflected in the price of the end product. 
Apportioning the value of the end product to the value of a specific patented 
feature in clear distinction from all the other patented and unpatented features 
and non-infringed in the standard is an exercise similar to claim construction 
during the examination of patent validity. 206  In the case of multicomponent 
products, apportioning value to a standard-essential component should also take 
into account its relative value in comparison to other technical contributions 
embedded in the end product. Observable facts such the strength of the patent 
(citations, litigation score, validity scope across multiple jurisdictions), other 
enforcement aspects, portfolio integration/packaged licensing, market 
transactions etc. can inform and facilitate the apportionment process. Based on 
the accuracy of pricing data, some scholars suggest multiple patents reading on a 
standard should be valued in proportion to their marginal contribution (“ex post 
Shapley pricing”). Approaching the incremental value of the patented technology 
with awareness of all relevant information that is revealed ex post, including the 
fact that the patent was incorporated into the standard, it is suggested that, 
although the patentee cannot capture more than the patent’s incremental 
contribution to the value of the standard, the patentee should also be able to 
capture some portion of the invention’s increase in value attributable to network 
effects, as revealed ex post (Siebrasse & Cotter, 2016). 
 
d) Define the lower boundaries of the royalty range for the patented 
technology 
While the value added by the patented feature to the value of the standard-
compliant products and the implementers’ profits define the upper boundary of 
the royalty range, the lower range is defined by the patent’s intrinsic value and 
best alternative uses of the patents outside the standard. This lower boundary 
                                           
206  Cf. Ericsson v D-Link, 773 F.3d 1201 at 1232; GPNE Corp. v Apple Inc., ND of Cal. San 
Jose (August 6, 2014). 
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defines the patent owner’s threat point, or his best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement, in the hypothetical negotiation. In particular, the patent owner’s 
willingness to accept a negotiated agreement is bound by the revenue the 
patentee would have been able to make with the patent by refusing the 
hypothetical agreement. If a patent is truly essential, i.e., the infringer would 
have used the patented technology also if was not specified by the standard, the 
patent owner would have legitimately refused any hypothetical agreement that 
places strong restrictions on the royalty rate. 
 
4.1.2.3.  Non-discrimination 
The ex ante auction model is designed to curb the potential for ex post 
opportunism such as patent hold-up. The FRAND commitment however also 
comprises the prohibition of discriminatory licensing terms. The non-
discrimination part of the commitment does not entail a mandate to charge every 
user of the standard the same royalty (Crane, 2008). Swanson & Baumol (2005) 
and Layne-Farrar et al. (2007) rather argue that the role of the non-
discrimination obligation is to prevent exclusionary conduct by a vertically 
integrated patent owner. They suggest testing compliance with this obligation by 
reference to the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR). This rule mandates that 
the patent owner charges firms competing with him the same price it charges its 
own affiliates or the price it implicitly charges itself for the same use of the 
technology. The rule however allows that different users making different use of 
the same standard are charged different royalties. 
Equal treatment thus does not necessarily mean equal royalty. The justification of 
license differentials should take into account the implementation of the same 
standards in a downstream product, while controlling for possible opportunistic 
behavior based on the ex post value of created by the standard implementer. 
Georgia-Pacific factor no. 4, i.e., the licensor’s established policy and marketing 
program to maintain his patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the 
invention or by granting licenses under special conditions designed to preserve 
that monopoly, is relevant in this regard. 
 
4.1.3.  Consistency of the concepts: a unified framework 
Next, we will analyze the consistency between different concepts used to define 
FRAND royalty rates.  
 
Step 1: The bargaining range 
It is useful to begin this analysis with the bargaining range of a hypothetical ex 
ante negotiation. For now, we will assume that the ex ante negotiation takes 
place after the cost of R&D is sunk. 
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Figure 2: the bargaining range of the hypothetical negotiation 
 
 
 
The bargaining range is defined by the willingness to pay of the implementer and 
the willingness to accept of the patent holder. The willingness to pay of the 
implementer is necessarily higher than the willingness to accept of the patent 
holder (otherwise the bargaining range is empty, and there is no price to which 
both the implementer and patent holder would have agreed). 
 
Step 2: Incremental value and stand-alone value of the patent 
The willingness to pay of the implementer is equal to the incremental profit of the 
implementer from using the patented feature, or the incremental value added by 
the patented feature to the implementer’s profits. The implementer would have 
been willing to pay at most as much as the patented feature adds to his profits. 
This incremental profit can be defined as the difference between the profit made 
by the implementer using the patented feature and the highest profit the 
implementer could have achieved when not using the patented feature.  
The incremental value added by the patent to the implementer’s profits is related, 
though not necessarily equal, to the incremental value added by the patented 
feature to the value of the infringing product. The contribution of the patented 
feature to the value of the infringing product may be higher than the contribution 
of the patented feature to the profit of the infringer (e.g., because of the higher 
cost of producing the good with the patented feature, or because parts of the 
incremental value are appropriated by consumers or other firms in the value 
chain), or it may be lower (e.g., if the patented feature generates additional 
sales; i.e., if the inclusion of the feature shifts not only the price, but also the 
quantity of the infringing product). The willingness to accept of the patent holder 
corresponds to the highest possible profit the patent holder could have made by 
refusing to grant the license. In the FRAND context, this is only possible if the 
patent holder refuses to make the patent available for inclusion into the standard. 
The willingness to accept of the patent holder in the hypothetical ex ante 
negotiation is thus determined by the stand-alone value of the patent.207 
 
 
 
                                           
207 This interpretation, which ties the intrinsic or stand-alone value of the SEP to the lower 
bound of the royalty range, was explicitly discussed and recognized in Microsoft v 
Motorola: “The lower bound of RAND will logically be constrained by the value of the 
SEP owner's portfolio.”, so Judge Robart in Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc., Order of 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, April 25, 2013, No. 10-cv-1823 at para 626 
(W.D. Wash.). 
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Figure 3: Intrinsic and incremental value of the patent 
 
 
 
Step 3: Incentive-compatibility 
The next step analyzes the compatibility of the FRAND rate with incentives to 
innovate and incentives to adopt. We call a FRAND rate incentive-compatible if 
the rate is such that all investments that were made would also have been made 
if the parties had known the FRAND rate in advance. In other words, an incentive-
compatible FRAND rate is such that it preserves both the patent holder’s 
incentives to innovate and make available his patented technology for inclusion 
into the standard, and the adopter’s incentives to implement the standard without 
unnecessary delay. 
If the royalty does not exceed the willingness-to-pay of the implementer in the 
hypothetical ex ante negotiation, it preserves his incentives to adopt the 
standard. The willingness-to-pay of the implementer is by definition the maximum 
rate the implementer would be willing to pay to have access to the patented 
feature, i.e., the rate at which the implementer is indifferent between adopting 
the standard without the patented feature, and adopting the standard including 
the patented feature and subject to an obligation to pay a FRAND royalty to the 
patent owner. Any rate exceeding this threshold reduces the adopter’s incentives 
to implement the standard compared to the scenario in which the patented 
feature does not exist.  
If the royalty exceeds the willingness-to-accept of the patent holder, it preserves 
his incentives to contribute his patented technology to the standard. The 
willingness-to-accept of the patent holder is by definition the lowest rate that the 
patent holder would accept in order to make his patent available for inclusion into 
the standard, i.e., the rate at which he is indifferent between making the patent 
available for inclusion into the standard subject to a FRAND obligation, and 
keeping his patent outside of the standard and subject to no FRAND obligation.  
The boundaries to the range of incentive-compatible rates are thus directly 
equivalent to the boundaries of the bargaining range in the hypothetical 
negotiation. This is not the case for the incentives to produce the patented 
feature in the first place, i.e., the incentives to innovate as opposed to the 
incentives to contribute the existing feature to the standard.  
In order to preserve the incentives to innovate, the royalty needs to exceed the 
cost of R&D (adjusted for risk etc.). There are three different constellations. First, 
the cost of R&D may exceed the willingness-to-pay of the implementer. In this 
case, the benefit of including the patented feature into the standard does not 
justify the cost of its development; and the FRAND royalty rate should not cover 
the entire R&D cost. The willingness to pay of the implementer is the ceiling for a 
FRAND royalty, and it is the highest royalty rate compatible with economically 
efficient incentives. Second, the cost of R&D may be inferior to the stand-alone 
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value of the patent. In this case, the patent would have been produced 
independently of the standard; and the royalty rate only needs to preserve the 
incentives of the patent holder to contribute the patented feature to the standard.  
There is a problematic third case, in which the cost of the R&D is within the 
bargaining range of the hypothetical negotiation. In this case, the patented 
feature would not have been produced independently of the standard, and the 
stand-alone value of the patent is not enough to compensate the patent holder 
for R&D; but the patented feature within the standard adds sufficient value to the 
product to justify the cost of R&D. A socially efficient royalty rate needs to be set 
high enough to compensate for the cost of developing such a feature. The royalty 
rate must at least correspond to the cost of R&D to be socially efficient. 
The lower end of the efficient royalty range is thus the stand-alone value of the 
patent or the cost of R&D -whichever is higher. This is also the willingness to 
accept of the patent holder in a hypothetical ex ante negotiation taking place 
before any standard-specific sunk investments are incurred, including the 
investment into standard-specific R&D. 
 
Figure 4: incentive-compatible royalty rates 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: Account for hold-up and royalty stacking 
The notion of hold-up is intrinsically related to irreversible sunk investments. By 
definition of hold-up, a royalty, which is determined before any sunk investments 
are incurred, is not subject to any hold-up. The willingness to pay of the 
implementer in the hypothetical ex ante negotiation is thus the value of the 
patent to the implementer excluding any hold-up value. The willingness to accept 
of the patent holder in the hypothetical ex ante negotiation before any standard-
specific R&D costs are incurred determines the ex ante value of the patent to the 
patent holder, unaffected by any discount for reverse hold-up.  
Finally, the efficient royalty range is subject to royalty stacking considerations. 
Not any value in the efficient royalty range is compatible with royalty stacking 
considerations. If a product includes multiple complementary features, the sum of 
the incremental values added by each of the different features exceeds the value 
of the product. Remunerating each feature by the entire added value to the 
product thus results in an excessive total royalty burden. While the R&D cost 
places a lower bound to the efficient FRAND range which may be higher than the 
stand-alone value of the patent, royalty stacking places an upper bound which 
may be lower than the incremental value added by the patent to the product. 
There is not one single accepted method of adjusting the notion of incremental 
value to a situation with multiple complementary components. Several scholars 
have endorsed the use of the Shapley value, a concept from cooperative game 
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theory, which allocates to each component its intrinsic value, and distributes the 
remainder of the value of the end product (the combination value) over 
components proportionally to their relative contributions. While this value is 
intended to represent a “fair” distribution of surplus, it is not guaranteed to be 
economically efficient (e.g., it does not guarantee that each component is 
sufficiently remunerated to justify the cost of its development). Establishing an 
economically efficient and legally sound method for sharing the surplus created 
by combining complementary inputs is still an open avenue for economic and 
legal research. An efficient FRAND royalty must thus fall somewhere in the range 
between the stand-alone value of the patent and the incremental value added to 
the standard, but both the stand-alone value and the value added to the standard 
can fall outside the FRAND range. 
 
Figure 5: The FRAND range 
 
 
 
To summarize, we have combined the overarching principles of the FRAND 
analysis into a unified analytical framework. The boundaries of the bargaining 
range of the hypothetical negotiation are intrinsically related to the 
complementary notions of ex ante value of the patent: the intrinsic, or stand-
alone value of the patent, defines the patent owner’s willingness to accept (and 
thus the lower bound of the range), while the value added by including the 
patented feature defines the implementer’s willingness to pay (the upper bound). 
The bargaining range must be adjusted if the stand-alone value of the patent is 
insufficient to justify the cost of the patented feature’s development, or if the 
standard includes multiple complementary inputs and the incremental value 
added by the feature’s inclusion includes a combination value which must be 
distributed over the standard’s different components. 
 
4.1.4.  Implementation 
4.1.4.1.  Evidentiary standards 
Admittedly, patent valuation is not an exact science. Achieving a high degree of 
approximation in the calculation of FRAND and coming up with a real value has 
proven to be a tough challenge for the trial court in view of insufficient evidence 
or limited access to historic, standard-related and price data – even when 
available, the latter are tied to entire technologies and multicomponent end-
products that already embed or have tested the specific standard in the market. 
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While the Federal Circuit allows for “some approximation” in the reasonable 
royalty context, this however “does not negate the Federal Circuit's requirement 
of ‘sound economic and factual predicates’ for that analysis.”208  
Frameworks of evidentiary value such as the Georgia-Pacific factors are conceived 
as a comprehensive list of fact-based requirements that guide damage experts 
and the trial court through the soundness and probative value of the expert’s 
methodology and submissions. Irrespective of the particularities of the various 
jurisdictions in Europe, the US and elsewhere, a high standard of proof is the 
appropriate standard for the evaluation of data-based evidence and multiple 
variables/calculations that play into the definition of FRAND royalties, ensuring 
that the latter are economically sound and factually consistent beyond bias 
(especially in jury trials) and untenable ambiguity.  
We have developed a framework for FRAND royalty analysis. We have shown that 
our framework does not specify a single rate, but a range of rates. In particular, 
we have argued that there is no accepted economic methodology that could be 
used to single out a rate in this range as the unique FRAND rate. Nevertheless, it 
is possible to define the boundaries of a FRAND range, thus specifying whether a 
particular rate is a FRAND rate (though not necessarily the only FRAND rate). 
Determining whether a particular rate is FRAND based on this framework is 
necessarily supported by expert analysis and market data whose probative value 
will be assessed by the court.  
The evolving SEP landscape, the emergence of economic theories and the 
increasing value of data-driven evidence in patent disputes pose significant 
challenges to the trial court during patent litigation, both on a substantive and 
procedural level. Significant procedural differences across the various jurisdictions 
in Europe and the US will remain – jury trial, cross examination, bifurcation, 
legally and technically qualified court panels, to name a few. It should, however, 
be put into consideration whether the threshold imposed by the applicable legal 
standard for the evaluation of the complex facts in an SEP case is high or 
adequate enough to ensure that looking into the “blackbox” of available data and 
the theoretical constructs of various methodologies translates into sound 
economic and factual predicates. 
There are generally two data sources that provide information to calculate a 
royalty for a specific case: product market prices and the prices of comparable 
licenses. Product market prices include the prices for the infringing end products, 
or the prices of smaller components. 
The use of these available data to infer a FRAND royalty rate is subject to a 
significant challenge: as we have seen, the determination of a FRAND rate is the 
outcome of an informed ex ante analysis. The only available data – both the price 
of products (end products or components) and the price of comparable licensees 
– is however determined ex post, i.e., these prices are set after the standard is 
set. This is not to say that ex post realities and practices should infiltrate the ex 
ante considerations, rendering the FRAND limitations irrelevant; rather it signifies 
that ex post available information offers significant pointers, benchmark values 
and practical references for discount and comparative purposes as part of the 
procedural and fact-finding “realities” imposed by litigation and the well-
established evidentiary rules in the respective jurisdictions.  
                                           
208  So Judge Rader in Cornell Univ. v Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 01-cv-1974, 2008 WL 
2222189, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 27, 2008).  
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4.1.4.2.  Product market prices – choice of royalty base 
An important source of empirical information about the ex ante value of a specific 
SEP for a specific standard-compliant product are product market prices. This 
includes the price of the product itself and the price of its patent-practicing 
components. The choice of using end product or component prices is called the 
choice of the royalty base. 
When using product market prices to identify the FRAND range, it is important to 
highlight that product market prices can only provide information on the right 
side of the range: product prices can provide information on the value that a 
patented feature adds to a product (or component), and can thus reveal the 
willingness-to-pay of the end product maker for the patented feature. Product 
market prices (end product or component) do not provide any information on the 
willingness-to-accept of the patent holder, which is a function of alternative 
standards or other uses that were available to the patent holder instead of 
making available the patent for the standard. The price of standard-compliant 
products does not provide information on R&D costs or the hypothetical value of 
alternative technologies, unrelated to the standard. Product market prices (end 
product or component) can thus only reveal the upper bound of the reasonable 
royalty range: they can indicate the value that the patented feature adds to a 
product; a royalty exceeding this value is not a reasonable royalty.  
Disputes regarding the choice of the appropriate base for calculating reasonable 
royalties have proven to be pivotal in many cases of litigation on FRAND royalty 
rates. SEP infringement cases usually involve multi-component products; thus 
raising the issue of apportioning the value of the end product to its different 
components. In these cases, courts can exercise considerable discretion in the 
calculation of reasonable royalties. In particular, reasonable royalties can be 
calculated either as a small fraction of the value of the entire product, or as a 
larger fraction of a smaller base, i.e., a component of the complex product; or as 
a combination of both approaches.209 Given their latitude in the choice of a base, 
courts have come up with very different results.  
In Section 3.3.2., we have discussed two important concepts that guide the 
choice of an appropriate royalty base in the US case law: the Entire Market Value 
Rule (EMVR) and the concept of the Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Unit 
(SSPPU). The EMVR establishes that when a patented feature does not drive the 
entire demand for an end product, the value of the end product must be 
apportioned to the patented feature. The SSPPU is an evidentiary rule developed 
much more recently by the Federal Circuit, which often requires patent owners to 
carry out this apportionment by choosing as a royalty base the price of the 
smallest product component, which directly implements the patented invention. 
While EMVR and SSPPU are concepts emanating from US case law, the new IEEE 
SA policy closely follows the idea of the SSPPU and holds that FRAND royalty 
rates should be assessed by reference to the price of the smallest saleable 
standard-compliant product. This policy will apply to SEP owners and 
implementers of IEEE standards anywhere in the world, underlining the necessity 
of analyzing the usefulness of the concepts of EMVR and SSPPU for determining a 
FRAND royalty rate. 
In this section, we will discuss the overarching legal and economic principles that 
determine whether a specific end product or component price is an appropriate 
royalty base for the purpose of FRAND calculation. We argue that it is necessary 
to move beyond the concepts of EMVR and SSPPU. There is considerable 
controversy regarding the role of these tests. In particular, EMVR and SSPPU are 
often erroneously understood as describing two alternative royalty bases (the end 
                                           
209  Ericsson v D- Link, 773 F.3d 1201 at 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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product and a component price). Framing the analysis of the royalty base as a 
choice between end product and SSPPU is misleading and not particularly useful. 
First, the end product and the SSPPU are often not the only existing alternative 
bases. Second, the SSPPU often itself comprises various features, so that using 
the SSPPU as a royalty base is insufficient to implement the apportionment 
required by the EMVR. Third, using the SSPPU as the royalty base may 
undervalue the specific technology (Stark, 2015). Ultimately, the value of an 
invention lies in the idea itself, and the benefit that idea imparts not to a 
particular chip or component, but rather to the ultimate user of the final product. 
More generally, EMVR and SSPPU should not be understood as describing two 
alternative bases at all; rather, they represent two separate, orthogonal tests.  
The EMVR analyzes the role of the patented feature for the demand for the end 
product, whereas the SSPPU analyzes the existence of a separate market for any 
smaller component practicing the patent. These tests are totally orthogonal to 
each other, and therefore are neither mutually exclusive, nor do they 
exhaustively describe the set of available bases. The choice of the royalty base is 
not limited to a choice between two bases, nor is the application of the EMVR and 
the SSPPU sufficient to identify the most appropriate base. 
Our approach to the analysis of a royalty base for FRAND determination 
encompasses a four-step methodology. The proper application of the EMVR and 
the identification of the SSPPU are an important but insufficient first step, leaving 
a substantial margin for choosing different royalty bases. This renders the 
application of the other three steps pivotal in our effort to narrow down the choice 
of an adequate royalty base. In detail, we suggest to examine each royalty base 
(price of the end product or any smaller component) using the following four 
criteria: 
 
a) Examine whether the suggested base (end product or component) 
satisfies the EMVR. Examine whether the suggested base (end product or 
component) is the SSPPU. 
EMVR and SSPPU, if properly understood, are useful, because they both define 
the lower bounds, i.e., the smallest component that provides a market price 
signal, which can probably be used as a base.  
If the end product (or compound component) satisfies the EMVR, the patented 
feature really accounts for the entire value of the product or component; there is 
no need to do any apportionment, and the rest of the analysis does not apply. If 
the product or component does not satisfy the EMVR, the patentee must 
apportion the value to the patented feature, “by careful selection of the royalty 
base to reflect the value added by the patented feature, where that differentiation 
is possible; by adjustment of the royalty rate so as to discount the value of a 
product’s non-patented features; or by a combination thereof.”210 
If the patented technology is the SSPPU, it is impossible to use the price of a 
smaller component as a royalty base. This does not dispense the patentee from 
apportioning the value of the SSPPU to the patented and non-patented features 
by lowering the rate, but the SSPPU is the smallest unit providing any information 
on market prices that could be used to calculate the value of the patented 
technology. The SSPPU is the lower bound of the range of component prices 
providing meaningful market information on the value of the patented feature. 
Apportionment beyond the value of the SSPPU must rely on non-market based 
information, such as consumer surveys (through conjoint analysis). 
                                           
210  Ericsson Inc. v D-Link Sys. Inc., 773 F.3d 1201 at 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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In this understanding, EMVR and SSPPU still have a role, but they don’t rule out 
bases that satisfy neither the EMVR nor the SSPPU, and they don’t give any 
priority to a base only because it satisfies either the EMVR or SSPPU. Showing 
that a base is larger than a base satisfying either the EMVR or SSPPU should not 
preclude reference to the larger base. That a patented feature fully accounts for 
the value of a component does not mean that the value of the component fully 
accounts for the value of the patented feature. Similarly, showing that a 
component is the smallest patent-practicing component that is independently 
traded does not do anything to prove that the price of the component measures 
the full value that the patented feature adds to the infringing product. EMVR and 
SSPPU define two lower bounds to the range of possible royalty bases, and can 
only constitute a first step in the analysis. 
Overall, EMVR and SSPPU provide little guidance as to how the courts should 
assess whether a particular price or price difference is an adequate base for 
measuring the incremental contribution of a patented technology to the value of a 
good. This brings us to the next three steps. 
 
b) Examine whether the price of the chosen base accounts for the value of 
the technology. 
This is the informativeness requirement. If not met, the base simply does not 
account for the value of the technology. There is then no need to pursue the 
analysis any further, because no methodology can take you to a reasonable 
royalty starting from a price that does not account for the value of the 
technology. 
The price of a component smaller than the end product is informative only if the 
price of the component reflects the cost of accessing the technology, or the 
component maker has substantial market power.211 In particular, the price that 
the infringer has paid for the infringing component is an informative royalty base 
only in particular circumstances. This is only the case if the component is 
produced with market power, and production costs and the value of other 
features of the product are negligible. These are very restrictive conditions that 
are not likely to be met in many SEP cases.  
The price of a non-infringing component is a very good indicator for the value of 
the technology, because it is determined after incorporating the cost of accessing 
the technology. Furthermore, it is a good indication of the royalty that an 
infringing end product maker (that has used an infringing component instead of 
the available non-infringing component) should pay. Indeed, the end product 
maker could have lawfully accessed the patented technology by purchasing the 
non-infringing component. The price difference between the infringing component 
and the non-infringing alternative would thus be a good basis for estimating the 
value of the patented feature. There are only few examples where courts were 
able to identify prices of non-infringing components. In LaserDynamics v. Quanta 
Computer, the court considered the price of the infringing component as well as 
the price of a replacement batch sold by a licensed manufacturer. The substantial 
price difference between the licensed and unlicensed components accounts for the 
value of the technology, and would be a good indication for the amount the 
infringer would have agreed to pay in a hypothetical licensing negotiation.212  
                                           
211  Note that this discussion is not restricted to the smallest saleable component, but 
applies to any component smaller than the entire product. 
212  Even though the district court considered the price of the non-infringing replacement 
batch, and the Federal Circuit did not challenge the use of this price as one reference 
point, unfortunately neither court explicitly recognized that it was the fact that the 
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The price of an unlicensed component does not necessarily account for the value 
of the technology (Baron, 2016). If the component manufacturer has substantial 
market power, the price he charges the end product maker for the component is 
an indication of the end product maker’s willingness to pay for access to the 
patented feature embedded in the component. A firm with market power can set 
a price that reflects the value of the product. If the component manufacturing 
industry is sufficiently competitive, the price of the component reflects nothing 
else than the marginal cost of producing the component. If in addition the 
component maker is not licensed to the patent, there is no reason to expect the 
cost of producing the component to reflect the incremental value of the 
technology. In the case of computer chips, “basing a royalty solely on chip price is 
like valuing a copyrighted book based only on the costs of the binding, paper, and 
ink needed to actually produce the physical product. While such a calculation 
captures the cost of the physical product, it provides no indication of its actual 
value.”213  
The price of the end product always accounts for the value of the end product and 
all of its features. While it is true that competition between unlicensed end 
product manufacturers drives down end product prices as well, and a part of the 
value of the end product is captured by the consumer surplus, the price of the 
end product accounts for the share of the value of the product, which is captured 
by the end product maker. This share constitutes the basis of the end product 
maker’s willingness-to-pay in a hypothetical negotiation. The manufacturer would 
not have been willing to pay more for a licensed use of the patent than the 
incremental profit he could make from the use of the patent in the industry. If 
this level of profits is deflated by strong competition and widespread patent 
infringement by competing end product makers, the reasonable royalty must be 
reduced accordingly.  
 
 
The royalty base: an applied economic model214 
The ex ante negotiation benchmark can be used to define an upper bound to a 
reasonable royalty. We therefore must compare the factual, observable profit 
made by the infringer with the counterfactual profit that he would have made 
without using the technology. 
We can write the infringer’s profit as: 
𝜋𝐼 = 𝑞(𝑝 − 𝑝𝑐 − 𝑐) 
Where 𝑞 is the quantity of sold end products, 𝑝 is the observable end product 
price, 𝑝𝑐 is the price of the component implementing the patented feature (paid 
by the end product maker to a component supplier), and 𝑐 is the end-product 
maker’s per-unit cost (we assume that cost is independent of the use of the 
technology, i.e., the incremental cost of producing the product with the patented 
feature is fully captured by 𝑝𝑐).  
We can compare this profit to the non-infringement profit, i.e., the profit that the 
same end product maker would have made had he not used the technology 
𝜋𝑁𝐼 = ?̂?(?̂? − 𝑐) 
                                                                                                                         
component was licensed that made it a valid reference point; LaserDynamics, Inc. v 
Quanta Computer Inc., 694 F. 3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
213  See the district court decision, CSIRO v Cisco, 2014 WL 3805817 at *11. 
214  This is an excerpt from Baron, The appropriate royalty base for calculating reasonable 
royalty rates. An economist’s perspective. Working paper, 2016 (forthcoming). 
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Where ?̂? is the counterfactual quantity of products that he would have sold if the 
products did not implement the patented feature, and ?̂?  is the counterfactual 
price of this product. We assume 0 ≤ ?̂? < 𝑞  and 𝑐 ≤ ?̂? < 𝑝  (the patented feature 
adds value to the product, and the end product maker would make a non-
negative profit even without using the patented feature). His profit from using the 
technology can then simply be written as 
𝜋𝐼 −  𝜋𝑁𝐼  = 𝑞(𝑝 − 𝑝𝑐 − 𝑐) −  ?̂?(?̂? − 𝑐) 
Dividing by q gives the maximum per unit royalty rate compatible with a royalty 
the infringer would have agreed to pay in a hypothetical ex ante negotiation 
?̇? = 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑐 −
?̂?
𝑞
?̂? − (1 −
?̂?
𝑞
) 𝑐 
A reasonable royalty requiring less information can however be defined as the 
difference between the observable price of the infringing end product and the 
counterfactual price of the same product if it did not incorporate the patented 
feature, minus the price of the component implementing the patented feature. 
𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 ≡ 𝑝 − ?̂? − 𝑝𝑐 
This is a reasonable royalty, because it is always lower than the maximum 
amount that the infringing end product maker would have agreed to pay in the 
hypothetical ex ante licensing negotiation: 
?̇? − 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  = 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑐 −
?̂?
𝑞
?̂? − (1 −
?̂?
𝑞
) 𝑐 − 𝑝 + ?̂? + 𝑝𝑐   
 = (1 −
?̂?
𝑞
) (?̂? − 𝑐)  
This is always bigger than 0 (
?̂?
𝑞
 is between 0 and 1, and ?̂? − 𝑐 ≥ 0). 
The difference between the end product price and the price of the same product 
not including the patented feature, minus the cost of implementing the patented 
features, thus constitutes a reasonable royalty, provided that the counterfactual 
price of the product without the patented feature can be properly identified.  
The price of the infringing component does not always provide an appropriate 
base for calculating the reasonable royalty. A royalty based on a component price 
can be excessive even if the only function of the component is to implement the 
patented feature. We define 𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 as a royalty based on the component price 
paid by the infringer: 
𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 ≡ 𝑝𝑐 
?̇? − 𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡  = 𝑝 − 2𝑝𝑐 −
?̂?
𝑞
?̂? − (1 −
?̂?
𝑞
) 𝑐 
We know that −
?̂?
𝑞
?̂? − (1 −
?̂?
𝑞
) 𝑐 < 0. Hence, for a sufficiently large component price, 
and in particular for 𝑝𝑐 ≥
1
2
𝑝, 𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 cannot be a reasonable royalty. The simple 
reason is that the price of the component is a cost to the end product maker. 
Basing the royalty payment on the price of the component is asking him to pay 
once again the price that he has already paid for the patented feature, instead of 
asking him to pay what he hasn’t paid yet.  
 
 
While the price of the end product always accounts for the value of the patented 
feature, this does not mean that it is always possible to identify this value from 
the price of the end product. 
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c) If this is the case, examine whether a method exists to reliably isolate 
and identify the value from this price.  
Once the informativeness principle is satisfied, the selected royalty base must 
also satisfy a practicability requirement which states that it must be possible to 
separately identify this value based on the chosen price.  
When inferring the incremental value of the technology from the price of the end 
product, retrieving information on incremental profits can be assessed by 
considering demand for products with patented features and contrasting that 
demand with demand for the same product without the patented features (see, 
Allenby et al., 2014). This is an identification problem, and more complicated 
than a mere factual price comparison of different products. The latter is a source 
of error for two reasons. First, prices in a market are jointly determined. The 
existence of the product including the patented feature can (and often does) 
deflate the price of other products that may be used for comparison. Absent the 
infringement, the other goods would be sold at a higher price. Second, firms often 
choose to include the most advanced patented features in their most expensive 
goods. This may result in an endogeneity problem: the infringing good may be 
more expensive than other goods for reasons totally unrelated to the patented 
feature. It is the fact that the good is more expensive that explains why it 
includes the patented feature, not the use of the patented feature that explains 
the price difference. 
Another common situation also represents a fundamental challenge to 
identification. If an end product maker has a substantial brand value, differences 
between the prices of products sold by the same firm typically overstate the value 
of the incremental features of the more expensive good. The price of the more 
expensive good reflects the willingness to pay of consumers with a higher 
valuation of the brand, whereas the price of the less expensive good reflects the 
willingness to pay of consumers with a lower valuation of the brand. The price 
difference between the two products thus includes not only the value of the 
incremental features, but also a share of the brand value.  
The risk of measurement errors resulting from the use of end product prices 
furthermore scales up if a patented feature only drives a very small share of the 
value of the end product, or is implemented in a “component of a component of a 
component”. While the informativeness requirement places no bound on the 
number of layers between the SSPPU and the appropriate base, for reasons of 
practicability it is therefore advisable to keep this number as low as possible. 
Inferring the incremental value of the technology from the price of a component 
smaller than the end product equally reveals some bottom-up identification 
challenges. As stated above, a particularly appropriate royalty base is the price of 
a non-infringing component observed in a different, comparable transaction. The 
price difference between an infringing and a non-infringing component is a 
satisfactory royalty base, because the end product maker could have avoided the 
need to obtain a license by using a non-infringing component. Nevertheless, it 
must be kept in mind that the real test is once again a counterfactual 
observation. The true comparison price must be the price that the end product 
maker would have paid if he had had to purchase a non-infringing component. 
This may be more or less than what was charged to other end good makers 
buying non-infringing components (the accused infringer may have had to pay 
more if he makes more valuable end goods, or less if he has more bargaining 
power). Also, the existence of the infringing component drives down the prices 
that can be charged for the non-infringing components. 
There may be many industries in which there are no suitable price observations of 
non-infringing components, because the patent or similar patents are not 
commonly licensed to this specific component manufacturing industry. In these 
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cases, the price of a component is unlikely to even include the value of the 
technology, so that there is no methodology that could adequately measure the 
value of the technology on this base. 
The identification challenges may be overcome using consumer surveys, in 
particular through conjoint analysis. In order to analyze the consumers’ 
willingness to pay for a patented feature, the US courts have increasingly relied 
on consumer surveys to measure the value of a patented feature in damage 
calculations.215  
 
d) Assess whether the reference to the base nevertheless invites for 
confusion and may mislead the jury in its decision.  
If a base carries information on the value of the technology, and it is practically 
possible to identify and isolate that value from other factors contributing to the 
price of that base, it is also necessary to make sure that the reference to the base 
does not induce a cognitive bias. This last requirement relates to the psychology 
of courts and juries, and states that care must be taken not to mislead the jury 
about the value of the technology by establishing a reference to the value of a 
base. 
If the purpose of citing the final good price is to make the damage award look 
small in comparison, reference to the end good price is prohibited under an 
evidentiary rule clearly laid out by the Federal Circuit. At its core, the purpose of 
this evidentiary rule is to ban frivolous references to the value of the non-
infringing features of the good that purposefully mislead the jury. When the 
reference to the end product price does not fall under the evidentiary rule, 
because the choice of the end product price as a base is motivated by factual 
evidence, a very large base still has the potential to “skew the damages horizon”. 
Juries may be disinclined on grounds of “fairness” to grant very low rates: “The 
disclosure that a company has made $19 billion dollars in revenue from an 
infringing product cannot help but skew the damages horizon for the jury, 
regardless of the contribution of the patented component to this revenue.”216 
Symmetrically however, an appropriate compensation may be a very large share 
of the price of a component implementing the patented feature (and not 
restricted to values below 100%, as we have seen). Juries may also be disinclined 
on grounds of fairness to grant very high royalty rates, especially rates higher 
than 100%. The absence of bias requirement could apply in particular if several 
calculation methods pass the other tests, or if a royalty calculation can also be 
based upon additional reference points (such as comparable licenses). In these 
cases, it can be a judgment call whether adding another reference point may be 
helpful. If the additional reference point relies on a very small or very large base 
that requires either a very high or very low rate to yield a reasonable royalty, it 
may be a good idea not to allow this additional information to be presented as 
evidence. 
 
4.1.4.3.  Comparable licenses 
The other main source of empirical information that can be used to implement the 
FRAND framework in practice is the price of comparable licenses. Comparable 
licenses can reveal the likely outcome of a hypothetical ex ante negotiation. If a 
                                           
215  See, e.g., Summit 6, LLC v Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 802 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
216  Uniloc USA, Inc. and Uniloc Singapore Private Limited v Microsoft Corp., 632 F. 3d 
1295 at 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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license can be found that was concluded under conditions sufficiently similar to 
the conditions of the hypothetical ex ante negotiation, the outcome of the 
hypothetical ex ante negotiation can be expected to be similar to the outcome of 
this factual licensing negotiation. 
Comparable licenses reflect an agreement of similarly situated patent holders and 
implementers. Comparable licenses thus provide an indication of one rate within 
the bargaining range between the willingness to pay of implementers and the 
willingness to accept of patent holders. If a truly comparable license can be 
found, and the comparable license was concluded ex ante, the price of this license 
can be deemed to be a FRAND rate (even though there may be many other 
FRAND rates). 
Part of the evidentiary procedure is the assessment of both the technical and 
economic comparability of existing licenses and whether these are probative of 
the hypothetical negotiations or not (cf. also the threshold of the Georgia-Pacific 
factors no. 1 and 2). For instance, comparative licenses that involve the same 
parties, relevant technology, and are close in time to the date of the hypothetical 
negotiation have been deemed “sufficiently comparable”.217 On the premises that 
prior licenses are almost never perfectly analogous to the infringement action, 
i.e., allegedly comparable licenses may cover more patents, include cross-
licensing terms, cover foreign intellectual property rights, or be calculated as 
some percentage of the value of a multi-component product, adjustments for 
non-comparable licenses are deemed necessary: district courts performing 
reasonable royalty calculations are “cautioned [...] and must account for 
differences in the technologies and economic circumstances of the contracting 
parties.”218 In that spirit, where expert testimony explains to the jury the need to 
discount reliance on a given license to account only for the value attributed to the 
licensed technology, the mere fact that licenses predicated on the value of a 
multi-component product are referenced in that analysis is not reversible error.219 
With reference to existing licenses and related policies, the Georgia-Pacific factors 
1-3, 6 are relevant. Comparable licenses, patent pool rates, cross-licensing 
agreements present useful benchmarks. On the opposite end of licensing 
practices that are detrimental to implementers such as royalty stacking, the 
aggregate burden on the standard is or can be a practical parameter in top-down 
approaches to royalty determination: defining first a royalty rate for the entire 
standard, and then splitting it within a licensed portfolio is a means of preventing 
the risk of stacking too much royalty if per patent (or portfolio) royalty rates are 
determined one by one without consideration of the final effect at a 
more aggregate level. Further adjustments related to multi-component products 
and worldwide portfolio licensing burden the value apportionment with additional 
challenges, particularly in view of the ex post centrality of the standard in a multi-
component or packaged licensing; network externalities that impact de facto 
essentiality as a proportion to the downstream product and its correlation to the 
value of the patented technology (more valuable patents are more likely to be 
declared essential; declared but not judicially validated essentiality does not 
automatically increase the incremental value or drives the rate determination); 
combinatorial value of SEPs (complementarity v. substitutability, “fixed-
proportion” production of downstream products); portfolio bundles of SEPs with 
non-SEPs/ patented with unpatented features/ infringing with non-infringing 
components etc. The above complexities may result in a shift of the burden of 
proof towards SEP holders. In any case, a reasonable royalty should be based on 
                                           
217  See, e.g., SSL Services, LLC v Citrix Sys., Inc., Appeal No. 2013-1419, -1420 (Fed. Cir. 
October 14, 2014). 
218  VirnetX, Inc.v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 at 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
219  Ericsson v D- Link, 773 F.3d 1201 at 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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the disaggregated value of the patent(s) in suit and the demand attributable to 
the patented feature. 
The most significant challenge to the use of comparable licenses is that there are 
usually no licenses concluded ex ante, prior to standard setting, and courts use 
comparable licenses concluded ex post. These ex post negotiations take place 
after infringement has already taken place, and are thus conducted in the shadow 
of litigation. 
Setting the royalty calculation in the broader context of litigation involves 
considering to what extent assumptions of essentiality, validity and infringement 
may inform the royalty calculation; and to what extent existing licenses were the 
result of the (implicit, explicit or realized) threat of an injunctive relief. Court 
proceedings offer an independent venue for continuing the negotiations by other 
means – the courts interpretation of FRAND commitments impacts the ability of 
the SEP holder to impose a given rate or of the infringer to “hold-out”. The ex 
post context of litigation proceedings under the (realized) threat of filing a motion 
for prohibitive orders or pending validity/infringement proceedings with uncertain 
outcome allows insight into the specific dynamics of the case, e.g., it informs on 
the aspect of de-facto essentiality, strength of patent/patent-portfolio, litigation 
score, shifts in the bargaining power of the parties, evolving commercial 
relationship and opportunistic behavior, aggressive enforcement strategies etc.  
Observing these factors does not imply modelling FRAND negotiations according 
to ex post determinants, but it may help provide adjustments against potential 
fallacies inherent to the hypothetical negotiation construct while preserving the 
appropriate incentives to invent and participate in the standardization process. In 
practice, some European and US courts have examined essentiality, validity and 
infringement or at least taken into account the probabilities related to these 
outcomes. 
From an economic point of view, the use of comparable licenses concluded ex 
post, after beginning of the infringement, presents almost unresolvable 
complications. Comparable licenses are a good indication of the value of the 
patented feature if they signal the ex ante willingness to pay of an implementer 
to obtain access to the patented feature. If the license is negotiated ex post, after 
the implementer already incurred sunk implementation costs, the license may 
reflect more than this ex ante willingness to pay, and also include a hold-up 
value. This risk has led some commentators to reject licenses negotiated under 
threat of injunction as a comparable license, because these licenses may indeed 
reflect a hold-up value. 
On the other hand, if the license is negotiated ex post, and the alternative for the 
implementer to signing the license is continued infringement, the price of the 
license does not reflect the ex ante willingness to pay of the implementer for 
access to the patented feature, but only the willingness to pay to forego the 
available remedies for patent infringement. This induces a risk of perfect 
circularity. The willingness to pay of the implementers for licenses to patents that 
they already have used is determined by their incentive to forego litigation with a 
resulting damages award. The willingness to pay of implementers for SEP 
licenses, and hence the observable royalty rates, are thus a function of the 
expected damages awards. At the same time, damages are calculated as a 
function of prevailing royalty rates.  
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Figure 6: Circularity problem resulting from the use of comparable licenses 
 
 
This is a situation leading to multiple equilibria: if the parties of licensing 
negotiation expect that damages will be very large, patent holders will ask for and 
implementers will consent to higher royalty rates. As damages are calculated with 
respect to the negotiated royalty rates, damages are indeed large, so that the 
beliefs of the parties are correct. If, however, parties expected damages to be 
low, implementers will only consent to and patent holders will accept lower 
royalty rates, leading to lower damages awards. A large number of different rates 
could thus arbitrarily become the prevailing reasonable royalty rates; and there is 
no particular reason to expect that these royalty rates fall in the FRAND range. 
 
4.2.  INTERPRETING FRAND IN THE CONTEXT OF 
LITIGATION 
4.2.1.  Overview  
In Section 4.1., we established that the theoretical concepts underpinning the 
definition of FRAND do not determine a FRAND rate, but a range of rates that can 
be considered FRAND.220 In many instances, it is plausible that this range is very 
large. Furthermore, we have seen that implementing the FRAND framework 
requires complex hypothetical analyses, comparing factual outcomes to 
counterfactual states of the world in order to understand the ex ante competition 
between features and the bargaining position of the parties in a hypothetical ex 
ante negotiation. This implementation is necessarily based on strong assumptions 
and on limited empirical data, which can only provide information on some 
aspects of the FRAND range, but not shed light on the entire range. Finally, even 
if the entire FRAND range could be inferred from available empirical data, there is 
no accepted methodology for singling out a unique FRAND rate from this range. 
Given these significant limitations, some commentators do not come to terms 
with the vagueness of the FRAND commitments: “[…] Without some idea of what 
those terms are, reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing loses much of its 
meaning.” (Lemley, 2002); “From the perspective of a potential product vendor, 
the theoretical reasonable royalty rates suggested by most commentators thus 
seem no less indeterminate than the vague FRAND commitment that they seek to 
clarify.” (Contreras, 2013). 
                                           
220  By comparison, Contreras (2012) highlights that the term “reasonable” per se implies 
that there is not a single acceptable royalty rate in a given situation (industry, type of 
technology, firm scale, nature of transaction), but that royalties may span some range 
of “reasonable” values within the limitations imposed by FRAND commitments. 
 151 
The difficulties of determining a FRAND rate based on the accepted legal concepts 
and evidentiary methods do however not necessarily imply that the FRAND 
obligation lacks content. Contreras (2012) carves out a list of overarching 
principles that should underlie any FRAND solution:  
1) Certainty is preferable to uncertainty concerning the cost of implementing a 
technical standard. Greater certainty regarding the cost of implementing 
standards should be beneficial to those who are considering the design and 
eventual adoption of standards.  
2) There is a meaningful upper limit on reasonable royalty rates. There are some 
finite and objective limits on the level of royalties subject to a RAND commitment, 
definable by criteria other than the wishes of the patent holder. 
3) Information regarding RAND licensing terms should be available before 
adoption of a standard. Despite the various criticisms of ex ante disclosure 
policies as they are currently understood, general notions of efficiency and 
fairness still seem to tilt the balance toward a need for greater transparency of 
royalty rates and other terms for SEP licenses.  
4) Individual RAND commitments must be constrained by the aggregate royalty 
burden on a standard. Royalty stacking being a issue of magnitude rather than 
one of disclosure, it is critical that, in the context of technical standards, any 
assessment of the “reasonableness” of an individual patent holder’s royalty rate 
take into account the overall number of SEPs applicable to a standard and the 
aggregate royalty burden on the standard.  
5) Non-SEPs must not be bundled with SEPs. The so-called bilateralist argument 
that vendors almost always wish to license non-SEPs in addition to SEPs, thereby 
rendering RAND commitments irrelevant, is often contradicted by established 
practice in certain industries and could be answered by expanding the universe of 
SEPs to include commercially essential patents.  
6) SEPs should not be used to block implementation of a standard unless the 
recovery of monetary compensation is impossible. If a patent holder is found to 
have offered a royalty that is reasonable within the meaning of its RAND 
commitment and its actions for monetary damages have been unsuccessful or 
cannot be maintained due to legal or jurisdictional obstacles, then injunctive relief 
preventing the further manufacture and sale of the standardized product by the 
defaulting vendor would be appropriate. 
7) RAND commitments should travel with the patent. It is widely acknowledged 
that RAND commitments made by a patent holder with respect its SEPs should 
bind any subsequent holder of those SEPs 
Bearing these guideposts in mind, it is important to recognize that, although the 
licensing terms for SEPs are generally determined in bilateral negotiations, these 
negotiations take place in the shadow of litigation. Both the prospect of a 
judicially defined FRAND rate – typical for the US practice – as well as the threat 
of injunctions – mostly in the European context - have significant impact on the 
determination of FRAND licensing terms during bilateral negotiation. The following 
sections look into this aspect against the background of divergent approaches and 
evolving trends across the various jurisdictions. 
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4.2.2.  Enforcing the FRAND commitment 
4.2.2.1.  Third-party determination of FRAND rates 
In Section 4.1., the discussion of the FRAND framework renders clear that the 
determination of a FRAND rate for a specific dispute is costly and complicated. 
The significant cost of producing the evidence and analysis required to make an 
informed decision raises the question of the best allocation of resources devoted 
to this activity. Different mechanisms are available for this task, and in particular 
judicial adjudication, bilateral negotiations and arbitration. Each of these 
mechanisms has its relative advantages, and an effective mechanism for FRAND 
determination must most likely rest on some combination of these tools.  
Highlighting the effectiveness of bilateral licensing, Epstein et al. (2011) argue 
that the flexibility inherent to FRAND obligations is both beneficial and necessary, 
in that it enables parties to negotiate efficiently to differing outcomes based on 
their individual interests, priorities, and negotiating resources. Geradin (2014), 
for example, sees in the abstract – and thus flexible - notions of fairness and 
reasonableness strength rather than a weakness. He perceives the lack of 
precision of FRAND in the IPR policies of most SSOs as an intentional, desirable 
feature that allows contracts to be concluded in a context where it is not possible, 
or would be excessively costly, to address all future contingencies. 
Typically, the determination of a reasonable royalty lies in the discretion of the 
parties that negotiate the licensing terms of a standard-related technology. In 
case of an impasse in negotiations, though, the lack of mechanisms for dispute 
resolution within the SSO context - coupled with the lack of a clear methodology 
for the calculation of FRAND - has led to parties choosing court litigation as a last 
resort. Although some commentators point out the adverse effects of judicially 
defined royalties, which could seriously undermine the current set of well-
functioning private coordination activities in the IP marketplace, competition and 
consumer welfare (e.g., Epstein et al., 2011), most scholars see the role of courts 
in defining FRAND royalties in a positive light (e.g., Contreras, 2013; Layne-
Farrar & Wong-Ervin, 2014). Or, as Judge Davis of the US Federal Circuit pointed 
out in Ericsson v. D-Link: “The paradox of RAND licensing is that it requires a 
patent holder to offer licenses on reasonable terms, but it offers no guidance over 
what is reasonable […] This creates a situation that is ripe for judicial 
resolution.”221 
In addition to bilateral negotiations and judicial adjudication, many observers 
believe that arbitration is a promising middle way, and proposals to strengthen 
the role of arbitration have gained increasing attention. Lemley and Shapiro 
(2013) argue that FRAND licensing terms should systematically be determined 
through arbitration. Under their proposed policy, the SEP owner is only entitled to 
enforce his patent through litigation if a standard implementer is unwilling to 
enter into binding arbitration. The authors favor final-offer arbitration. This 
system, in which the arbitrator can only choose between two offers made by the 
two sides, encourages parties to enter into arbitration with a reasonable offer that 
has a high likelihood of being deemed acceptable.  
The attractiveness of arbitration resides in its lower cost as compared to litigation. 
Nevertheless, unlike an arbitrator, the judicial system has the authority to declare 
that a patent is invalid. Such a decision produces a positive externality for other 
standard implementers who no longer have to bear licensing costs or judicial fees 
to seek invalidation of the patent themselves. The possibility that the failure to 
agree on licensing terms may result in invalidation of a patent furthermore 
                                           
221  Ericsson v D- Link, Case no. 6:10-CV-473, Memorandum Opinion and Order (August 6, 
2013), at *50.  
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exercises downward pressure on royalty requests in bilateral licensing 
negotiations (Choi & Gerlach, 2015). Gupta et al. (2015) argue that the possibility 
of patent invalidation through courts creates an inverse Cournot effect, by which 
a patent holder may lower its rates to force other patent owners to also lower 
their rates or else to face the risk of litigation. It is thus not clear that proposals 
making arbitration mandatory and restricting access to litigation would result in 
lower royalties and more efficient licensing negotiations. 
Overall, the analysis of any instrument designed to reduce the vagueness 
inherent to the FRAND commitment must take into account the different roles of 
adjudication, arbitration and bilateral negotiation. In this light, it is thus not 
necessarily a symptom of failure if judges are not put in the position to determine 
the unique FRAND rate in a case of dispute. Courts are not necessarily the best 
place to determine prices, and their intervention should be limited to the cases in 
which bilateral negotiation has failed. The trend to increasing sophistication in the 
methodologies used by courts bears the risk to increasingly shift the burden of 
price determination on the judicial system, and to crowd out the necessary 
contributions of the disputing parties to market-driven instruments of price 
determination. For very similar reasons, Larouche et al. (2014) argue that 
mandatory arbitration does not support clarity in the SEP licensing market, 
because it risks undermining the incentives of parties to invest resources in the 
process of complex bilateral negotiations. 
 
4.2.2.2.  The role of injunctions in the FRAND determination 
In addition to determining royalty rates, courts can grant SEP owners injunctive 
relief. The availability of injunctive relief crucially determines the incentives of the 
different parties to actively participate in licensing negotiations. On the one hand, 
if SEP owners can obtain injunctions against willing licensees, they may be in the 
position to force standard implementers into licensing agreements, which exceed 
the boundaries of the FRAND range. On the other hand, placing systematic and 
strong restrictions on the availability of injunctive relief may undermine the 
incentives of standard implementers to enter into licensing negotiations. 
The availability of injunction turns out to be pivotal in the hold-up versus hold-out 
controversy. Jacob (2013) argues for instance that the stance of competition 
authorities vis-à-vis the grant of injunctions on SEPs breaches the right of the 
patent holder’s access to the courts, and necessarily invites implementers to 
engage in hold-out.  
Several theoretical papers aim to shed light on this issue by modelling FRAND 
negotiations "in the shadow" of patent litigation (Langus et al., 2013; Ratliff & 
Rubinfeld, 2013; Choi, 2014). All papers share the same premises that litigation 
starts when a first offer of royalty rate is rejected by one of the parties, and that 
the task of the court is then to determine what is the FRAND royalty rate. 
However, they use different assumptions regarding the initial proponent and the 
availability of injunction at subsequent litigation stages, leading to different 
results in support of either a hold-up or a hold-out effect. Comparing the different 
mechanisms at play is therefore useful to better figure out how the threat of 
injunction may influence the outcome of FRAND negotiation. 
 Langus et al. (2013) posit that it is the implementer who makes the initial 
offer. They also assume that the implementer has a second chance to offer a 
FRAND rate in case the court deems the first offer non-FRAND, so that 
injunction becomes available only if the court believes that the second offer 
too is not FRAND. As a result, Langus et al. conclude that the litigation 
process favors the implementer and that "hold-out" is likely to occur in 
equilibrium. 
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 Ratliff & Rubinfeld (2013) posit that the SEP holder makes a first offer. If the 
implementer rejects that offer, the court has to determine a FRAND rate. The 
implementer has then the option to accept or reject the FRAND rate 
determined by the court, and injunction becomes available only if she chooses 
to reject. As a result, the implementer has nothing to lose by refusing the 
initial offer, which confers her with an unfair advantage in negotiation. Indeed, 
litigation creates an option either to accept the initial offer (if that offer is 
deemed FRAND by the court) or to benefit of a lower rate determined by the 
court (if the initial offer is deemed excessive by the court), and the threat of 
injunction is never activated in practice. 
 Choi (2014) similarly assumes that the SEP owner makes the initial offer, and 
that a rejection by the implementer triggers litigation. However, a key 
difference with Ratliff & Rubinfeld (2013) is that injunction becomes directly 
available if the court considers that the initial offer was FRAND. Choi (2014) 
moreover assumes that the court's decision on FRAND is not fully predictable, 
so that a rejection of the initial offer necessarily generates a potential 
injunction threat. He concludes that this threat systematically tips the balance 
of bargaining power towards the SEP owner, and therefore advises that the 
court be more lenient towards implementers when considering injunction, 
especially when it is less able to assess the FRAND rate precisely. 
Some scholars (Scott-Morton & Shapiro, 2015) and the FTC (2011) argue that 
even without a threat of injunction, the rules guiding the judicial determination of 
the FRAND royalty rate in the US could be sufficient to deter hold-out. Their 
argument is that a court is supposed to consider the litigated patent as valid and 
infringed when it sets the "patent damages royalty rate", while the likelihood of 
invalidation and/or rejection of the infringement claims would be taken into 
account in the context of an ex ante FRAND negotiation, thereby leading to a 
lower negotiated FRAND royalty rate. As a result, "a target firm that refuses to 
pay a FRAND rate bears the risk that it will pay a much higher patent damages 
royalty rate if the patent is ruled valid and infringed" (Scott-Morton & Shapiro, 
2015). 
This view however requires that courts be well equipped to determine a FRAND 
royalty rate in a specific case of dispute. If the royalty rates determined by courts 
do not accurately reflect the royalty rates that would have resulted from a 
bilateral negotiation, there is a risk that judicial determination crowds out 
bilateral negotiation as the principal forum for determining royalty rates. The 
alternative is to specify the conditions under which a standard implementer is 
deemed unwilling to contribute to the success of bilateral licensing negotiations, 
and to preserve SEP owners’ access to injunctive relief in these - and only these - 
cases. This approach limits the participation of courts in the costly activity of price 
determination, and strengthens the incentives of parties to negotiate an 
agreement. 
 
4.2.3.  Divergent approaches in the implementation of FRAND 
4.2.3.1.  United States 
Over the past few years, US courts across various jurisdictions have increasingly 
dealt with the definition of FRAND within the context of patent litigation and the 
calculation of damages. If a FRAND agreement is construed as an enforceable 
contract, and the litigation continues to a final judgment, the court may be asked 
to determine a reasonable royalty under the contract. Patent law inherently gives 
patent owners a right to exclude others from practicing their invention, so when a 
court determines that an injunction is not appropriate but the non-owner was 
infringing the patent, the court may set an ongoing royalty rate to provide a 
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reasonable compensation to a patentee who has thus given up his right to 
exclude the infringer from practicing the patent.222 
Our comparative case law analysis under Part 3 has demonstrated that, despite 
an emerging consistent approach to the definition of FRAND, this definition does 
not often provide sufficient guidance for the determination of actual royalty rates 
in specific disputes. The US courts have therefore developed additional 
methodologies and evidentiary rules for the determination of single FRAND rates, 
which either appear competing or have not always been applied with the same 
consistency. Various commentators have reviewed the respective methodologies 
in order to inform theory, practice and policy around their possible implications on 
price competition and the efficiency of the standardization process (e.g., 
Contreras, 2013; Layne-Farrar & Wong-Ervin, 2014).  
In particular, the outcome of FRAND disputes in the US has been significantly 
determined by rules restricting both the choice of the royalty base and the 
selection criteria for comparable licenses. Rules or concepts such as the Entire 
Market Value Rule (EMVR) or the Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Unit 
(SSPPU) have neither been specifically developed for FRAND cases nor do they 
have a clear link to the theoretical analysis of FRAND. The application of such 
restrictive evidentiary rules in the context of FRAND litigation is used to limit the 
number of accepted criteria for the determination of a FRAND rate, thereby 
significantly shrinking the FRAND range and – with it – the scope for 
disagreement on a rate. In the previous sections, we have examined in depth the 
prevalent methodologies in court practice and suggested a consistent framework 
regarding the application of the different concepts. At the same time, however, 
we have demonstrated that the application of these concepts may often be at 
odds with an economically consistent implementation of FRAND. In practice, the 
implementation of the suggested framework encounters significant challenges: i) 
the determination of a FRAND rate involves a complex analysis of counterfactual 
outcomes; ii) it requires substantial empirical data, which is often difficult to 
produce and provides only limited or partial information on the FRAND range; and 
iii) even if there is reliable and conclusive information on the FRAND range, these 
concepts fail to determine a single specific rate. In other words, there is no 
commonly accepted methodology to single out a unique rate from this potentially 
very wide range.  
 
4.2.3.2.  Europe 
Most FRAND cases before the European courts are cases where the SEP holders 
sue the infringing party for injunctive relief in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) while patent infringement and, 
possibly, validity proceedings are pending – either as part of the same procedure 
or separately due to bifurcation such as the German legal system. Because 
FRAND dispute and patent dispute may have to run in parallel, damage claims in 
European FRAND cases are rare or the court will refuse to adjudicate on the 
matter while validity is being challenged. Against this background, bringing both a 
FRAND and a validity dispute to the courts may have significant strategic 
implications for the potential licensee; if the patent is declared valid, its 
bargaining position in the FRAND negotiations is weakened against a strong 
patent and comprised against other licensees who have accepted a FRAND offer 
from the patent holder.  
In any case, the European legal system does not foresee a unilateral cause of 
action to ask a court to set the FRAND rate for an SEP (or a patent portfolio). 
                                           
222  Paice LLC v Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620 at 624 (E.D. Tex. 2009). 
 156 
Hence, the national courts do not deal with questions around the incremental 
value rule in determining FRAND rates; whether methodologies for determining 
FRAND royalty rates or damages must take into account concerns about patent 
hold-up and royalty stacking; and whether the appropriate royalty base is limited 
to the SSPPU. Market conditions as well as substantive law issues equally account 
for the limited case law on FRAND licensing in Europe: There is no harmonized 
approach with regards to the nature and enforceability of FRAND commitments. 
For instance, German and Dutch law regard FRAND commitments as a merely 
pre-contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith, and it is not clear which law 
should apply (OECD, 2014).  
In the aftermath of the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) in the case Huawei v. ZTE, which provided guidance to SEP holders that 
seek injunctive relief in order to avoid abuse of their dominant position, automatic 
injunctions without further examination of the parties’ conduct during 
negotiations are no longer the norm in the national jurisdictions. Given that the 
CJEU has not provided any guidance on how FRAND royalties should be 
determined, the question arises - where injunctions are denied - whether national 
courts may impose FRAND royalties for damages and which methodology they 
should apply. Here, useful benchmarks such as comparable licenses, the 
technological and economic importance of the invention, the interaction between 
royalty base and rate amount and sales volume are used as valuable-establishing 
factors that influence the amount of the rate (see, for an overview, Harguth & 
Carlson, 2011). 
Regarding the particularities of German litigation, Judge Kühnen (2017) of the 
Düsseldorf Court of Appeal examines the nexus of IP and antitrust law in the 
context of FRAND, walks us through the negotiation framework and highlights the 
implications of the parties’ conduct on the outcome of the infringement 
proceedings. He also offers guidance to the courts regarding the calculation of 
FRAND royalties. Below are some important takeaways of his analysis:  
 The SEP holder is obliged to offer a license on FRAND terms prior to 
seeking injunctive relief. This offer has to be concrete and substantiated to 
the extent required by the circumstances of the individual case. The 
FRAND terms would have to be determined in writing by the SEP holder 
(when making the offer) and include a specific license rate as well as any 
other terms that are customary in the industry. It is incumbent on the SEP 
holder to establish that its offer is FRAND. This may require disclosure of 
existing licenses and other confidential information. If the SEP holder 
initiates infringement proceedings prior to the FRAND offer, it may have its 
injunction request rejected or be confronted with a suspension of the 
proceedings and a temporary loss of its right to injunctions.  
 
 Prior to infringement proceedings – and once alerted about a possible 
infringement - the alleged infringer has to declare its willingness to receive 
a license offer; the declaration of willingness may be a general one and 
does not have to specify the licensing terms. The declaration must not 
contain conditions, which are not FRAND-compliant. If the SEP holder does 
not respond to this declaration with a concrete offer or its offer is not 
FRAND, conduct will be deemed abusive and the court will deny 
injunctions. Should the SEP holder respond with a FRAND offer, the 
alleged infringer is obliged to either accept that offer or to respond with a 
counteroffer on FRAND terms – or otherwise lose its right to successfully 
raise a FRAND defense. Throughout the negotiations, the alleged infringer 
maintains its right to challenge the validity/essentiality of the patent at 
issue or ask for a declaration of non-infringement. Neither side may 
engage in delaying tactics. 
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 The purpose of determining a FRAND royalty is not to provide an adequate 
compensation to the SEP owner for the use of its patents, but to achieve a 
balance of interests. The court may use different methodologies for the 
royalty calculation such as cost-benefit analysis or comparable licenses. In 
the absence of comparable licenses, the court has to rely on the data 
points and market-related information provided by the parties in support 
of the proposed rates. Judge Kühnen cites concrete examples for the 
calculation of royalty rates as well as the apportionment of value for an 
SEP portfolio; factors relevant for this “undocumented” (“vorlagenfrei”) 
calculation are the number of SEPs/non-SEPs, the various degrees to 
which the underlying technology drives the sales of the end-product (“first 
class”, “second class”, non-practiced bundles with defensive use), 
essentiality and sales data. Albeit not binding, the calculation examples 
include a ceiling cap of about 1/3 of the net selling price of the highest-
priced standard-compliant product and apportion a higher share of the 
total royalties for “first-class” SEPs as opposed to the merely nominal 
royalties apportioned for “second-class” SEPs. Irrespective of the chosen 
methodology, the ultimate purpose of the royalty calculation is not to 
achieve mathematical accuracy, but an approximation based on certain 
values and estimates for the sake of procedural efficiency. 
 
 From an evidentiary standpoint, the burden of proof on the SEP holder 
becomes fact-intensive as it shifts from a mere submission of comparable 
licenses to a long list of measuring points, e.g., number of SEPs owned, 
ratio between “first class” and “second class” patents, share of the overall 
SEPs needed for a given product its portfolio represents etc. 
Although most scholars believe it fairly improbable that German courts would 
imminently adopt novel arguments or develop certain methodologies on FRAND, 
the impact of CJEU jurisprudence as well as the emerging parallel litigation in the 
UK and Germany mark a trajectory from established previous positions to 
possible adjustments dictated by the evolving SEP landscape. Nevertheless, 
European jurisdictions are expected to refrain from adopting the methodological 
view of their US counterparts, leaving the actual determination of FRAND rates to 
the parties: Instead of developing tools that allow courts to specify royalty rates, 
European judges opt for a set of conditions that assess the FRAND-compliance of 
the licensing parties during the conduct of negotiations. In particular, courts 
evaluate whether an SEP owner made a specific, written offer for a royalty rate, 
whether the alleged infringer’s counteroffer took place in a timely manner, or 
whether an implementer who refused a patent holder’s licensing offer 
demonstrated that he would readily enter into an acceptable licensing agreement 
(e.g., by paying accruing royalties into escrow). Courts in Korea and Japan follow 
a similar approach.223 
The converging practice to tie the grant of an injunctive relief to the conduct of 
both parties places emphasis on the good faith negotiations toward an actual 
result over the initial offer. Admittedly, the willingness of the parties and the 
conditions under which bilateral negotiations take place are subject to an evolving 
body of case law and it remains to be seen whether a unified framework will 
ultimately emerge. Nevertheless, this approach is flexible enough to allow for a 
wide span of licensing terms that pass the FRAND test, so that courts may shift 
                                           
223  Seoul Central District Court, August 24, 2012, Case no. 2011 GaHap 39552, Samsung 
Electronics Co., Ltd. v Apple Korea Ltd; Apple v Samsung, Japanese IP High Court, 
Decision of May 16, 2014, Case No. 2013[Ne] 10043. This is an appeal case from the 
judgment of Tokyo District Court, February 28, 2013 [Case No. 2011 [Wa] 38969].  
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focus more towards the FRAND-compliance of the parties’ conduct during the 
negotiations rather than the actual outcome. In this respect, the fact that the 
implementation of FRAND does not lead to a unique royalty rate does not mean 
that it is void of legal content. On the contrary: the said approach recognizes that 
the idea of FRAND as a range also accommodates different interpretations 
regarding its economic function, allowing the parties to determine and 
substantiate the respectively proposed rates based on objective criteria.  
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5. PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1.  PREMISES FOR POLICY ACTION 
Based on the comprehensive overview of SEP licensing terms and the underlying 
legal and economic considerations we have laid out in the previous sections, we 
have carved out the following policy-relevant aspects of FRAND: 
 
FRAND is a range 
The theoretical concepts behind FRAND and the empirical data that is available to 
determine FRAND rates for specific patents and products merely allow for the 
determination of a (potentially wide) FRAND range – not a unique FRAND rate. 
The FRAND commitment does not determine future licensing rates that will be 
negotiated between patent holders and standard implementers with scientific 
precision.  
Many commentators see this inherent “vagueness” of FRAND as a weakness. 
There are several proposals to replace the allegedly “vague” FRAND commitment 
with more specific obligations. Lerner & Tirole (2014, 2015) suggest replacing 
FRAND commitments with more explicit royalty caps to be announced before a 
standard is set. They argue that SDOs will not provide such policies 
spontaneously, given that SDOs are competing to attract the owners of valuable 
patented technologies. The authors thus argue that government intervention is 
required to promote policies with pre-announced royalty caps. Rysman & Simcoe 
(2011) propose a very different institutional framework, which they call Non-
Assertion After a Specified Time (NAAST). In their proposal, patent owners 
commit to no longer enforcing their SEPs after an initial phase in which they are 
free to charge any royalty they want. According to the authors, their proposal 
reduces uncertainty and reliance on litigation, while preserving the balance 
between the interests of patent owners and implementers.  
In practice, explicit royalty caps or ex ante disclosure of the most restrictive 
licensing terms play only a limited role in the current landscape for SEP licensing. 
FRAND continues to be by far the most important regulatory instrument, and 
policies allowing or requiring more explicit commitments complement rather than 
replace the role of FRAND. Future policies for SEP licensing will probably continue 
to provide an important framework for FRAND commitments. Further developing 
FRAND as a regulatory instrument for the future of SEP licensing requires that we 
understand and acknowledge that FRAND, by design and by necessity, defines a 
range - not a rate. 
 
FRAND is a range that accommodates various approaches regarding its 
legal nature 
There are two prevalent views on the legal nature of FRAND obligations: 
contractual and antitrust. From a contract law perspective, the courts regard 
FRAND as an incomplete contract or preliminary commitment with third party 
beneficiaries. The prevalent view here is that the FRAND commitment creates an 
obligation for the SEP owner to offer every potential implementer the right to use 
the patented technology on reasonable conditions that are negotiated in good 
faith. This interpretation leaves room for a wide span of licensing terms that are 
compliant with the FRAND obligation, so that courts may shift their focus more 
towards the parties’ FRAND compliance during the negotiations rather than 
towards the outcome. From an antitrust perspective, there can be two different 
approaches to FRAND:  
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a) The enforcement of the FRAND obligation can be seen as a remedy to the 
competitive harm that could result from the horizontal agreement through 
standard setting. In this case, the FRAND obligation can be interpreted as a 
commitment of the SEP owner to a specific conduct, which will be specified by 
courts and antitrust authorities over time. At this point, it is worth highlighting 
that there is no clear definition of conduct remedies in EU Competition Law or the 
respective laws of the Member States. As opposed to antitrust sanctions and 
damages, the topic of competition law remedies has gone largely unexplored by 
legal and economic literature;  
b) A common interpretation in the context of antitrust ties the FRAND obligations 
to antimonopoly law or, in the EU context, to Art. 102, Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU). Following this interpretation, non-compliance with 
FRAND equals an abuse of a dominant position. In this case, FRAND allows for a 
potentially wide range of behaviors and terms that are non-abusive without any 
rate specifications. 
 
FRAND is a range that accommodates different approaches regarding its 
economic function  
In the economic literature, two approaches stand out:  
a) In search of a welfare-maximizing royalty rate, economists establish that the 
primary purpose of FRAND is to provide optimal incentives to both developers and 
implementers. The idea behind this interpretation is that the SSOs select their IPR 
policies with a view to maximizing the value of their standards;  
b) The second approach analyzes FRAND as a response to specific market failures 
resulting from complementarity (royalty stacking) or incomplete contracts (hold-
up). In this regard, the role of the economist is to analyze the counterfactual 
royalty rate that would have resulted if the licensing process had been perfectly 
competitive. As we have shown in the analytical framework above, both views 
converge: neither the concept of FRAND as welfare-maximizing nor the concept of 
FRAND as restoring competitive price setting define a unique FRAND rate.  
 
The determination of the FRAND range is challenging and often error-
prone 
The boundaries of the FRAND range are determined by a comparison of factual 
data with counterfactual equilibria such as the development of an alternative 
standard not including the patented feature, alternative uses of the standard, etc. 
Important aspects of these counterfactual scenarios that are crucial for FRAND 
definition are not fully determined without adding further assumptions, e.g., 
regarding the nature of the competitive process between features in the process 
of standard development. Available data such as product market prices and 
comparable licenses can provide some information on the upper bounds of the 
range (product market prices) or some individual points out of the wider range of 
acceptable agreements (comparable licenses) only, but they neither reveal the 
entire FRAND range nor identify a single FRAND rate. In order to arrive at a single 
FRAND rate, courts have developed evidentiary rules that place restrictions on the 
methodologies that can be used for calculating FRAND rates (e.g., EMVR, SSPPU, 
restrictions on comparable licenses), but they are often at odds with the 
principles of FRAND. 
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There are limits to what courts can do or should be expected to do 
Evidentiary rules and sophisticated methodologies developed by the US courts for 
the calculation of FRAND royalties are not particularly useful in the European 
context. These tools are designed to assist the US courts in determining a single 
FRAND rate. In contrast, in the context of injunctions, European courts have 
focused on defining the conditions under which the conduct of the negotiating 
parties is incompatible with their FRAND obligations. The increased reliance of 
firms on the judicial system for the determination of FRAND rates risks 
undermining their incentives to agree the price of intellectual property through 
bilateral negotiations. The judicially defined rates are generally based on 1) the 
prices of infringing components, which may bear little information on the value of 
the technology, and 2) comparable licenses that reflect the parties’ assumptions 
regarding the outcome of litigation rather than their valuation of the patented 
technology. It’s hard to imagine that substantial methodological progress could be 
made starting from these premises. An economically sound approach is only 
possible once it is recognized that the ex ante-driven methodological challenges 
that courts need to overcome to determine ex post an appropriate royalty rate 
are simply overwhelming.  
Against this background, policies that support market mechanisms and conditions 
conducive to bilateral negotiations and their proper conduct as early on as 
possible can enhance clarity around the definition of FRAND and restore legal 
certainty in the field of SEPs. 
 
5.2.  SEP LICENSING IN THE EUROPEAN POLICY 
FRAMEWORK 
5.2.1.  FRAND as a strategic lever – impact of SEP licensing on 
incentives 
Recent court and antitrust decisions around the world, including the reforms 
currently taking place in Asia in the field of standardization and antitrust, are 
shaping the global landscape of SEP licensing and the meaning of FRAND. The 
principles and economic guideposts underlying these decisions are finding their 
way into the strategic and tactical decisions of SEP holders and implementers, 
rewriting the “playbook” for conducting negotiations and establishing FRAND 
terms in view of the evolving legal, regulatory and economic perspective. The 
benchmarks and clarity provided by courts and antitrust authorities, coupled with 
the evolving practices of privateers and non-practicing entities, put pressure on 
innovators and implementers to reassess the potential gains and risks of their 
standardization strategies and current business models. Also, the various 
approaches to, and divergent outcomes of, FRAND disputes across national 
jurisdictions worldwide – due not so much to fundamental disparities on what 
constitutes FRAND as to differences in litigation profiles, competition dynamics 
and political priorities – have a significant impact on the incentives to innovate, 
implement and participate in standard setting.  
The interpretation of SEP-licensing terms in the context of FRAND adjudication, 
related evidentiary challenges, antitrust actions and legislative reforms must be 
taken into account, namely:  
1. considerations of patent hold-up/hold-out  
2. ex ante framework of the hypothetical negotiation 
3. value of the patented technology prior to standardization  
4. incremental value of the technology 
5. existing next-best alternatives  
6. choice of royalty base  
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7. assumptions of essentiality, validity and infringement  
8. threat and predictability of injunctive relief 
9. willingness of the parties to negotiate in good faith  
10. legal standard of proof and the type of evidence required in the 
proceedings 
11. regulatory framework pertaining to business practices by non-practicing 
entities and portfolio bundling.  
The above aspects have a major, cumulative impact on a wide range of 
interlocking strategic, financial and tactical decisions for innovators and 
implementers along the value chain (both roles are often assumed by the same 
firm), namely: 
1. Positioning the firm in the market, exclusively, by focusing either on the 
development or the implementation of standard-related technology or, 
vertically, by expanding activities along large portions of the supply chain 
from R&D over to manufacturing and distribution of downstream products as 
way to avoid the hold-up problem; 
2. Developing technical solutions related to a specific standard, e.g., 4G or 5G 
WiFi standards or chip components, that is both essential to the functioning 
and interconnectivity of a wide range of devices as well as decisive for 
customer demand; 
3. Deciding on timing and cost of R&D/implementation investments as a way of 
mitigating losses and regulating bargaining power – also through the lens of 
the ex ante benchmarks of the hypothetical negotiation; 
4. Participating and collaborating with other firms in the context of 
standardization as a way of controlling lock-in effects and competing 
alternatives. The decision to refrain from participating in the collaborative 
process or even withdraw entirely the membership from a given SDO in view 
of changes in the IPR policy that reframe the terms of FRAND is also a method 
that allows firms with unique market positions and long-established licensing 
practices to mitigate additional uncertainty tied to the interpretation of the 
new rules by various stakeholders. The decision may also be based on other 
motives such as directing the standard development towards technological 
solutions where the respective companies are strong and can offer specific 
services or infrastructure; 
5. Deciding on quality, scope and cost of patenting activities as a way of 
increasing IPR leverage and the strength of patent portfolios; 
6. Attending to patent quality and the technical superiority of the patented 
solution over prior art increases the impact of the stand-alone value of the 
SEP on the bargaining range and renders patent portfolios less vulnerable to 
validity and infringement challenges; 
7. Deciding on the timing and scope of ex ante disclosure along the lines of the 
IPR policies of the respective SDO as a way of balancing the burdens 
(frequent patent reviews in connection with standards in which the participant 
has no interest) with the benefits (desire to participate in the development of 
only some of the standards that the SDO creates) associated with 
participation in a given SDO. The scope of ex ante disclosure pertaining, e.g., 
to patent applications, patent claims versus whole patents, patent transfers 
etc., is intended to inform working groups and potential implementers about 
the potential patent landscape of various technical directions, and to enable 
them to assess the advisability of working around patent-heavy approaches. 
In the case of FRAND-encumbered standard-essential patents, the prescribed 
or voluntary choice on the scope of disclosure has important ramifications 
beyond the standardization context – especially with regards to the 
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informational value of the disclosed information for the negotiation and, later, 
litigation process; 
8. Declaring essentiality and specifying the timing and scope of licensing 
commitments by performing portfolio reviews/business analysis, identifying 
SEPs with increased licensing potential and evaluating the adoption of various 
licensing schemes for different SEPs. In the case a SEP holder decides to 
license on FRAND terms, it will do so in full awareness that respective 
commitments will set the FRAND-encumbered patents apart from the firm’s 
other IP assets in terms of market, competition, licensing and litigation 
impact; 
9. Deciding on the starting date and conduct of the negotiations of SEP licensing 
as a way of establishing “willingness” and control leverage and costs during 
the bargaining process early on. The effects of the CJEU decision Huawei v. 
ZTE on the requirements of what constitutes willingness to negotiate in good 
faith establish a more balanced distribution of the burden of proof between 
the negotiating parties. This conditions their approach to injunctive relief, 
delaying tactics and unsubstantiated FRAND offers/counteroffers;  
10. Deciding whether to license the SEPs to an ‘Original Equipment Manufacturer 
(OEM)’ or, further downstream, to a physical or internet retailer. In the 
smartphone industry, the licensing point is typically the OEM, namely the 
handset manufacturer, due to the existence of vertically integrated firms with 
strong market presence. On the other hand, innovation specialist firms 
advocate a shift of the licensing point further upstream, namely at the chipset 
level. This would be a way of controlling the apportionment of their SEPs in 
the context of the incremental value rule or the SSPPU choice of royalty base 
and also to strengthen their own defenses against an SEP portfolio assertion 
by a third party against the OEM’s products. Shifting the licensing point 
further upstream allows the chipmakers to maintain various licensing 
schemes, depending on the end-products of their downstream clients. 
However, there are practical difficulties attached to the traceability of the 
SSPPU in a wide range of complex devices related to vertical industries 
(transport, health, energy etc.) and the technologies surrounding the Internet 
of Things (IoT); 
11. Outsourcing licensing activities or transferring patent portfolios of bundled 
SEPs to non-practicing entities as a way of controlling costs, efficiencies and 
patent hold-out. The threat of patent hold-out is said to increase the pressure 
on market leading innovators to delegate their licensing activities to 
privateers. This could be more likely in markets where competition is strong 
than in markets characterized by increased concentration with limited risk of 
implementers seeking to exploit market weaknesses or holding out 
commercial rivals; 
12. Balancing the costs associated with the length and possible outcome of SEP 
litigation over potential profits from downstream products before resorting to 
third-party adjudication or (forcibly) bringing negotiations to a conclusion 
through settlement; 
13. Deciding where and when to litigate based on the predictability of favourable 
outcomes (forum shopping); 
14. Adjusting world-wide licensing, pricing and bundling practices in view of 
regulatory restrictions and frequency of antitrust investigations across various 
jurisdictions. 
Obviously, in light of the evolving case law around the meaning of FRAND and the 
highly dynamic character of the SEP markets, it is still early to talk of legal 
certainty or fully assess the impact of SEP licensing on incentives and firm 
strategy. Equally there is a number of open questions in the legal and economic 
literature about the effect of an active market for patents on incentives for 
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investment, litigation, and standard-setting. However, the added value of the 
above considerations lies in our ability to develop a full understanding of the 
interdependencies of the licensing terms as well as the underlying trade-offs - 
with the ultimate purpose of capturing the critical policy components inherent to 
the legal and economic analysis of FRAND. 
 
5.2.2.  FRAND as a regulatory lever – policy recommendations 
at the European level 
The objectives set out in Horizon 2020, the EU Competition Rules on Horizontal 
Cooperation Agreements, the Digital Single Market Strategy and other initiatives 
converge into a single agenda: fuel and support innovation in its dual function as 
a private and public good, from the development and implementation stage up to 
manufacturing and the use of the embedded technology by millions (as in the 
case of ICT). The aim to ensure incentive compatibility of related programs and 
measures while preserving market conditions in healthy competition reveals the 
linkages between case law, economics, licensing practices and policy action. 
Tensions at the interface of standardization, patents and market dynamics have 
sparked a lively debate on the academic frontlines and also the evolution of legal 
reasoning across multiple jurisdictions in the context of SEP litigation and 
antitrust intervention. From a policy perspective, the key issues identified in our 
interdisciplinary analysis of FRAND and the impact of SEP licensing on the vested 
interests among stakeholders can be summarized in the following set of 
recommendations at the European level: 
5.2.2.1.  Incentive-based approach to FRAND  
In view of the unique implications of standard-essential patents for widespread 
innovation, interconnectivity and the maximization of social welfare, the fair 
balance of interests among SEP holders and implementers has become a central 
notion in recent case law and antitrust intervention. To ensure fair licensing 
conditions, the need for a balanced framework for negotiations between right 
holders and implementers of SEPs is advocated in the context of the European 
Digital Single Market (DSM), one of the Commission's ten priorities that aims to 
generate up to EUR 250 billion of additional growth in Europe before 2020. The 
Commission intends, through the DSM, “to boost competitiveness through 
interoperability and standardization. Standardization has an essential role to play 
in increasing interoperability of new technologies within the Digital Single 
Market.” In the digital economy, SEPs are an increasingly important feature in 
standardization and a key element of the business model for many industries 
eager to monetize their investment in research and innovation.  
The understanding of the interlocking incentive structure of FRAND strengthens 
its meaning as a commercially viable percept beyond the mere prevention of 
patent hold-up or the scope of IPR enforcement. In this sense, FRAND is not 
“broken” nor should it be “fixed”. It would be more accurate to say that it needs 
to reflect the current market diversity and dynamics within an enlarged circle of 
stakeholders. The latter confirms that FRAND as a range has been able to 
accommodate various business models while facilitating worldwide access to 
standard-compliant products and services for millions of consumers and 
households. Against this background, innovators deserve market-based financial 
returns as much as implementers deserve market-based licensing terms. 
Economically consistent policymaking should take the incentives of both sides into 
account in order to promote healthy competition at the micro level with beneficial 
impact at the macro level.  
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5.2.2.2.  More clarity on FRAND through a common framework  
FRAND has the potential to control opportunistic behaviour, enhance competition 
and evaluate licensing arrangements under a “reasonable” framework. The 
FRAND principles offer a powerful tool to affect norms on a systemic level. 
At this level, the EU approach can be described as horizontal. In its December 
2010 Horizontal Guidelines, the European Commission states that it is for the 
relevant rights holders to assess for themselves whether their terms, and in 
particular their royalties, comply with their FRAND commitment. In analyzing a 
FRAND commitment, the EC stresses that an assessment of whether royalties are 
unfair or unreasonable should be based on whether a royalty “bears a reasonable 
relationship” to the economic value of the patent or other right. However, the 
Horizontal Guidelines do not address the meanings of “fair”, “reasonable” and 
“non-discriminatory”.  
Greater clarity on the terms of FRAND has been recently provided by the CJEU in 
Huawei v. ZTE to the licensing parties and the courts in the context of injunctions. 
The national courts have followed through and tied the grant of injunctive relief to 
the conditions specified in the Court’s proposed framework. Focusing the FRAND 
analysis on the requirements of willingness in the context of bilateral 
negotiations, the CJEU jurisprudence has paved the way to a common framework 
conducive to negotiations between the licensing parties. Based on the principles 
of FRAND (see above, Section 4.1.), the policy premises (Section 5.1.) and the 
strategic and economic implications of SEP licensing (Section 5.2.1.), informed 
policy action should be designed to deepen and expand that common framework 
by addressing specific types of licensing conduct and clarifying the conditions 
under which FRAND compliance can be excluded or presumed – the devil is in the 
details where FRAND is concerned.  
European policy action should encourage more clarity and flexibility in the 
definition of FRAND. Articulating a common set of criteria and guidelines for 
practice – anchored in a clear definition of FRAND – could facilitate private 
negotiations; enhance due diligence on behalf of the parties; limit the need to 
seek a third-party determination of a FRAND rate and, in the case of litigation, 
help courts set convergent standards while allowing flexibility on a case-by-case 
basis. To that end, policy guidance for the various aspects of FRAND should focus 
on identifying behaviour and rates that clearly fall outside the FRAND scope (i.e., 
define what is not FRAND), rather than supporting economic guideposts and 
evidentiary rules that isolate a single rate. After the courts, antitrust authorities 
play a significant role by sanctioning conduct that is incompatible with firms’ 
patent rights or FRAND obligations.  
However, the implementation of the FRAND range in practice should not aim to 
calculate a single royalty – this has proven to be at odds with economic 
considerations and the diversity of established legal traditions across the various 
jurisdictions. Against this background, the European approach, which ties FRAND 
compliance to the conduct of the negotiating parties, is more likely to result in 
economically efficient royalty rates. It encourages parties to do their due 
diligence, and to negotiate licenses as early as possible by avoiding delaying 
tactics and opportunism. 
The objective of these efforts is not to address the amount of specific royalties, 
which has been the focus of US jurisprudence, or propose specific methodologies 
and constructs in the footsteps of IEEE or the Federal Trade Commission in its 
2011 Report, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies 
with Competition. Instead, they aim to use the court teachings and principles of 
FRAND as a springboard to pre-empt undue leverage, remove unnecessary 
barriers in the market for the licensing of SEPs and, ultimately, shift firm strategy 
from merely aspiring to “win the game” to recalibrating the mind-set for the 
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overall benefit of the system in the long run. There is more to FRAND than royalty 
calculation.  
 
5.2.2.3.  Governance in the 5G markets  
The impact of SEP licensing on the evolution of standardization practices in the 
long run begs the question: who should clarify FRAND? Courts and antitrust 
authorities around the world have done so and, beyond evaluation of the specific 
outcomes, they have induced a certain degree of transparency by adopting 
sophisticated methodologies and other benchmarks for the calculation of FRAND 
royalties in a landscape of imperfect SDO policies and undisclosed licensing 
terms. Moreover, there has been a tendency for large manufacturers to make 
unilateral promises for FRAND licensing to promote transparency and reduce legal 
uncertainty. During the last few years, commercial entities and SDOs have also 
initiated alternative patent licensing methods such as ex ante royalty caps or 
royalty-free arrangements. At the same time, the majority of SDOs avoid specific 
interpretations of FRAND through their statutes and bylaws and emphasize their 
role as a mere platform on which the parties concerned can resolve any 
discrepancies regarding the licensing of standard-essential patents.  
SDOs are encouraged to increase efforts towards a common framework for 
FRAND licensing through enhanced clarity and predictability. Against this 
background, the new IEEE policy provides a more specific interpretation of FRAND 
and assesses specific methodologies of calculating a FRAND rate. By taking a 
stance on these issues, the IEEE addresses the much broader societal, legal, and 
economic impact of standardization thereby redefining to some extent the mission 
of SDOs in the global setting – also with a prospect towards 5G, Internet of 
Things (IoT) and the design of autonomous systems.  
The impact of the IEEE initiative on the governance of standardization is 
significant, even though its counterparts, including major European 
standardization bodies such as CEN, CENELEC and ETSI, have decided to leave 
the determination of FRAND rates to the negotiating parties. In a recent position 
paper, CEN and CENELEC “stress that FRAND has no precise pricing content, but 
instead is a ‘comity device’ designed to promote good faith negotiation between 
patent owners and prospective licensees”; and “do not support initiatives to 
provide guidance on, or impose compliance with, FRAND pricing, valuation and 
rate-setting methodologies.”224 
Nevertheless, the development and deployment of 5G means that SDOs will have 
to work in tandem. In view of the next generation of mobile standards, standard 
setting on a global scale and market-led (rather than business-led) SDO policies 
will determine the success of innovation. Considering the increased influence of 
societal groups and vertical industry players (transportation, life sciences, energy, 
etc.) involved in standard setting, a well-coordinated relationship between 5G 
players and these actors will challenge the governance of standard setting and 
render 5G infrastructure a booster for vertical markets. 
Hence, there is a need for SDO policy coordination in general and for IPR policies 
coordination in particular. Within the European regulatory environment, for 
instance, the competition authorities can use Article 101 TFEU and perhaps Article 
102 TFEU to nudge SDOs to modify their IPR policies in order to, at the very 
least, ensure intra-technology or intra-standard competition in products 
implementing an SDO’s standards (OECD, 2014; Bekkers et al., 2014). For the 
time being, ETSI has initiated ad hoc consultations in order to gather useful 
                                           
224  http://www.cencenelec.eu/News/Policy_Opinions/PolicyOpinions/EssentialPatents.pdf 
 167 
outcomes for a possible review of its IPR policy. The effort to embed FRAND rules 
the IPR policies of standard-setting organizations could in itself improve the 
standardization process. Timing is, however, important. Increased clarity around 
the meaning of FRAND at the SDO level may enjoy broader acceptance once a 
clearer legal situation has emerged (cf. CRA Report, 2016). 
In this regard, critical issues around SDO governance, including recommended 
policy action, will be at the heart of a new study commissioned by the Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission. A report on this study is due 
to be published in 2018.  
 
 
The IEEE policy change 
IEEE-SA updated its policies in 2015 in order to give some meaning to what may 
constitute a “Reasonable Rate” and also to add clarity to the notion of non-
discrimination, the availability of Prohibitive Orders and permissible demands for 
reciprocal licenses. Being confronted with evidence that its 2007 policy changes 
were overly ambiguous (Karachalios, 2015), the new IEEE rules cap FRAND 
royalties at the ex ante incremental value of the technology in question and 
foresee the calculation of FRAND on the basis of the smallest saleable unit in 
which the patented technology is embedded. Specifically, a “reasonable rate” is 
defined as the appropriate compensation to the patent holder for the practice of 
an essential patent claim excluding the value, if any, resulting from the inclusion 
of that essential patent claim’s technology in the IEEE Standard (network effect of 
the standard). The amendments provide additional clarity by recommending the 
consideration of three non-mandatory factors: 1) the value contributed “to the 
value of the relevant functionality of the smallest saleable Compliant 
Implementation that practices the Essential Patent Claim,” 2) the value 
contributed “in light of the value contributed by all Essential Patent Claims for the 
same IEEE Standard practiced in that [smallest saleable] Compliant 
Implementation,” and 3) “Existing licenses” that “were not obtained under the 
explicit or implicit threat of a Prohibitive Order” and “otherwise sufficiently 
comparable” circumstances and resulting licenses. With this licensing framework, 
IEEE is the first SDO that weighs in on the meaning of FRAND by adjusting 
existing economic and case law doctrines to fit the purpose of its policies to serve 
the broader public good. 
The IEEE approach to the notion of reasonable royalty has been welcomed as 
much as criticized (especially by chip manufacturers with large patent portfolios). 
According to a recent report (CRA Report, 2016), licensors are unanimously 
against an approach of this kind, as they perceive that such rules would limit their 
private right to define commercial policies within the scope of the law. In 
particular, it is perceived that any rule defined at the SDO level might lead to 
effectively lower royalties than would otherwise be rightfully obtainable. In 
contrast, implementers take a far more favourable view on SDO-based FRAND 
policies, as this is viewed as providing some protection against unreasonable 
royalty requests. Both sides, however, acknowledge the difficulty of defining an 
overarching principle that takes into account all the specific contingencies in a 
particular licensing context or does not compromise the flexibility inherent to ex 
post assessments on a case-by-case basis in court. 
Albeit controversial, the updated IEEE policy has the potential to benefit 
competition and consumers by facilitating licensing negotiations, mitigating hold-
up and royalty stacking, and promoting competition among technologies for 
inclusion in standards (US DoJ, Antitrust Division, Letter dated February 2, 2015). 
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5.2.2.4.  Complementing FRAND with other instruments 
Clarifying the legal content of the FRAND obligation is an important step towards 
assisting negotiations on SEP licensing terms. However, the complex issues at the 
interface of IPR and standardization and a proper balance between the interests 
of the manifold parties involved cannot be achieved through a single instrument. 
SDOs and other actors have various means at their disposal to further support 
the bilateral process of licensing negotiations. In particular, SDOs can make a 
significant contribution by increasing patent transparency in standardization 
working groups. According to the outcome of the Public Consultation on Patents 
and Standards held by the Commission from October 2014 to February 2015, 
there is broad support for early patent disclosure during standard setting. 
Transparency enhancing measures of this kind would help SDOs and their 
technical committees make informed choices and notably avoid situations where 
adopted standards cannot be implemented for lack of necessary licenses.  
In addition to requiring IPR disclosure and licensing commitments, several SDOs 
such as IEEE SA and the DVB consortium have adopted policies to encourage 
patent pool formation. Patent pools are often regarded as a promising solution to 
several of the perceived or real market failures in SEP licensing, particularly the 
risk of royalty stacking. Despite the appeal of patent pools from a theoretical 
perspective, their role in the SEP licensing market remains limited (see box 
below). The DVB consortium is also part of a group of SDOs, which specify 
policies for alternative dispute resolution (ADR). These are only few examples 
illustrating that SDO approaches to SEP licensing often involve a complex policy 
mix. 
  
 
Patent pools, a solution to anti-commons and royalty stacking? 
The economic literature consistently recommends the creation of a patent pool as 
a solution to the anti-commons and royalty stacking problems (see, e.g., Shapiro, 
2001; Lerner & Tirole, 2004). Patent pools make it possible for several patent 
owners to offer a single joint license for a bundle of all their essential patents. 
The royalty stream collected by the pool is then split between the pool members 
following a sharing key defined ex ante. The expected benefit is twofold: 
A pool keeps transaction costs down by establishing a one-stop shop for a large 
number of SEPs that relate to the same standard. While the required number of 
licensing contracts under bilateral licensing may be as high as M*N, where M is 
the number of SEP owners and N is the number of implementers, an 
encompassing pool may reduce the number of required contracts to N. 
A pool eliminates the royalty-stacking problem by setting a unique royalty rate for 
the bundle of all essential patents. This royalty rate corresponds to the optimal 
monopoly price that would have been set by a unique licensor if the ownership of 
essential patents had not been fragmented. It is expected to be lower than the 
stack of individual royalty rates, and to generate higher profits for patent owners 
thanks to wider implementation of the standard. 
Because patent pools could also be instrumental in the formation of cartels, their 
creation is subject to regulatory approval by antitrust authorities (Gilbert, 2004; 
Lerner & Tirole, 2004). Competition law requires that independent experts assess 
the pooled patents ex ante, so as to prevent pool members from foreclosing 
competition by tying non-essential patents to the licensed bundle. A 
complementary safeguard mechanism is to allow members to engage in 
independent licensing, so as to screen out collusive patent pools (Lerner & Tirole, 
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2004; Chiao et al., 2007). However, the effectiveness of these screening 
mechanisms remains controversial (due in particular to the difficulty of defining 
essentiality in practice), and some observers argue that pools frequently include 
patents that are not truly essential (Gilbert, 2004). 
Despite their potential benefits, patent pools often fail to emerge in practice. 
Some patent holders may find it difficult to articulate pool membership with their 
business model (Layne-Farrar & Lerner, 2011), and prefer for instance to seek 
bilateral cross-licensing agreements (Bekkers et al., 2014). Individual patent 
owners may also refuse to share the royalty mitigation effort (Aoki & Nagaoka, 
2004; Brenner, 2009), or fail to reach an agreement on a common royalty-
sharing scheme (Lévêque & Ménière, 2008; Peters, 2011). As a consequence, 
patent pools have been created only for a limited number of ICT standards so far. 
For instance, Bekkers et al. (2014) find that little more than 40 patent pools 
related to ICT standards had been created by 2013. Moreover, many patent pools 
actually involve only a few patent owners. Because they cover only a limited 
share of essential patents, these small pools do not effectively address royalty 
stacking. They may even amplify the problem if they are used by a group of small 
patent owners as a more aggressive means of licensing a bundle of minor and/or 
legally weak patents (Bourreau et al., 2015; Choi & Gerlach, 2015). 
 
 
5.2.2.5.  Advocacy at global level 
The incentives that drive today’s ICT markets and the practices of portfolio 
licensing are established globally. In this context, FRAND obligations lie behind 
reasonable access to increasingly important standards related to 5G and Internet 
of Things technologies that amplify the benefits for competition and consumers 
globally. 
Hence, decisions taken at a regional level and isolationist policies with an 
exclusive focus on local economies could disrupt global markets and undermine 
the integrity and reliability of FRAND commitments crucial to innovation. While 
competition and antitrust policies will continue to be shaped at a regional level, 
global advocacy and the ongoing dialogue of European policymakers with their 
counterparts in the US, China and the rest of the world could counteract the 
potentially distortive effects of domestic policies by exploring common ground and 
identifying best practices that safeguard the interests of society as a whole. 
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